S. Hrg. 108-854
THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS
Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-854
The Global Posture Review of Un
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
i OJMEW
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S. Hrg. 108-854
THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS
Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-854
The Global Posture Review of Un
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2005
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER,
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
Virginia, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JACK REED, Rhode Island
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Global Posture Review of United States Military Forces Stationed
Overseas
september 23, 2004
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense 6
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 16
Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States European Com-
mand and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 18
Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander, United States Pacific Command .. 26
LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, Repub-
lic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, Commander, United
States Forces Korea 28
(in)
THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED
OVERSEAS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room SH-
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman)
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Dole,
Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Ben-
jamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc-
tor; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Ben-
jamin L. Rubin, receptionist.
Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Greg-
ory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, pro-
fessional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff
member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J.
Philbin, professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, profes-
sional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic
staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn
N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, pro-
fessional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member;
Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P.
Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W. Florell, Cath-
erine E. Sendak, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, as-
sistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R.
Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to
Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator
Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L.
Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, as-
sistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E.
(l)
Benjamin Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; An-
drew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assist-
ant to Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman WARNER. The committee meets today to receive the
testimony on the Global Posture Review of the United States mili-
tary forces stationed overseas. We welcome our witnesses: Sec-
retary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard Myers, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs; General James Jones, Commander of the
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and
General Leon LaPorte, Commander of United States Forces, Korea.
We welcome each of you.
We are here this afternoon to receive this testimony on the pro-
posed changes to the U.S. global defense posture. One month ago,
August 16 I believe it was, President Bush announced a new plan
for deploying America's Armed Forces, and he stated: "Over the
coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible force,
which means that more of our troops will be stationed and de-
ployed from here at home."
This plan is the result of the administration's comprehensive 3-
year review of America's global force posture — the numbers, types,
locations, and capabilities of U.S. forces around the world. Exten-
sive consultations with our allies and our friends have taken place,
and it was an integral and important part of this plan.
The plan represents the most comprehensive restructuring of
U.S. military forces stationed overseas, currently numbering ap-
proximately over 200,000, since the end of the Korean War. It rep-
resents the final chapter, in my judgment, of this Nation's efforts
to transform our global defense posture away from the outdated
Cold War strategies and missions to better meet today's and tomor-
row's very complex, very different threats to our Nation's security.
Mr. Secretary, I am pleased that you agreed to appear before this
committee on this important matter before Congress adjourns. I
along with Senator Levin and Senator McCain and others thought
it important that you appear here to discuss this significant change
in the U.S. overseas military basing prior to this Congress adjourn-
ing.
Let me take a moment also, Mr. Secretary, to thank you and
General Myers — and you were joined yesterday by Ambassador
Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and General
Abizaid in briefing I think I estimated at one time, almost three-
quarters of the Senate were in room S-407 of the Capitol. It was
a very far-ranging, in-depth discussion of those serious issues con-
fronting us today. There was ample opportunity for questions and
exchange of views from many of those Senators who were present,
and I think personally it was one of the better meetings that we
have had in some time.
Today we are returning again to this subject. I want to also
pause for a moment to pay tribute to the Prime Minister of Iraq,
Mr. Allawi. He is the head of the Interim Iraqi Government, and
I was privileged to join some others here just moments ago to have
a smaller meeting with him. He provided the world with a power-
ful, moving speech of optimism about a nation and a people yearn-
ing to be free.
Prime Minister Allawi acknowledged the challenges ahead, but
showed the determination of the Iraqi people to succeed. They will,
as he said, need our further help and they want our help. They
will, I hope, Mr. Secretary and others, they will have our help. I
think our President has made that very clear.
To those who feel things have not gone well in Iraq, Prime Min-
ister Allawi had the following reassuring words, and I quote him:
"We are succeeding in Iraq and will take a giant step forward with
free and fair elections in January."
The subject of this hearing, however, is the Global Posture Re-
view. In the course of your delivery of testimony, I hope the wit-
nesses will touch on at least some of these issues: How will the pro-
posed changes to the U.S. global force posture strengthen — under-
line, "strengthen" — our U.S. national security? What will be the im-
pact of the proposed force structure changes on our ability to carry
out contingency operations in a more efficient and expeditious man-
ner wherever necessary on the globe? How will the proposed
changes affect U.S. relations, commitments, and treaty obligations
with our longstanding allies and our friends, and particularly some
of the new nations that have long wanted to break the bonds of the
Warsaw Pact and join the free world? Given that consultations
with other nations was an important part of this plan, what is the
status of the negotiations with our allies and friends under this
program?
Further, it is my understanding the changes recommended by
the review will result in the closure of significant numbers of U.S.
facilities overseas and the likely movement of 60,000 to 70,000
military personnel, together with their many family members, from
overseas locations to installations in the United States within the
next decade.
It is also my understanding that the review will in no way cause
a delay or be grounds for a delay in the Base Realignment and Clo-
sure (BRAC) process. I personally feel very strongly that we have
in place a law which sets forth a timetable and I believe it is im-
perative we stay on that timetable, and I hope, Mr. Secretary, you
can provide in your testimony today the basis for us to continue on
that timetable, because there are some challenges before this com-
mittee as we work through the final days of the conference with
the other body and prepare a report for action in both bodies and
a national defense authorization bill to be sent to the President
prior to the adjournment of this Congress.
Finally, this committee takes very seriously its solemn respon-
sibility to provide for the wellbeing of the men and women of the
U.S. Armed Forces. The President has stated that, as a result of
this restructuring, "Our service members will have more time on
the home front, more predictable and fewer moves over their ca-
reer, our military spouses will have fewer job changes, greater sta-
bility, more time for their children to spend with their families at
home." It is a very powerful and reassuring statement to our men
and women in the Armed Forces, and I hope you will provide us
with the facts which underlie the integrity of that statement.
We ask a lot of our men and women in uniform and their fami-
lies, and if this plan leads to an increase in their "quality of life,"
there is a compelling reason for us to support the plan, in my per-
sonal view.
Again, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony.
I now seek the comments of my distinguished ranking member.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you
in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon to discuss the Depart-
ment's global basing strategy, but also to discuss current oper-
ations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand that they have been
informed that that would also be a subject that members will be
asking them about.
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Jones, Admiral
Fargo, General LaPorte, it is good to have all of you here today.
As we meet today, hundreds of thousands of our men and women
in uniform are serving superbly in dangerous and demanding con-
ditions around the globe. Their courage is inspiring and we are im-
mensely proud of their service.
However, the situation in Iraq is far from encouraging and ap-
pears to be worsening. American soldiers and marines continue to
die at the rate of one or two each day and sometimes more. Consid-
erably more are suffering devastating wounds. Casualties among
Iraqis are numbered in the scores on an almost daily basis. Amer-
ican and other contractors are being taken hostage and murdered
in the most brutal fashion.
The lack of security is having a profound effect on reconstruction
and on the effort to establish a stable Iraqi government. In fact, the
administration has requested that billions of dollars be shifted from
reconstruction to security.
The security situation is now such that there are a number of cit-
ies and towns in Iraq where the U.S. and coalition forces do not
go. In the absence of a presence on the ground in places like
Fallujah, which has been taken over by insurgents, the U.S. mili-
tary has resorted to air power to strike safe houses and other
places where intelligence indicates that the insurgents are located,
but which reportedly then results in death and injuries to innocent
Iraqi civilians as well. The result is an even greater lack of support
for U.S. and coalition presence in Iraq and for the Interim Iraqi
Government which supports and relies upon our presence. More-
over, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings are becoming
more and more frequent.
In that context, even Iraqis who would like to cooperate with us
are deterred from doing so and we are then denied the intelligence
that we need to fight the insurgency.
It is difficult to discern a strategy that is being followed for Iraq.
For instance, Marine General Jim Conway publicly criticized the
orders that he received with respect to Fallujah after four U.S. se-
curity contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated. First, he
was ordered to go in and clean out the insurgents, which went
against the Marine Corps strategy of engagement with the civilian
population. Then, after the Marines were halfway to securing the
city and after the loss of many marines, orders were reversed, to
withdraw from the city and turn over control of the city to a local
security force, which quickly lost control.
The chaos in Iraq puts scheduled Iraqi elections at risk. The
United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative for Iraq reported to
the Security Council on September 14 that, "the vicious cycle of vio-
lence," as he put it, "and the lack of security" was undermining the
world body's effort to assist in elections set for January.
This is compounded by the fact that the administration has so
far been unable to convince any country to provide the troops need-
ed to protect the U.N. presence in Iraq. Consequently, a scant 4
months before nationwide elections are to be held, there are only
35 U.N. staff members in Iraq, far short of the 200 required to sup-
port the election.
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is worried by events in
Iraq. The July 2004 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq
reportedly sets out three possible scenarios for Iraq, including a
worst case of developments that could lead to civil war and where
in the best case security will remain tenuous.
This pessimistic estimate would appear to bear out the assess-
ment of former President George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft
in the 1998 book, "A World Transformed," concerning the question
of whether to march to Baghdad in the 1991 Gulf War. They wrote
that, "To occupy Iraq would instantly shatter our coalition, turning
the whole Arab world against us. It would have taken us way be-
yond the imprimatur of international law bestowed by the resolu-
tion of the Security Council." They wrote further that doing so
would commit our soldiers to "urban guerrilla war and plunge that
part of the world into even greater instability and destroy the
credibility we were working so hard to reestablish."
If we insist that things are going just fine or if we pretend, as
the President incredibly enough put it yesterday, that we are deal-
ing with just a "handful of people who are willing to kill," we will
be less willing to search for ways to change the negative dynamic
which has been unleashed in Iraq and we will be less willing to
look for ways to motivate Iraqi factions and leaders and Islamic
countries to become more involved in and willing to take the risks
necessary to build a democratic nation in Iraq.
Surely, unless Iraqis want a democratic nation for themselves as
much as we want it for them, unless they suppress the violent ones
inside their own communities and the terrorists who want to pre-
vent the election in January from happening, our presence would
be more destabilizing than stabilizing.
We also meet today to discuss the Department's proposal to repo-
sition our forces with the goal of further enhancing our capabilities.
When the President announced the outline of these changes a
month ago, he stated that "The new plan will help us fight and win
these wars of the 21st century," and it will reduce the stress on our
troops and our military families, and that the taxpayers will save
money.
These are laudable goals we all share and I certainly hope all
these assertions prove true. But to date the Department has not
shared the details that would allow us to tell whether they are. I
look forward today to getting some of those details. The briefings
we have gotten to date have explained what the Department in-
6
tends to do, but not provided enough information about why, and
have provided virtually no specific information about the impact on
our military capabilities that would result from these moves.
I also hope and expect that we will be informed today on the
overarching military and national security strategies underlying
this plan, on the costs to implement this plan, and on the implica-
tions for our military capability. For example, I hope the Depart-
ment can articulate how these proposals would affect our ability to
respond and carry out missions such as the current ones in Afghan-
istan and Iraq should the need arise in the future.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses today describe how they
believe that the relocation proposals will advance these common ob-
jectives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Levin.
You will recall that when we discussed some weeks ago the need
for this hearing you were strongly urging we have this hearing on
this global strategy, and we did have the opportunity — I realize you
were otherwise engaged — yesterday to hear from the Secretary and
the Chairman and many others extensively on the situation in
Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. We appreciate this opportunity to discuss the work
of some 3-plus years to transform the Department of Defense. I will
abbreviate my remarks and ask that the full statement be put in
the record.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, the full statement of all
witnesses will be placed in today's record.
Secretary RUMSFELD. History is traced by major events. It is im-
portant to learn from them, as we all know. As we look back on
the wars of the last few centuries, we can see some key moments,
turning points, and the statesmen and legislative leaders who
played roles in helping to make the world more secure and helping
freedom spread. I am not certain that our work with this commit-
tee and Congress in carrying out the vision for transforming our
military is one of those milestones, but it could prove to be so, and
indeed it is important that that be the case.
Today I will mention some of the elements of reform, even revo-
lution if you will, that fit under the somewhat pedestrian term of
"transforming." General Jim Jones of the European Command, Ad-
miral Tom Fargo of the Pacific Command, and General Leon
LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, are here today along
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dick Myers, to discuss
these proposals.
Rearranging our global posture is only part of our considerably
broader set of undertakings, essential to transforming our military
into a more agile and more efficient force.
It is said that Abraham Lincoln once equated reorganizing the
Army with bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon. He was,
I suppose, expressing the truth that change is not easy. Yet,
throughout our history Americans have shown a talent for innova-
tion and invention and the providence of finding the right leaders
for the right times. General Ulysses S. Grant made skillful use of
the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to help win the Civil War.
After World War I, visionaries like Billy Mitchell predicted the rise
of air power as critical to future battles and Generals Patton and
Eisenhower's awareness of the importance of the tank and armored
warfare helped prepare for World War II. In Afghanistan our forces
utilized a creative combination of cutting edge satellite technology
and old-time cavalry charges to liberate a country with a minimal
loss of life.
America today remains the world's preeminent military power
because our leaders have properly challenged assumptions and the
status quo, invested in and made use of new technologies, and were
willing to abandon old certainties and strategies when freedom's
defense required it.
The changes we propose to our defense strategies are not precipi-
tous. They are part of a broad strategy that, as this committee
knows, has been in the making and will be implemented over the
next 6, 7, or 8 years. This administration has consulted extensively
with our allies. We have sought the advice of Congress.
But let me set out where we are at this point in the journey. We
have increased the size of the U.S. Army and we are reorganizing
it into more agile, lethal, deployable brigades with enough protec-
tion, fire power, and logistics assets to sustain themselves. We are
retraining and restructuring the active and Reserve components to
achieve a more appropriate distribution of skill sets, to improve the
total force's responsiveness to crisis, and so that individual reserv-
ists and guardsmen will mobilize less often, for shorter periods of
time, and with somewhat more predictability. Already, the Services
have rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces both within and be-
tween the active and Reserve components, and we are projected to
rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.
We are increasing the jointness between the Services. We are im-
proving communications and intelligence activities. We have sig-
nificantly expanded the capabilities and missions of the Special Op-
erations Forces. We have established new commands and restruc-
tured old ones. We are working to maintain a regular review of
plans, challenging our own assumptions, and keeping the plans
fresh and relevant, as they must be in a fast-changing world.
Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing what
are essentially non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up Reserves to
help deal with the global war on terror. We are converting some
of these jobs filled by the uniformed personnel to positions sup-
ported by Department of Defense (DOD) civilians or contractors.
The Department has identified over 50,000 positions to begin con-
version and we plan to carry out this conversion at a rate of about
10,000 positions per year.
So when we talk about changes to our country's global posture,
it is important to look at these changes as part of the broader
transforming of our way of doing things, and one cannot succeed
without the other.
If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so we are
prepared for the challenges of the new century, the newer enemies,
8
and the increasingly lethal weapons we face, it is clear that our ex-
isting arrangements are seriously obsolete. We are still situated in
large part as if little has changed for the last 50 years, as if, for
example, Germany is still bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across
the northern German plain. In South Korea, our troops were vir-
tually frozen in place from where they were when the Korean War
ended in 1953.
So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the way
we will align ourselves in the coming years and decades. A first no-
tion is that our troops should be located in places where they are
wanted, where they are welcomed, and where they are needed. In
some cases, the presence and activities of our forces grate on local
populations and have become an irritant for host governments. A
good example is our massive headquarters in some of the most val-
uable downtown real estate in Seoul, Korea's capital city, long a
sore point for many South Koreans.
In the last few years we have built new relationships with coun-
tries that are central to the fight against extremists in places such
as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, to offer a few examples. We
also have strong partnerships with the newly liberated nations of
Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense to try to work out ar-
rangements with countries that are interested in the presence of
the U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the regions of the
world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future.
A second governing concept is that American troops should be lo-
cated in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Be-
cause U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to engage
extremists on short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to
trouble spots quickly. They are for the most part unlikely to be
fighting where they are stationed. They will have to move and they
will have to be able to be moved.
Yet, over time some host countries and/or their neighbors have
imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our forces. So it
makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal
and support arrangements with our allies and partners where we
might choose to locate, to deploy, or to exercise our troops.
Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable
and flexible. As the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf War was
a stunning victory, but it took 6 months of planning and transport
to summon our fleets and divisions and position them for battle. In
the future we cannot expect to have that kind of time.
Because training and operational readiness are also essential ele-
ments of deterrence, U.S. forces operating abroad must have rea-
sonably unrestricted access to ample training areas. This includes
access across the spectrum of land, sea, and airspace. Host nations
will need to guarantee unfettered access to training areas and air-
space free of encroachment and unreasonable restrictions.
Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced capa-
bilities that allow us to do more with less. In this century, we are
shifting away from a tendency to equate sheer numbers of things —
tanks, troops, bombs, et cetera, with capability. We can, for exam-
ple, attack multiple targets with one sortie rather than requiring
multiple sorties to attack one target. The Navy's response time for
surging combat ships has been shortened to the point that we will
likely not need a full-time carrier strike group present in every
critical region.
As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have developed
plans for a more flexible and effective force posture for the 21st
century. For example, main operating bases in places like Ger-
many, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea will be consolidated but
retained. In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and
naval access to overcome vast distances while bringing additional
naval and air capabilities forward into the region.
In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabili-
ties and strengthened Special Operations Forces, both positioned to
deploy more rapidly to other regions as required.
In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call
"warm facilities" for rotational forces and contingency purposes,
building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Af-
rica and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of
smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access. Of
course, we welcome comments and suggestions as these negotia-
tions with potential host countries proceed.
One additional benefit to the proposed new arrangements is that
they will significantly improve the lives of military families. Over
the coming period of years, we plan to transfer home to American
soil up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000 family members and ci-
vilian employees. In addition, deployments of the future should be
somewhat shorter, families should experience somewhat fewer per-
manent changes of station and thus less disruption in their lives.
A word on the base realignment and closure, or BRAC, process.
The global posture decision process and BRAC are tightly linked.
Indeed, they depend on each other. They both will be critical in-
struments for stability in the lives of service members and their
families and will help provide more predictability in assignments
and rotations.
The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to pro-
vide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input
will allow domestic implications of the Global Posture Review with
forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from
U.S. territory to be accounted for as effectively as possible within
the BRAC decisionmaking process.
Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the U.S.
will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for difficult to
reconstitute assets, to respond to surge needs, and to accommodate
significant force reconstitution as may be necessary, including all
forces based within or outside of the United States.
Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture realign-
ment will stimulate questions, especially in an election year, I sup-
pose. Some ask, for example, will reducing overall force levels in
Korea reduce our ability to come to its defense. General LaPorte
will comment on this in some detail, but in fact our partnership
with the Republic of Korea is a good example of what we hope to
accomplish. The Defense Department has been investing in and
making arrangements for improved capabilities, such as long-range
precision weaponry, to be available on the Korean Peninsula. As a
result, as we are increasingly able to transfer some responsibilities
10
to Korean forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The
combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will
make our defense of Korea stronger than before.
As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is notably different
from what it was 50 years ago, back when South Korea was an im-
poverished and virtually destroyed country. Today South Korea is
an economic powerhouse with a modern military force of 600,000
troops and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 18 times that
of North Korea. Our proposed global force posture initiative will
make it clear that the U.S. and the Republic of Korea are working
together as partners, each bringing important capabilities to our
shared challenges.
Another question is, does realigning our posture send a dan-
gerous message to North Korea about our commitment to the
South? The answer is an emphatic no. We know that sheer num-
bers of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment
or of capability. As I have noted, our capabilities in defending the
Republic of Korea are increasing and they are not decreasing.
One of the members of your committee, Senator Lieberman, said
it well in an interview a few weeks ago. He noted that: "Kim Jong
II is not under any misconceptions. We have enormous power at
sea and in the air and on the ground in the Asian Pacific region
and on the Korean Peninsula, and if he tries to take aggressive ac-
tion against South Koreans he will pay a very heavy price." The
Senator is correct.
Should we have given earlier warning to our allies? In fact, we
have met with officials in foreign governments on a variety of lev-
els on all of these concepts. Secretary Powell and I have spoken
many times with our counterparts abroad, as have our staffs. In
fact, when we issued the Quadrennial Defense Review, as required
by Congress, in September 2001, one of the chapters was on rein-
venting, reorienting the U.S. military global posture. So this is
nothing new.
Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input was
sought before key decisions were made. They understood our global
long-term view and the strategic rationale for conducting the re-
view at this time. Indeed, we have available many very positive
quotes from various foreign countries that are affected by this.
Another question is, if we will be sending more troops home from
theaters in Europe will it weaken our ability to surge quickly to
trouble spots? Actually, the opposite is probably closer to the truth.
Presence is important, but forward stationing does not mean opti-
mal stationing. Forces in Europe, for example, are only closer to
the Middle East if they can deploy rapidly to the south, not if they
have to go north first. If those same forces have to deploy to the
north through the Baltic or North Sea, then to the Atlantic, then
to the Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the
United States.
We also know that our forces will need to move to the fight,
wherever it is. That means that command structures and capabili-
ties must be expeditionary. If there are legal or political restric-
tions on the movement of our troops where they are stationed, the
difficulties in using them quickly multiply.
11
This week I had the privilege of participating in one of our regu-
lar meetings in Washington with the combatant commanders. They
are impressive. Three of them are here. Yesterday we spent 3
hours on the Hill with General Abizaid, as you pointed out, and
Ambassador Negroponte giving every Member of the House and
Senate an opportunity to talk about Iraq.
The individuals are impressive. They follow in the footsteps of
the visionary military leaders of the past. This plan was under-
taken with the benefit of their military advice. One day future gen-
erations will look back at these combatant commanders and the
military leadership of our country with gratitude for what they
have accomplished in the last few years in helping to transform the
Department of Defense and also in the struggle against global ex-
tremists. Our task is to see that one day historians and generations
will look back at what is being done today and what is being ac-
complished and say that our actions, this committee and the De-
partment together, also have helped to make the world more peace-
ful and our military more formidable and our freedom more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
We thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work of some 3 Vi years to trans-
form the Department of Defense.
History is traced by major events. It is important to learn from them. As we look
back now on the wars of the last few centuries, we see the key moments, the turn-
ing points, and the statesmen and legislative leaders who played critical roles in
helping to make our world more secure and allowing freedom to spread.
I am not certain that our work, together with this committee and Congress, in
carrying out the President's vision for transforming of our military is one of those
milestones.
But it could prove to be so.
I hope it is. Indeed, it is important that that be the case.
Today I will mention some of the elements of reform — even revolution — that fit
under the somewhat pedestrian term of "transformation" or "transforming." We all
can look back with some satisfaction on how much has been achieved, and look for-
ward with encouragement, as we seek to do still more.
We meet as the brave men and women in uniform are defending the American
people against those who seek to terrorize and intimidate civilized societies and to
attack our freedoms. The folks in uniform represent the best our country has to
offer. They have not wavered in meeting the tough challenges we face.
While I know the committee agrees that our responsibility is to ensure that they
have the tools they need to fight this war, and a military structure that helps them
win it, we need to do still more.
Rearranging our global posture, the subject of today's hearing, is essential to our
success. General Jim Jones, Admiral Thomas Fargo, and General Leon LaPorte are
here today with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Myers, to dis-
cuss these important proposals.
It is important to note that rearranging our global posture is only part of our con-
siderably broader set of undertakings. What we are doing is changing mindsets and
perspectives.
Essential to this is transforming our military into a more agile, more efficient
force that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric challenges of this new and
uncertain time.
This is a sizable undertaking. It is said that Abraham Lincoln once equated reor-
ganizing the Army with "bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon." He was
expressing the truth that change is not easy.
But history has long warned great nations of the perils of seeking to defend them-
selves by using the successful tactics and strategies of the last war. The French ex-
perienced this with the Maginot Line.
12
Throughout our history, Americans have shown a talent for innovation and inven-
tion, and the providence of finding the right leaders for the times. General Ulysses
S. Grant made skillful use of the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to win the Civil
War. At the turn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the
potency of deterrence and used naval power to project American strength.
After World War I, visionaries like Billy Mitchell predicted the rise of air power
as critical to future battles. Patton and Eisenhower's awareness of the importance
of the tank and armored warfare helped to prepare for World War II.
In Afghanistan, our forces utilized a creative combination of cutting edge satellite
technology and old-time cavalry charges to liberate that country with a minimal loss
of life.
America today remains the world's preeminent military power because our leaders
have properly challenged assumptions and the status quo, invested in and made use
of new technologies, and abandoned old certainties and strategies when freedom's
defense required it. Ours are the military forces that have been on the cutting edge
of new ideas. So we must be today.
Members of the committee, we do not propose changes to our defense strategies
lightly or precipitously. They are part of a broad strategy that, as this committee
knows, has been years in the making. These proposals will take place over the next
6 to 8 years. There will be no grand announcement. This administration has con-
sulted extensively with our allies — new and old — on a multitude of levels, every step
of the way. We have sought the advice of Congress. We recognize that no one has
a monopoly on wisdom.
The course we have charted is not novel or sudden. Key points were designated
by the President, before he was even elected.
In a 1999 speech at the Citadel, then-Governor Bush warned of the rise of terror-
ism, the spread of missile technology, and the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction— a "world of terror and missiles and madmen."
Calling for a "new spirit of innovation," he outlined ambitious goals: "to move be-
yond marginal improvements — to replace existing programs with new technologies
and strategies. Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily
deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project
our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."
Mr. Chairman, I realize these goals are not new to you or to this committee. We
have been working on these changes together for a number of years.
But let me set out where we are at this point of our journey:
• We have increased the size of the U.S. Army and are reorganizing it into
more agile, lethal, and deployable brigades — light enough to move quickly on
short notice, but also with enough protection, firepower, and logistics assets to
sustain themselves;
• We are retraining and restructuring the active and Reserve components to
achieve a more appropriate distribution of skill sets, to improve the total force's
responsiveness to crises, and so that individual reservists and guardsmen will
mobilize less often, for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more pre-
dictability. Already the services have rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces
both within and between the active and Reserve components in 2003, and are
projected to rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.
• We are increasing the jointness between the Services. Instead of simply de-
conflicting the armed services and members of the Intelligence Community we
are integrating them to interact as seamlessly as possible.
• We are improving communications and intelligence activities. This includes,
for example, the development of Space-Based Radar (SBR) to monitor both fixed
and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines and over denied areas, in any kind
of weather. We also are at work on the Transformational Communications Sat-
ellite (TSAT) to provide our joint warfighter with unprecedented communication
capability. To give you an idea of the speed and situational awareness the TSAT
will provide, consider this: transmitting a Global Hawk image over a current
Milstar II, as we do today, takes over 12 minutes. With TSAT it will take less
than a second.
• The Department is constructing three new state-of-the-art guided missile de-
stroyers to patrol the seas; 42 new F/A-18 fighter aircraft to guard the skies;
and new C-17 strategic air lifters, which will improve our ability to move forces
quickly over long distances.
• We have significantly expanded the capabilities and missions of Special Oper-
ations. SOCOM has moved from exclusively a "supporting" command to both a
"supporting" and a "supported" command, with the authority to plan and exe-
cute missions in the global war on terror.
• We have established new commands and restructured old ones:
13
• the Northern Command, dedicated to defending the homeland;
• the Joint Forces Command, to focus on continuing transformation; and
• the Strategic Command, responsible for early warning of and defense
against missile attack, and the conduct of long-range attacks.
• We are working with NATO in an effort to make the Alliance more relevant
and credible in this post-Cold War era, shedding redundant headquarters and
creating a new rapid response force.
• It used to be that operational and contingency plans were developed, then
placed on the shelf for years. We're working to maintain a regular review of
plans, challenging our own assumptions and keeping the plans fresh and rel-
evant.
• The Department is changing its approach to infrastructure and installations.
When the administration arrived, facilities were funded at a rate and level that
reflected an expectation that they would be replaced only every 175 to 200
years. Our goal was and remains to cut it down to a more realistic recapitaliza-
tion rate closer to 70 years.
• We are making progress in changing the culture in the Department and the
military from one of "risk avoidance" to one that rewards achievement and inno-
vation.
Let me mention another example of an activity underway that on its own may
seem minor, but is crucial to the process of transforming.
Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing what are essentially
non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up Reserves to help deal with the global war
on terror. The same benefit as we achieve with an increase in military personnel
is already coming from converting some of these jobs filled by uniformed personnel
to positions supported by DOD civilians or contractors. The Department has identi-
fied over 50,000 positions to begin such conversion and plans to carry out this con-
version at a rate of about 10,000 positions per year. We are also continuing to re-
view thousands of other positions for possible conversion.
To support this, we are working with Congress and the unions to improve our ci-
vilian personnel systems so we can fill these converted positions expeditiously. This
is an enormously complicated matter and there is a great deal more work to be
done. But when fully implemented, the National Security Personnel System, should:
• Expedite the hiring process for civilian employees;
• Recognize and reward outstanding civilian individuals;
• Make it easier to provide merit-based promotions and reassignments; and
• Streamline the complex webs of rules and regulations that currently frus-
trate efficient management of the Department.
When we talk about changes to our country's global posture, it is important to
look at those changes — as part of the broader transforming of our way of doing
things. One cannot succeed without the other.
If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so we are prepared for
the challenges of this new century — the newer enemies and the more lethal weap-
ons— it is clear that our existing arrangements are seriously obsolete.
We have entered an era where enemies are in small cells scattered across the
globe. Yet America's forces continue to be arranged essentially to fight large armies,
navies, and air forces, and in support of an approach — static deterrence — that does
not apply to enemies who have no territories to defend and no treaties to honor.
We are still situated in a large part as if little has changed for the last 50 years —
as if, for example, Germany is still bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across its
northern plain. In South Korea, our troops were virtually frozen in place from where
they were when the Korean War ended in 1953.
So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the way we will align our-
selves in the coming years and decades. Though this should not be news to many
on the committee since we have offered extensive briefings to members and staffs,
let me reiterate some of the concepts.
A first notion is that our troops should be located in places where they are want-
ed, welcomed, and needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of our forces
grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments. The
best example is our massive headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown
real estate in Seoul — Korea's capital city — long a sore point for many South Kore-
ans. Under our proposed changes, that headquarters will be moved to a location well
south of the capital.
In the last few years, we have built new relationships with countries that are cen-
tral to the fight against extremists — in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Uzbekistan, to offer a few examples. We also have strong partnerships with the
newly-liberated nations of Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense to try to work
14
out arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the U.S. and
which are in closer proximity to the regions of the world where our troops are more
likely to be needed in the future.
A second governing concept is that American troops should be located in environ-
ments that are hospitable to their movements. Because U.S. soldiers may be called
to a variety of locations to engage extremists at short notice, we need to be able
to deploy them to trouble spots quickly. Yet over time, some host countries and or
their neighbors have imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our forces.
So it makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal and support
arrangements with our allies and partners where we might choose to locate, deploy,
or exercise our troops.
Many of our current legal arrangements date back a half a century or more. We
need our international arrangements to be up-to-date — to reflect the new realities
and to permit operational flexibility. They have to help, not hinder, the rapid de-
ployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis. These
legal arrangements should encourage responsibility and burdensharing among our
partners and ourselves, and be certain to provide the necessary legal protections for
U.S. personnel.
Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable and flexible. As
the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf War was a stunning victory. But it took 6
months of planning and transport to summon our fleets and divisions and position
them for battle. In the future, we cannot expect to have that kind of time.
Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow
us to do more with less. The old reliance on presence and mass reflects the last cen-
tury's industrial-age thinking.
In this century, we are shifting away from the tendency to equate sheer numbers
of things — tanks, troops, bombs, etc. — with capability. If a commander has a smart
bomb that is so precise that it can do the work of eight dumb bombs, for example,
the fact that his inventory is reduced from ten dumb bombs to five smart bombs
does not mean his capability has been reduced — indeed his capability has been sig-
nificantly increased.
The "old think" approach needs to be modernized. In terms of lethality, precision
weapons have greatly expanded our capability, while significantly reducing the
number of weapons needed.
We can, for example, attack multiple targets in one sortie, rather than requiring
multiple sorties to attack one target. The Navy's response time for surging combat
ships has been shortened to the point that we will likely not need a full-time carrier
strike group presence in every critical region.
As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have developed plans for a more
flexible and effective force posture for the 21st century. For example, main operating
bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, will be consoli-
dated, but retained. We hope to rely on forward operating sites and locations, with
rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment, and to gain access to a broader
range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic serv-
ice or contractor support.
In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access to over-
come vast distances, while bringing additional naval and air capabilities forward
into the region. We envision consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and
Korea, establishing nodes for Special Operations Forces, and creating multiple ac-
cess avenues for contingency operations.
In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strength-
ened Special Operations Forces — both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other re-
gions as necessary — and advanced training facilities.
In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call "warm" facilities
for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access
provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of smaller co-
operative security locations for contingency access.
Of course, we welcome comments and suggestions as negotiations with potential
host countries proceed.
One additional benefit to our proposed new arrangements is that they will signifi-
cantly improve the lives of U.S. military families. This is important. Over the com-
ing period of years, we plan to transfer home, to American soil, up to 70,000 troops
and some 100,000 family members and civilian employees. In addition, deployments
of the future should be somewhat shorter, families should experience somewhat
fewer permanent changes of station, and thus less disruption in their lives.
15
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)
The global posture decision process and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
are tightly linked, indeed they depend on each other. They are both key components
of the President's transformation agenda, and they both will be critical instruments
for stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will
help to provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.
The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to provide specific
input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input will allow domestic implica-
tions of the Global Posture Review — with forces and personnel either returning to
or moving forward from U.S. territory — to be accounted for as effectively as possible
within the BRAC decisionmaking process. Finally, as was the case with previous
BRAC rounds, the U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for dif-
ficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge needs, and to accommodate signifi-
cant force reconstitution as necessary, including all forces based within or outside
the United States.
Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture realignment will stimu-
late questions — especially in an election year.
I appreciate this opportunity to address a few of the myths and misconceptions
that seem to be lingering out there about what is contemplated.
For example, will reducing overall force levels in Korea reduce our ability to come
to its defense?
In fact, our partnership with the Republic of Korea is a good example of what we
hope to accomplish. The Defense Department has been investing in and making ar-
rangements for improved capabilities — such as long range precision weaponry — to be
available on the Korean peninsula. As a result, as we are increasingly able to trans-
fer responsibility to Korean forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The
combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will make our defense
of Korea stronger than before.
As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is different from what it was 50
years ago, back when South Korea was impoverished and virtually destroyed. Today
South Korea is an economic powerhouse, with a modern military force of some
600,000, and a GDP per capita of 18 times that of North Korea. Our proposed global
force posture initiatives make it clear that the U.S. and the Republic of Korea are
working together as partners, each bringing important capabilities to our shared
challenges.
Has the administration prepared the public — and informed Congress — about these
changes?
As I mentioned, these concepts were outlined years ago — first in a 1999 speech
before President Bush took office and then a number of times since.
The Global Posture Review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the Statutory
Quadrennial Defense Review. On November 25, 2003, President Bush announced
that the U.S. would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and partners over-
seas.
We have made significant progress during 2003-2004, and these proposals have
been shared frequently with the congressional leadership, committee leadership and
members, and with committee staffs.
I'm told that in the past 2 years the Department of State and this Department
have provided at least:
• Four briefings to House committee staffs and one each to members of the
House Armed Services Committee and House Appropriations Committee —
Defense Subcommittee;
• Four briefings to individual Senators;
• Nine briefings to Senate committee staffs or members' personal staffs;
and
• This year alone, I took part in five breakfast meetings on the subject with
Congressmen and Senators, including one on April 29, 2004, with Chair-
man Warner and Senator Levin.
Should we have given earlier warning to our allies?
In fact, we have met with officials in foreign governments on a variety of levels
on these concepts. Secretary Powell and I have spoken many times with our coun-
terparts abroad, as have our staffs.
The results of multiple consultations by Under Secretary of Defense Feith, his
State Department colleague Marc Grossman, and others at NATO and in key Euro-
pean, Asian and other capitals helped to create understanding and cooperation re-
garding our posture realignment.
16
Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input was sought before key
decisions were made and they understood our global, long-term view and the strate-
gic rationale for conducting the review at this time.
Does realigning our posture send a dangerous message to North Korea about our
commitment to the South?
The answer is an emphatic "no." We know that sheer numbers of people are no
longer appropriate measures of commitment or capabilities. As I have noted earlier,
our capabilities in defending the Republic of Korea are increasing, not decreasing.
Senator Joe Lieberman said it well in an interview a few weeks ago. He noted
that: "Kim Jong II ... is not under any misconceptions. We have enormous power
at sea, in the air, on the ground, in the Asian Pacific region and on the Korean pe-
ninsula. If he tries to take aggressive action against the South Koreans, he will pay
a very, very heavy price." The Senator is correct.
Will sending more troops home from theaters in Europe weaken our ability to surge
quickly to trouble spots?
Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth. Presence is important, but forward
stationing does not mean optimal stationing. Forces in Europe, for example, are only
closer to the Middle East if they can deploy rapidly to the south. If those same
forces have to deploy to the north, through the Baltic and North Seas, then to the
Atlantic and Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the United
States. We do not expect our forces to fight where they are stationed. We know that
our forces will need to move to the fight, wherever it is. That means that command
structures and capabilities must be expeditionary. We need well-developed transpor-
tation networks. We need materiel and supplies along transportation routes.
So, if there are legal or political restrictions on the movement of our troops where
they are stationed, the difficulties in using them quickly multiply.
Additionally, the more flexible arrangements we are seeking with our allies will
allow us to make changes as changes are needed. Area commanders don't own
forces. Our country does. We have no hesitation in moving forces from one region
to another as circumstances change and require — and we do frequently.
Critics of these proposed moves seem trapped in the thinking of the last century.
In some ways, that is understandable. It is difficult to part with thoughts that one
has harbored for decades. But the world changes and updated thinking is needed.
We owe an up-to-date defense posture to our troops in the field and the genera-
tions that may be called to battle in the future.
This week, I had the privilege of participating in one of our regular meetings in
Washington with the combatant commanders, some of whom are here today. They
are impressive. They follow in the footsteps of the visionary military leaders of the
past. This plan was undertaken with the benefit of their military advice.
One day future generations will look back at them with gratitude for what they
have accomplished in the last few years in the struggle against global extremists.
Our task is to see that one day historians and generations will look back at what
is being done today, at what is being accomplished, and say that our actions also
helped to make the world more peaceful, our military more formidable, and our free-
dom more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Myers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, mem-
bers of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
this important program with you.
First, I want to thank you for your dedication to protecting our
Nation against current and future threats, as well as improving the
quality of life of our service men and women, priorities that I cer-
tainly share with you.
I firmly believe that this approach to our global defense posture
is in the best interest of both our national security and our troops.
This plan will leave us better positioned to engage our allies and
17
promote regional stability and better positioned to prevail in com-
bat when war cannot be prevented.
When I started my Air Force career nearly 40 years ago I was
stationed in Germany, flying F-4s. My squadronmates and I spent
many hours studying the enemy's weapons and tactics. We knew
exactly who the threat was, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact, and we knew exactly what our mission would be, to defend
Europe by ensuring air superiority and supporting the massive
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ground force. As Gen-
eral Jones knows very well, our troops stationed in Europe today
have to deal with a lot more uncertainty. They have to look beyond
the Fulda Gap, beyond the long-established war plans, to new mis-
sions in new places like Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn
of Africa.
Our Armed Forces have to fight a completely new kind of war,
the war on terrorism or against extremism. They have to be ready
for future threats that are still unknown.
So we are transforming our forces to better confront these chal-
lenges and threats, and we must have a global posture that is
aligned with the key tenets of a transformed military. Those are
agility, flexibility, and speed.
We also have a unique opportunity right now, one that we must
seize. Because we won the Cold War, many of our former adversar-
ies, the same ones I studied as a lieutenant, have become valued
allies and partners. I travel to Eastern Europe and Central Asia
and meet with my counterparts and I can tell you that they could
not be more willing to engage with us. They understand the value
of freedom and democracy because it is in many cases so newly
won, and they are ready to join the international team.
This global posture strategy engages these new allies in very
positive ways, allowing us to create effective new partnerships.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula has also changed dra-
matically. When I sat alert at Osan Air Base as a captain in the
1970s, our F-4s were parked alongside Korean War-vintage F-86s
from the Korean Air Force, and the Republic of Korea's economy,
as the Secretary said, was on par of the world's poorer nations.
Now they have F-16s that can drop precision bombs and their
economy is ranked 11th in the world, ahead of many European
Union (EU) nations. They have a stable democracy and a highly-
capable military.
Our own military capabilities have also changed dramatically:
precision weapons, long-range strike capabilities, networked com-
mand and control, our ability to get to the fight more quickly, and,
perhaps most importantly, our ability to fight as an integrated,
joint, and coalition team.
Yet, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, U.S. forces in Korea are posi-
tioned exactly where we were at every base camp and station when
the armistice was signed 51 years ago. The calculus has changed
completely and this global posture strategy accounts for that fact
in Korea and across the globe.
We owe it to our troops to position them for success and at the
same time to support their families. Not so long ago, I visited sev-
eral spouse support groups in the First Armored Division in Ger-
many. I was extremely impressed by them and the network they
18
had built to take care of one another. Working with the division's
leadership, they were very energetic and creative in dealing with
family issues while the division was deployed in Iraq.
But their challenges were even tougher because they were over-
seas. It is much easier at home with immediate access to extended
families, friends, and other support networks and job opportunities
for family members.
As the Secretary said, the Joint Chiefs and combatant command-
ers have been fully involved in these ongoing studies and discus-
sions over the last 3 years. We know it will take time to implement
and the end state is designed to flex and adapt in a dynamic world.
But we cannot wait any longer to move forward with this impor-
tant task. We owe it to our troops, our allies, and to the American
people.
I appreciate this opportunity to answer your questions and I
thank you for your continued strong support of our brave and self-
less men and women in uniform. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Jones.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SU-
PREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE
General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee: I am pleased once again to appear before you to discuss
the strategic transformation proposals of the United States and in
particular the United States European Command. If approved ei-
ther in whole or in part, I am convinced that our proposals will in-
crease the strategic effect of our forces who are assigned to operate
on the European and African continents and in their contiguous
waters. We have an historical opportunity, it seems to me, to ad-
just our basing and operating concepts in such a way as to make
them much more capable and useful to our national, coalition, and
alliance goals.
I believe it is important to state as emphatically as possible that
this effort should not be characterized as an indication that the
United States is demonstrating a lesser interest in Europe or Afri-
ca, losing interest in leading or participating as fully as we have
in the past in NATO, or withdrawing capability from our many bi-
lateral relationships and commitments throughout our expanding
area of interest, or that we now embrace diminished appreciation
of the value of forward basing. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
On the contrary, we should affirm the clear opposite, which is to
say that transformation will better enable the United States to
strategically impact its 91-country area of responsibility and its
new challenges in a manner unprecedented since the end of World
War II. United States European Command's (EUCOM) strategic
transformation will create an agile and more usable permanent
force in theater, augmented by dedicated expeditionary rotational
forces, all operating aboard a family of three new basing concepts,
and anchored on radically modernized prepositioned equipment lo-
cations on land and at sea.
19
Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor to be able to be a part of
this effort and I look forward to answering your questions on this
very important and exciting subject. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:!
Prepared Statement by Gen. James L. Jones, USMC
I. INTRODUCTION
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee — It is
my privilege to appear before you as Commander, United States European Com-
mand (EUCOM), to discuss our strategic theater transformation plans and to dis-
cuss the way forward for both EUCOM and the NATO Alliance. On behalf of all
the men and women in EUCOM and their families, all of whom proudly serve this
Nation, I want to thank the committee members and staff for your unwavering sup-
port since my assignment began in January 2003. During this time I have had sev-
eral opportunities to appear before you, to meet with members and staff in a num-
ber of different venues, both here and in theater, and to share the vision for the
transformation of the 91 nation European and African theater. Your insightful and
candid appraisals of this important endeavor have been instrumental in refining a
plan that will enable us to do our part to protect our democracy, contribute to the
security of our Nation, support the 26 nation NATO Alliance, and help improve se-
curity and stability conditions within our area of responsibility. Your dedication and
efforts on our behalf are both recognized and greatly appreciated.
In 2001, the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive, strategy-based re-
view of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed all combatant
commands to evaluate their structure, organization and processes in order to gain
transformational efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging require-
ments. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Sec-
retary represent the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its his-
tory. The changes we are proposing contain broad and far-reaching implications for
our Nation, our allies, and our military. As we embark upon this important endeav-
or, we must be mindful of the unique leadership responsibilities we enjoy in the
community of nations, and we must ensure that the measures we undertake will,
in its end state, increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty
and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as an influen-
tial leader in providing stability and security. It is a responsibility this Nation has
not merely accepted, but has embraced for more than half a century. As we map
a course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled
us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize the new se-
curity challenges we face. Our ability to be successful in fighting the global war on
terrorism and achieve a force posture necessary to operate across the broad spec-
trum of potential conflict requires innovative thought and comprehensive coordina-
tion at all levels of our Government. I look forward to working with you and your
staff as we set about this important enterprise that will ultimately establish the
framework for a new capability for a new and different era.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE
EUCOM's greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in prevent-
ing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield. This is accomplished through
influence, forward presence and engaged leadership. It is sustained only through
our enduring and visible presence and commitment in our theater.
EUCOM's current structure is still centered based on a threat-based, defensive,
and static philosophy facing east. Happily, this threat has passed, and the continu-
ous flux of the security environment since the end of the Cold War has rendered
obsolete the foundation of making threat-based changes to our strategic posture.
Our transformation vision, therefore, seeks to evolve to a capabilities-based strategy
that supports the full range of military operations better suited to meet new chal-
lenges. The strategic and operational environment and mission direction have
changed radically, and EUCOM must change as well.
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a significant turning point in the national
strategy and in the utilization of the resources required to support our theater secu-
rity objectives. The United States has periodically changed its overseas defense pos-
ture as strategic circumstances themselves evolve. In the post-Cold War period,
EUCOM significantly reduced its force structure while simultaneously increasing its
stability and contingency operations. For example, EUCOM force structure has been
20
reduced from 315,000 troops and 1,421 installations to 112,000 troops and approxi-
mately 500 installations concentrated in Western Europe since 1991.
The operational environment within EUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) con-
tinues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen and difficult to predict just
a few short years ago. The global war on terrorism, expanding Theater Security Co-
operation (TSC) requirements, instability in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus,
and NATO expansion largely define recent changes and necessitate a trans-
formational shift in EUCOM's theater strategy for new challenges and realities in
a new century. In contrast to the Cold War-era monolithic threat and its linear bat-
tlefield, EUCOM and NATO can expect to face global, multiple, and asymmetric
threats in the 21st century. The new security menace is transnational, characterized
by enemies without territory, without borders, and without fixed bases. Today's se-
curity environment includes threats such as the export and franchising of terrorism,
eroding control of weapons of mass destruction, narcotrafficking, unanticipated and
uncontrolled refugee flow, and illegal immigration. Many of these threats are nur-
tured in misgoverned or even ungoverned regions as terrorists and extremist organi-
zations seek to find new havens from which to operate.
We must change our posture to reflect the realities of the 21st century (Figure
1). Our remaining forces, now at less than 40 percent of our Cold War force, are
not necessarily equipped or sited to adequately address the emergence of an entirely
new array of threats and security requirements. EUCOM is transitioning east and
south to engage these emerging threats. In order for EUCOM to be better postured
to achieve national interests in theater, we must significantly change the manner
in which we execute our new missions in response to our new challenges. The foun-
dation of EUCOM's transformation should be evaluated in the context of seeking to
dramatically increase our strategic effect, retain our historical leadership role in the
NATO Alliance, enhance our ability to develop our growing bilateral relationship,
and underscore the significant benefits of forward deployed forces.
]
Post-Cold War
Strategic Realities
21 " Century
of the j
Bipolar Conventional and ~\
Nuclear Global Confrontation
Force Structure:
31 5K Troops and 1421
installations & Sites
Large Heavy Standing Forces
Garrisoned mainly In Western
Europe
Evolution o/ Central &
Eastern Europe
Russia's New Uncertain Role
Integration of Former East
Block into the West / NATO
Force Structure:
112K Troops and 491
Installations & Sites
Evolving Force lor Stability
and Contingency Ops
Positioned mainly In Western
Germany
New Geo-poiiiic.il
Environment
NATO
NATO Summits
9-11
War On Terrorism
Increased Instability in East
and South
European Union Force
Force Structure:
Requires Adaptive Force
Structure and Infrastructure
Hgure 1
Balanced Force:
Agile, Transformed and
Lethal
Expeditionary for Operational
Reach & Tactical Flexibility
III. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF EUCOM'S TRANSFORMATION
EUCOM's theater transformation is based on the assumptions that the United
States:
• Desires to maintain its current position as a nation of global influence
through leadership and the efficient and effective application of informa-
tional, military, economic, and diplomatic power
21
• Remains committed to its friends and allies through global, regional and
bilateral organizations and institutions, and supports treaties and inter-
national agreements to which it is a signatory
• Pursues a global strategy, a cornerstone of which is increased access and
forward presence in key areas, which contributes to the first line of defense
for peace, stability, and order
• Supports in-depth transformation of its Armed Forces and basing struc-
ture to respond to 21st century asymmetrical threats and challenges
• Seeks ways to mitigate or offset obstacles posed by 21st century sov-
ereignty realities through a re-orientation of its land, maritime, air and
space presence
• Recognizes current U.S. basing within EUCOM may not adequately sup-
port either the strategic changes attendant to an expanded NATO Alliance,
or the national requirements of a rapidly changing AOR
• Seeks to preserve those assets which have enduring value to its missions,
goals, and national interests
• Continues to enhance and build defense relationships enabling the
United States, allies, and friends to respond effectively
These assumptions, if agreed to, serve as the cornerstone which underpins
EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan.
IV. EUCOM'S CRITICAL THEATER CAPABILITIES
EUCOM's success hinges on maintaining critical capabilities as both a supported
and a supporting combatant command. These capabilities include: as much freedom
of action as possible within our many agreements with nations who host our forces;
power projection; bases for our operations; command, control, communications, com-
puters, and intelligence (C4I); alliances and coalition partners; theater based and ro-
tational forces; and facilities for joint and combined training opportunities. EUCOM
gains and maintains freedom of action and the ability to build alliances and coali-
tions through its security cooperation efforts and an effective interagency process.
Power projection platforms and associated bases must optimize our limited strate-
gic air and sea-lift, maximize available intra-theater lift, leverage existing enduring
bases, and well-maintained pre-positioned equipment. EUCOM should preserve our
critical capabilities by maintaining select (Joint) Main Operating Bases where cur-
rently located, and by establishing new (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint)
Cooperative Security Locations where needed. The temporary and semi-permanent
expeditionary installations established throughout the AOR will provide essential
facilities and equipment for expeditionary forces in proximity to the areas of inter-
est, crisis, or conflict and will avoid saturation at key nodes and along lines of com-
munication. Where possible, (Joint) Propositioned Stocks will provide additional
means to rapidly project equipment to contingency response areas. By design, the
inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid
response, intervening into a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential
for larger scale operations requiring massive force. However, if a larger force is re-
quired in theater or in an adjacent theater, EUCOM's basing plan is flexible enough
to allow for a rapid expansion of follow-on forces whenever needed. This built-in
scalability will provide the initial agility necessary for EUCOM to effectively support
a truly global strategy.
Lexicon: Transformation Assets
(Joint) Main Operating Base (JMOB)
By definition, this is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory
with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures, and
family support facilities. (J)MOBs serve as the anchor points for throughput, train-
ing, engagement, and U.S. commitment to NATO. (J)MOBS have: robust infrastruc-
ture; strategic access; established command and control; ready access to training
areas; (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security Location
support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As previously stated,
these are already in existence.
(Joint) Forward Operating Site (JFOS)
An expandable host-nation "warm site" with a limited U.S. military support pres-
ence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a
focus for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to meet antici-
pated requirements and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support
by a ( J)MOB may be required.
22
(Joint) Cooperative Security Location (JCSL)
A host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence. (J)CSLs will re-
quire periodic service through contractor and/or host nation support. (J)CSLs pro-
vide contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation activities. They
may contain propositioned equipment. (J)CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for
tactical use, expandable to become a JFOS, forward and expeditionary. They will
have no family support system.
(Joint) Preposition Site (JPS)
A secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel (combat, combat sup-
port, combat service support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable rota-
tional and expeditionary forces. They may be collocated with a (J)MOB or (J)FOS.
JPSs are usually maintained by contractor support and may be sea based. They are
an important component to our transformation efforts.
"En Route" Infrastructure (ERI)
A strategically located enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability
to rapidly expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises or con-
tingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement,
and US commitment. They may also be a (J)MOB or (J)FOS.
In addition to maintaining our traditional lines of communication and access, we
will seek new access to facilities, and routine freedom of transit through nations of
the east into the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Levant, and Africa in order to sup-
port current and future operations. In the near-term, attention will focus on Poland,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, supporting similar near- to mid-term efforts in the
Caucasus states.
"En Route" Infrastructure
A significant component of our ability to prosecute the war on terrorism and
maintain operational access is the En Route Infrastructure Program. Operations
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have highlighted the importance
of our primary en route bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal,
Turkey, and Italy. Enhancing their capabilities in the near- to mid-term is essential
to our continued ability to deploy and sustain U.S. forces.
EUCOM will develop new installations for engaging the many threats we face
today and that we will respond to in the future. Retention of critical JMOBs will
preserve existing infrastructure for the Joint Reception, Staging and Onward Move-
ment and Integration (JRSOI) Center functions. Establishing JFOSs, CSLs, and
JPSs in new countries will allow the command to develop and mature host-nation
support and contractor agreements to support additional JRSOIs.
The ability to rapidly project military power during times of crises or contin-
gencies is the central and most enduring premise of the concept of forward station-
ing of forces. The very presence of such forces, either forward based or rotational
and the military capabilities they possess are powerful instruments of national in-
fluence. A robust "En Route" Infrastructure combined with an array of (Joint) Pre-
positioned Sites throughout the EUCOM theater, will enable the United States to
have the strategic agility to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Beyond strict
military significance, forward forces serve to strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign
policy; demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of U.S. friends and allies; dem-
onstrate to potential challengers the resolve of the United States to meet its com-
mitments; and bolster regional security through our theater security cooperation
programs.
Rotational Forces
A key aspect of EUCOM's transformation plan is the reliance on "rotational" units
as a significant portion of the forces in theater. By design, the inherent agility of
these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid response, interven-
ing in a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale oper-
ations requiring massive force. Further, rotational forces arrive trained and ready
to operate immediately within the theater. As a force provider (supporting com-
mand), EUCOM can provide these rotational forces quickly in support of other com-
batant commands.
This combination of permanently-based and rotational forces will permit a full
range of operational capability in areas and regions within our area of responsibility
that are increasingly important. EUCOM's Service components will develop and exe-
cute effective plans to integrate and employ a combination of permanently assigned
forces and rotational forces from continental United States (CONUS). The transfer
of heavy forces to CONUS in no way reflects a reduced commitment or interest in
our region, but rather a shift from conventional thinking and a desire to adopt new
23
methods to better protect our interests. The decrease in overall numbers in the the-
ater will be offset not only by the retention of inherently expeditionary units such
as airborne brigades, aviation units, and naval forces, but also by the introduction
of our most modern transformed forces (e.g. Stryker Brigade), providing the agility
needed to operate effectively in EUCOM's unpredictable and fluid international se-
curity environment.
The employment of rotational forces in the European theater is not a new concept.
The Navy and Marine Corps deployed Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and Amphib-
ious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) to the Mediterranean
throughout the Cold War, and the new Fleet Response Plan will continue the rota-
tional presence of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG/ESGs). The Army
has had tremendous success with the use of rotational forces in support of oper-
ations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Air Force's transformation to the Expeditionary
Wing structure enabled rotational presence during operations in the Balkans and
in support of Operation Northern Watch (northern Iraq no-fly zone enforcement).
European Command's Theater Security Cooperation engagement today is conducted
with rotational forces in Africa and the Caucasus. The efficacy of rotational forces
is a tried and proven concept. The linchpin to EUCOM's theater transformation is
the recognition that the continuing and expanded role of rotational forces is essen-
tial to increasing our strategic effectiveness in an area of responsibility that encom-
passes 91 countries in Europe and Africa.
Joint Force Command and Control
Reliance on rotational forward presence forces, new and enhanced bilateral and
multi-national agreements, our leadership role in a transformed NATO, and the de-
cisive execution of the global war on terrorism has transformed EUCOM's command
and control structure and architecture.
In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance, EUCOM has established its
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and the European Plans and Oper-
ations Center (EPOC). It will rapidly achieve an agile, proven command and control
capability for joint and multi-national forces within EUCOM through the execution
of command and control exercises. The EPOC will also be the cornerstone of the
JCS-funded exercise program in EUCOM and will ensure multi-echeloned training
of theater command and control headquarters.
Each component will be organized to participate and lead in the command and
control of joint and multi-national forces as a joint task force ( JTF) or a combined
joint task force (CJTF) throughout the theater. At end state, EUCOM will have the
ability to establish six JTF core headquarters. This represents a substantial in-
crease from current capabilities and more accurately matches potential command
and control headquarters requirements with emerging requirements, thus enabling
joint solutions to emerging or existing crises.
Transformation will also afford theater components opportunities to leverage
emerging technologies and doctrine and, in some cases, lead transformational com-
mand and control for the Department of Defense. Allies and coalition partners will
experience similar gains as we assist their transformation efforts.
V. EUCOM AND THE NATO ALLIANCE
NATO, which has been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security
since its inception, continues to transform in order to remain the preeminent secu-
rity alliance in the world. During the recent NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, the
Alliance reaffirmed its new global commitment to undertake the necessary measures
to confront present day threats. NATO's decision to expand the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including the establishment of several
more Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and its decision to assist the Interim Iraqi
Government with the training of its security forces, underscores the level of transi-
tion occurring in the Alliance. Additionally, efforts to enhance the Mediterranean
Dialogue program and to offer cooperation to the Greater Middle East is a testa-
ment to the desire of NATO to be fully engaged on issues that will help shape our
common future.
Further, as the Alliance deploys beyond its members' boundaries, I believe that
EUCOM can provide essential support with operationally focused, all-source intel-
ligence. In concert with our NATO partners, EUCOM is standing up the NATO In-
telligence Fusion Cell (NIFC), a dedicated intelligence element comprised of U.S.
and other NATO personnel. This element will have a core of intelligence profes-
sionals operating under common tactics, techniques, and procedures, enhancing U.S.
and NATO-nation intelligence interoperability. The NIFC will be co-located with our
EUCOM Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom.
24
As I stated during my testimony before this committee in March of this year, the
ongoing transformations in EUCOM and NATO are inextricably linked to the chal-
lenges inherent in today's international security environment. These simultaneous
transformations are mutually supporting and complementary, the synthesis of
which produces an effect greater than the sum of its parts. By its leadership and
example, EUCOM supports both the Alliance in its transformation, as well as NATO
member nations undergoing their own internal transformations.
A transformed posture in Europe — one that supports NATO's own transformation
goals — requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable both within and beyond
Europe. They must be able to perform the full range of military operations and
serve as a deterrent, as well as a combat force. The NATO Response Force (NRF)
is the transformational vehicle for the Alliance. The expeditionary standards and
certification training serve to ensure the forces meet the desired level of capability
and interoperability. Our NATO allies have fully embraced the NRF and we will
achieve full operational capability early next month. The Alliance continues to work
with member nations to ensure political decisions are made which will enable us
to deploy the NRF within the timeframes established at the Prague Summit in
2002. These forces will train alongside other NATO forces to improve their inter-
operability and serve as a model to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance.
EUCOM facilities and activities also play a vital role in NATO's transformation.
They provide both training opportunities and the power projection platforms nec-
essary for joint and combined operations. One such example is the Joint and Com-
bined Expeditionary Training Center at Grafenwohr, Germany. This advanced train-
ing facility, along with other high-capacity mobility and throughput infrastructure,
i.e. Ramstein Air Base, Germany, will have an increasingly important role in the
development of our allies' capabilities and our future European posture.
NATO's recent expansion to include seven new nations has shifted the Alliance's
focus eastward. At the same time, long-term NATO member nations have improved
their individual and collective ability for mutual defense and find themselves well
ahead of the new member nations. While NATO welcomes new member nations, the
Alliance recognizes that their military capabilities are not yet fully interoperable
with NATO forces and will require significant investment. This is ongoing work.
Our new allies have offered extensive training opportunities and areas, as well
as fewer restrictions on maneuver. Encroachment challenges at our current bases
and training areas and the desire for increased training with our new allies lead
EUCOM to pursue further Eastern European access. Increasing EUCOM's forward
presence in Eastern Europe through operating sites, training, and exercises will in-
crease security cooperation engagement, bolster these new members' military capa-
bilities and pave the way for greatly enhanced future contributions to NATO. As
these forces transform, they will become more expeditionary and better able to re-
spond to global requirements.
Additionally, EUCOM forces will be in a position to exercise and maintain leader-
ship roles in any new NATO force or command structure developed in Eastern Eu-
rope. Although EUCOM will maintain strong participation in established NATO
countries through the recently approved NATO command structure, an eastward
move will concurrently develop our constructive influence within the new NATO
countries and allow the United States and our NATO partners to meet the goals
of the Prague Summit more quickly.
VI. EUCOM'S THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION
EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program forms the centerpiece of
our efforts to promote security and deter aggression. The TSC program is indispen-
sable in building relationships, enhancing allied and coalition capabilities, and pro-
viding access to en route infrastructure. This program will not only pave the way
for our transformation plan, it will also be enhanced as the benefits from that trans-
formation are realized.
Theater Security Cooperation builds and strengthens key relationships that pro-
mote U.S. strategic interests. These relationships involve interactions at multiple
levels from heads of state to students who engage in the many and varied training
programs provided by the U.S. and its allies. Capabilities for self-defense and coali-
tion operations are enhanced by TSC and OPTEMPO demands on U.S. forces are
reduced. Through the TSC, essential peacetime and contingency access and "en
route" infrastructure is provided and the development of regional security organiza-
tions to prevent or mitigate conflicts with minimal U.S. participation is accelerated.
A number of programs are provided under the TSC umbrella including: bilateral
and Partnership for Peace training events and exercises; Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET); the State Partnership Program (SPP); and foreign assistance pro-
25
grams such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Foreign
Military Financing (FMF).
One extraordinarily successful example is the Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP). This was a EUCOM executed program that trained Georgian tactical units
to conduct up to company-level operations that were instrumental in enhancing
Georgia's ability to protect its sovereignty and stabilize the region. Similarly, the
Pan Sahel Initiative is an ongoing effort to assist four countries — Mali, Niger, Chad,
and Mauritania — in detecting and responding to the migration of asymmetric
threats across and within their extensive and poorly controlled borders. Under this
program, company-sized units are trained and equipped as rapid reaction units, pro-
viding them the mobility, communication, navigation, and individual soldier skills
essential for border security, internal defense, and counterterrorism efforts.
Similar TSC programs include: training assistance in Poland to the OIF Polish
Division rotations; training assistance to NATO ISAF training preparation in the
NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway; Exercise Bulwark '04 in Bul-
garia featuring rotational forces from CONUS, permanently assigned forces from
EUCOM, and Bulgarian forces in Novo Selo, Bulgaria; and the recently initiated
Torgau exercise series with Russia being conducted both in Russia and in Germany.
All of these programs are initiatives that require small investments, but that yield
enormous dividends in our effort to promote peace, stability, and democracy. They
are also an example of how rotational forces can operate at the tactical level and
produce a strategic result.
Two current strategic initiatives that EUCOM continues to develop and expand
include "Caspian Guard" and the "Gulf of Guinea Guard." These are two engage-
ments that demonstrate a regional approach towards establishing stability and se-
curity in relatively remote areas within the theater susceptible to transnational
threats.
Theater Security Cooperation programs have become critical enablers of
EUCOM's proposed theater transformation by building and maintaining the key re-
lationships that will allow us to establish new Forward Operating Sites and Cooper-
ative Security Locations. These new sites will enable EUCOM to protect growing
U.S. interests in areas of increasing importance to regional security and economic
opportunity, while extending the global power and reach of U.S. forces. TSC effec-
tiveness is directly linked to an effective and focused forward basing strategy.
VII. THE TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE
The process of transforming EUCOM requires a comprehensive, synchronized ap-
proach integrating many segments of our Government and those of our allies and
partners to achieve our theater goals. The timeline and ability to implement our
Strategic Theater Transformation plan is based on a number of interlocking vari-
ables that must be carefully considered, evaluated, and orchestrated in order to gain
the greatest benefit. How we do this is as important as what we do. The underlying
principles that guide our collective efforts should be the eight assumptions — dis-
cussed earlier — that formed the basis for the development of EUCOM's Strategic
Theater Transformation plan.
The speed at which transformation will occur depends in large measure on the
bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements we have with sovereign countries per-
taining to our military personnel, installations, and activities. These legal arrange-
ments constitute the formal framework for our military presence, access, and ability
to conduct actions that enhance our operational readiness. Although EUCOM has
worked extensively to identify existing installations that will be maintained and
those that will need to be established, the final outcome will be predicated, in large
measure, on renegotiating longstanding agreements already in place with current
allies and negotiating new agreements with new allies or partners that share our
concerns for global security. The Department of Defense and the Department of
State have already conducted a series of consultations and are proceeding with ne-
gotiations to ensure present and future arrangements optimize our ability to train,
deploy, and conduct missions in support of our National Security Strategy.
Several key determinates beyond our direct control will influence the trans-
formation tempo in EUCOM. These include the Army's ability to source and deploy
"rotational" forces to the theater; identifying and providing installations for units re-
turning to CONUS; available funding to support the plan to establish Joint Forward
Operating Sites, Cooperative Security Locations, and additional Joint Pre-positioned
Sites throughout the AOR; and the relationship between operational imperatives
within the theater and the support we provide to adjacent combatant commands.
While a decision has been made on the essential elements of the plan, consider-
able efforts to negotiate, resource, and implement the details of that plan remain.
26
This is not a turn-key operation that can be completed in a few short years. Rather,
it is a deliberate, methodical process that will require several years of investment
and a considerable degree of interaction on many levels within our Government and
with the governments of our allies. Congress is an integral part of this process. We
greatly appreciated the visits to EUCOM's theater by members and staff of this
committee to learn more about our requirements and plans for the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have historically unique opportunities before us. Our efforts over the past year
to develop new basing and operational concepts have produced a consensus among
our Services and our allies. If implemented, this new direction will enable us to
move our capabilities more fully into the new century and away from some 20th
century paradigms that are no longer relevant. The physical and visible presence
of the United States military in the EUCOM theater is as important as it ever was,
however, its character stems from new and different reasons. The security threats
of the 21st century are no longer either linear or predictable. They require a "capa-
bilities based" strategy at the core of our thinking with regard to transformation.
Those who wish to draw false conclusions with regard to our national commitment
to Europe and Africa will no doubt be increasingly vocal as we propose further re-
ductions in our troop and family numbers permanently based in Europe. The re-
sponse to such criticism is that the historical doctrine suggesting that "mass equals
commitment" is no longer as valid a concept as it once was; what we now need is
sufficiency and usability in our new basing doctrines. Augmented forward presence
(the combination of permanently based, but increasingly expeditionary forward
forces augmented by sufficient and predictable rotational forces) along with the war
reserve material at Joint Pre-Positioned Sites, and a robust "En Route" Infrastruc-
ture will form the nucleus of our strategic presence across an expanding European-
African theater. Such capability, while currently lacking, is urgently necessary. Our
firm intent is to increase the strategic effect of our forward based and rotational
forces in such a way as to form the basis of a vastly improved capability to respond
to the new array of threats we face as a Nation, as a member of future coalitions,
and as a member of NATO.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Jones.
Admiral Fargo.
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. FARGO, USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished
members of the committee: Thank you for this opportunity to ad-
dress U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) planning to strengthen our
global and theater defense posture. Let me add first my thanks for
your outstanding support of our men and women in the Armed
Forces today.
Two and a half years ago, I testified before this committee on our
priorities for the PACOM. Two of these, reinforcing the constants
in Asian Pacific security and promoting the change necessary for
improving our defense posture, are key to our larger global strat-
egy. Together these priorities reinforce the foundation of regional
stability — our longstanding bilateral alliances, our friendships both
old and new, and the presence of our forward-deployed combat
forces — while optimizing capabilities of the PACOM to tackle the
challenges of the evolving security environment.
The new threat context demands profound and enduring im-
provements in the way we command, equip, employ, and station
our forces. Strengthening and rebalancing our security relation-
ships with Japan and South Korea are vital to stability in north-
east Asia. Each is working closely with us to secure peace and ef-
fect enduring solutions to mutual challenges associated with basing
our forces while maintaining a strong deterrent posture.
27
Our other Asian treaty allies, Australia, Thailand, and the Phil-
ippines, along with good friends such as Singapore, Malaysia,
India, Indonesia, Mongolia, and many others, have also worked
side by side with us to advance efforts in the war on terrorism.
During my service in the Pacific over the past 5 years, the pace
of change has been stunning, certainly since the end of the Cold
War and also since September 11. Globalization has added a di-
mension of speed to nearly every aspect of life. Crises clearly affect
more people faster. Cyber, biological, and terrorist threats are
present along with more traditional concerns, like the Korean Pe-
ninsula, the potential for miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait
or in Kashmir, and a host of transnational threats. I mentioned
terrorism earlier, but there is also proliferation and the trafficking
of humans and drugs. We require a changed approach to meet
these complex security challenges.
In Asia and the Pacific, the vibrant economies, burgeoning popu-
lations, maturing democracies, and military modernization only
serve to add momentum to regional transformation and increase
the need for new security strategies.
In response to this changing environment, PACOM undertook ef-
forts with the direction of the Secretary and the Chairman to
operationalize our National Security Strategy in the PACOM's area
of responsibility and in support of other combatant commanders
worldwide. For the U.S. PACOM, those efforts included updating
our plans, strengthening command and control, increasing capabili-
ties for immediate employment, creating new operational patterns
and concepts, improving force posture, and diversifying access and
in-or-out logistics.
Forward and expeditionary ground, sea, and air forces have en-
hanced our ability to immediately employ tailored power on short
notice in new ways and will do so more in the future. For example,
we are co-locating Stryker brigades with high-speed vessels and C-
17 airlifters in Hawaii and Alaska. We are deploying rotational
bomber elements to Guam. We are stationing once again sub-
marines in Guam. We have proposed homeporting an additional
carrier strike group forward in the Pacific.
Optimizing these immediately employable forces requires an ap-
propriate footprint with more reachback, less infrastructure, and
less burden on hosts. For instance, as part of the defense policy re-
view initiative we are working closely with our ally Japan to re-
duce the overall number of U.S. troops there, remove longstanding
noise encroachment concerns, and adjust force posture in Okinawa.
As part of this process we will mature and strengthen the U.S.-
Japan security alliance while assuring an enduring presence of
critical forward forces and warfighting capability.
In the future of the Republic of Korea-United States alliance ini-
tiative, we are consolidating our footprint into two enduring hubs
south of the Han River, which leverages both improved capabilities
to enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence, both on the
peninsula and regionally. The United States will also redeploy
troops from South Korea as combined forces are modernized and
the Republic of Korea assumes a greater role in its own defense.
Finally, we are looking for access and logistics prepositioning op-
portunities throughout the theater that allow us to move forces
28
quickly to the location of greatest need. A network of cooperative
security locations, places not bases, will provide avenues of critical
access for contingency operations, expand Special Operations Force
presence, and continue through our security cooperation efforts to
strengthen the capacity of our allies and partners in the region.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am proud to rep-
resent the men and women of the United States Pacific Command,
who work tirelessly on behalf of our Nation to put in place credible,
flexible, and ready forces to secure our national interests at home
and abroad.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look for-
ward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General LaPorte.
STATEMENT OF GEN. LEON J. LaPORTE, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED
STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
General LaPorte. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distin-
guished members of the committee: I am honored for the oppor-
tunity to appear before you today. Moreover, I am honored at the
opportunity to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
who serve our Nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK).
I will briefly address how the new global defense posture is
strengthening our deterrence and readiness on the Korean Penin-
sula through our enhance, shape, and align initiatives. These ini-
tiatives are the result of nearly 2 years of close consultation with
our valued ally, the Republic of Korea. The Mutual Defense Treaty
between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America,
signed over a half century ago, is the foundation for peace and sta-
bility on the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea-United
States Combined Forces Command, created as a result of this trea-
ty, is the cornerstone of our deterrence. This command is vigilant,
well-trained, and ready to fight, tonight, and win.
Today deterrence is achieved by an integrated team of nearly
690,000 active duty troops and 3 million reservists from the Repub-
lic of Korea, combined with some 34,000 forward deployed United
States military personnel on the Korean Peninsula. This combined
force can be rapidly reinforced when needed from regional and stra-
tegic assets. Additionally, U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula are
advantaged by extensive reachback capabilities to resources resi-
dent in the Pacific Command and the continental United States.
Historically, the metric of readiness has been the number of
troops on the ground. However, what is truly important is the com-
plementary deterrent and combat capabilities that each nation con-
tributes to the security of the peninsula. Over the past several
years there has been a tremendous improvement in the interoper-
ability of our combined forces. Concurrently, the U.S. Armed Forces
have transformed our capabilities in many areas, including strate-
gic deployability, command and control, precision strike, and joint
and combined operations.
These capabilities allow us to focus overmatching combat power
when and where we choose to defeat armed aggression. United
29
States forces can now be sized to provide tailored capabilities that
complement those of the Republic of Korea ally, providing over-
whelming strategic deterrence. Our regional and strategic rein-
forcement capabilities allow us to defeat any potential North Ko-
rean aggression.
The Combined Forces Command continues to adapt to the chang-
ing security environment. This transformation is taking place
through three key initiatives: enhancing combined capabilities,
shaping combined Republic of Korea and United States roles and
missions, and aligning U.S. forces for the future.
The most visible of these are the capability enhancements that
we are now making throughout our combined forces modernization
programs, that include more than 340 United States and Republic
of Korea enhancements to greatly strengthen our combined deter-
rence and readiness capabilities, enhancements such as fielding the
PAC-3 Patriot missile system, coupled with the stationing of a Pa-
triot brigade headquarters and a second Patriot battalion with two
additional Patriot batteries to strengthen our theater missile de-
fense. The upgrade of our Apache helicopters to AH-64 Delta
Longbows increases the combat capability of that weapons system
by 400 percent. F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets, either carrier or
land-based, provide precision strike capabilities day and night and
in all weather. The introduction of high-speed vessels and C-17s
facilitate rapid reinforcement of regionally positioned United States
forces, such as the Marine Expeditionary Force or the Stryker bri-
gade combat teams, by sea and by air. Additionally, our investment
in prepositioned sets of equipment allows for rapid reinforcement.
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces are also enhancing their ca-
pabilities with the addition of the Multiple Launch Rocket System,
the K-l tank, the F-15 aircraft, the Aegis cruiser, and the K-9
howitzer, just to name a few.
As a result of our combined combat capability enhancements, the
Republic of Korea-United States military committee agreed to
transfer several Combined Forces Command missions from the
United States forces to the Republic of Korea over the next 2 years.
These mission transfers will shape the combined forces to leverage
each nation's specific strengths, allowing the United States Forces
Korea to tailor its capabilities on the peninsula and in the region.
Consolidating the majority of the United States forces in Korea
into two enduring hubs is the final component of our trans-
formation. This effort consists first of consolidation of forces and
then their eventual relocation to the south, away from the Seoul
metropolitan area, creating a less intrusive footprint and increas-
ing the operational mission of our on-peninsula stationed forces.
Close consultation for the past 18 months between the United
States and the Republic of Korea governments has brought this ini-
tiative closer to reality, as demonstrated by recent agreements de-
tailing the specifics of consolidation and relocation.
The Republic of Korea's own national defense strategy extends
far beyond equipment modernization. In its 2004 National Security
Strategy, President Hyun declared his intention to promote a coop-
erative, self-reliant defensive posture when the Republic of Korea
will assume a leading role in its national security. Minister of Na-
tional Defense Yoon recently announced to restructure the Republic
30
of Korea armed forces, including a 40,000-person reduction, which
reinforces our mutual confidence in our combined capability en-
hancements.
In conclusion, I want to reaffirm that the Combined Forces Com-
mand is trained and ready to fight and win, tonight. We are pos-
turing the combined ROK-U.S. capabilities to deter and, if nec-
essary, defeat any potential North Korean aggression. Our plan is
on course to enhance the United States and Republic of Korea ca-
pabilities, to shape combined roles and mission by leveraging each
alliance member's unique strengths, and while aligning the force
for sustainable long-term United States military presence on the
peninsula.
Your continued support of our transformation efforts will ensure
our sustained ability to protect the security of the Republic of
Korea and guarantee stability in Northeast Asia. Thank you and
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Secretary, General Myers, and the combatant commanders,
I commend you on a very strong case, one of the most important
initiatives, Mr. Secretary, that you have undertaken in your ad-
ministration.
Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask one brief question and I ask
that you reply as briefly as you can because I wish to reserve the
chairman's time of 6 minutes to be utilized by me as I see appro-
priate in the course of the subsequent questions. My one question,
Mr. Secretary: Should Congress adjust the current BRAC schedule
and constitute a delay, would that impair the implementation of
this program and delay the return to home bases of our troops
overseas?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It would be most unfortunate if there were
to be any delay in BRAC. It would indeed delay forces being re-
turned to the United States. The timing is fortuitous and had we
not initiated this global review of our posture prior to a BRAC
round, the BRAC round would be in the dark as to what might
happen prospectively. Because we have the timing — we started 3
years ago to work on this — the timing is excellent and they are
linked together tightly.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you. You might also in your expan-
sion for the record talk about the implications for the negotiations
with allies and other countries that are an integral part of this. I
thank the Secretary.
I will reserve the balance of my time.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, about a year ago in November 2003, acccording to
a New York Times article, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
assessed at that time that the situation in Iraq "is creating a more
fertile environment for the anti-American insurgency" and that the
insurgency is gaining strength. That was November 13, 2003. It
seemed to be a correct assessment at that time.
The President the other day gave his reaction to the reported
new intelligence assessment, and I am wondering what is your re-
action to that reported assessment?
31
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have read it. It is now a number of
months old. My recollection is a lot of the data was accumulated
in April and May. I have not read it recently, but it took various
approaches, worst case and medium case and best case, as I recall.
I think what I would say about it is that I recall data in there
that pointed out that people did not like having foreign forces in
their country, in Iraq, and that comes as no great surprise to me.
I do not think many countries would like to have foreign forces in
their countries for a prolonged period.
I have forgotten whether it was in that particular document, but
my recollection is there was very strong support for elections and
there also was a reasonably good level of support for having forces
remain to assure that elections occurred.
A lot has happened since those months in April, May, and June
when that was prepared. First, the Iraqi Governing Council is gone
and the Interim Iraqi Government exists. There is a prime min-
ister, there are cabinet ministers. The U.N. helped fashion that ap-
proach.
Second, they have recently had 1,000 people gather and select a
100-person constituent assembly.
Both of those steps, as well as the leadership that has been pro-
vided that the chairman mentioned with the prime minister who
was here today, I think are vivid demonstrations to the Iraqi peo-
ple about the seriousness of moving forward to elections and being
able to continue to develop the Iraqi security forces and over time
reduce the coalition forces, which are clearly what the estimate in-
dicated was desired by the Iraqi people.
Senator Levin. Was your reaction that that estimate was too pes-
simistic?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not have a judgment on that. I would
not say it was too pessimistic. I think there were various pieces of
it that might prove over time to be too pessimistic, possibly some
pieces too optimistic.
Senator LEVIN. Would you say that security is better in Iraq
today than it was 3 months ago?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Clearly the incidents of violence are up, if
that is what you mean by security. But the other thing that is up
are the number of Iraqi security forces that are now trained and
equipped, and that is a good thing.
Senator LEVIN. But overall would you say the security situation
in Iraq is better today than 3 months ago?
Secretary RUMSFELD. First of all, it is hard to talk about — I
should also add, Mr. Chairman, I was not aware that this was
going to be on Iraq.
Senator Levin. I thought that was clarified with you. It was our
understanding
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not to me, and I would have been happy
to have General Abizaid and Ambassador Negroponte join us here
today.
Senator LEVIN. It was very clearly understood that Iraq would be
included in the subjects to be covered here today. I am sorry that
you were not informed. We were actually told specifically that you
were and you did have that understanding.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do not. I did not.
32
Let me go ahead and try to respond to this question, because it
is a fair question
Chairman Warner. Let me address the procedure here. Initially
when we received a request from a number of colleagues to have
a hearing on this important subject, I began to establish with you
the hearing date. At that time it was the consideration that we
would cover some of Iraq and some of the posture review.
But then when we arranged — and I urged the leadership to have
you and General Abizaid and others up yesterday — it seemed to me
that fulfilled the Senate's important need to have the opportunity
to question you, and that took place extensively yesterday. So we
revised the hearing notice to write very explicitly the hearing was
for the purpose of receiving your report on this subject.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, there is clearly a misunderstand-
ing, because that was not transmitted to us as being a private
meeting yesterday as a substitute for a public meeting today. In
any event, if the Secretary
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am happy to answer. I am happy to an-
swer.
The security situation has become — there is an increase in vio-
lent incidents, no question about that. I think that is to be ex-
pected. The intelligence has also suggested that, not just in Iraq
but in Afghanistan and possibly other parts of the world. We have
three elections coming up — ours, the Afghan elections, and the
Iraqi elections, and we have seen a spike, somewhat of a spike, in
Afghanistan as well.
There is no doubt but the people who are determined to not have
a free system in Afghanistan or a free system in Iraq are doing
things to try to prevent those free systems from being achieved. I
think that we should probably look forward to a continued spike in
activity between now and January when they plan to have elec-
tions, as the prime minister said today.
Senator Levin. Do you think that the increase in those attacks
is evidence of desperation on the part of the insurgents?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, goodness, I cannot climb in their
minds. I would not say that myself. I basically rely on the intel-
ligence I get, and I think that there is a determination on their
part to — if you think of their targets they are trying to assassinate
government officials, they are trying to prevent people from being
recruited to join the security forces, they are trying to disrupt im-
portant infrastructure, to make the Iraqi people dissatisfied.
These are people who chop off people's heads. The kind of system
they want in that country and for this world is not a system that
anyone with any sense would want to have achieved.
Senator Levin. I think there is unanimity on that.
Relative to the security forces being trained and equipped, there
has been a very slow delivery of weapons, vehicles, and commu-
nication devices. The figures that we have is that only half of the
required weapons have been delivered. In terms of equipping Iraqi
national security forces that we all want to be equipped — we are
talking here about Iraqi national forces — less than a third of the
vehicles have been supplied and less than a fifth of the communica-
tion devices have been supplied.
33
I am wondering if either you or General Myers might tell us why
it is that we are behind where our deliveries were intended to be
at this point, as well as the recruiting and training itself.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to start and Dick Myers
can finish. We started in effect with a need for security forces at
the end of major combat operations. The numbers then went up
from zero to about 206,000, and in the 206,000 were 74,000 facility
protection services that were not under our control in any sense.
They were part of the ministries. In addition, there were people in
that number that were not trained fully, not equipped fully.
We now have a number of roughly 100,000 that are fully
equipped and fully trained. So one reason that this has taken some
time, obviously, is the fact that we have changed the goal. You
used percentages. When General Casey went in, we sent in an as-
sessment team to determine what numbers of police that country
ought to have, what numbers of army, what numbers of border pa-
trols. The original numbers that the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council had developed in my
judgment proved to be too low. We raised those numbers. So the
percentage of accomplishment has dropped. That is one reason.
A second reason is we have been basically functioning out there
with peacetime rules and one of the major contracts I am told was
challenged, which caused it to be delayed for some period of a num-
ber of weeks under the normal procedures that we have.
I personally have a high degree of confidence in General Casey
and General Petraeus and the program they have in effect. I think
it is about right. The Iraqi government has generally agreed, al-
though they would prefer some more heavily mechanized units
than may be in the current program. They have a timetable which
is available on the web site for anyone to see as to what we think
it will evolve over time. They are looking for in January, I believe,
145,000, up from the 100,000 today, and by August of '05 up to
202,000 that will be fully trained and equipped.
Senator LEVIN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. The only thing I would add to that is last
spring — and I think we have testified in front of the committee on
this before — it was decided, decided by those of us involved, that
we needed a more holistic approach to the security forces. So the
responsibility for training the police and the border folks all came
under the Department of Defense.
Since that time, of course, we have General Petraeus over there.
Equipment is now arriving at a fairly rapid rate. We said it would
take until September to get the contracts in place and get the
equipment started to move. It is moving fairly well right now.
The one item I think that is before Congress is the $1.8 billion
reprogramming — I think you mentioned it, Senator Levin — to re-
program some of the reconstruction money into the security sector
because it is so important, and that is to meet the new force levels
that the Interim Iraqi Government has decided it needs. They did
it in consultation with us because we have division commanders on
the ground that make very valuable inputs to this whole equation.
I think we are in pretty good shape right now. If we get the $1.8
billion, if we can keep the contracts flowing, if we get the contract-
34
ing people over there that we need to get over there, we will be
okay.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin, if I could add, at our lunch-
eon meeting with the prime minister he specifically said, Mr. Sec-
retary, that he approached our Government and said that he would
want to increase substantially the number of battalions to meet his
projected security needs and that, while you sent General Petraeus
in with one level, when the Allawi government took charge they de-
cided to raise that very substantially.
Secretary RUMSFELD. That is under discussion now.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Secretary RUMSFELD. The other thing I would say, it is easy to
count numbers of people manned, it is easy to count equipment,
and it is easy to count number of weeks of training. The tough stuff
is the soft stuff. It is the chain of command, it is the leadership
structure, it is do you have generals and colonels and noncommis-
sioned officers and people in an integrated, well-staffed capability
that they can manage their affairs. That — in the ministry of inte-
rior and in the ministry of defense. Reality tells me that that is
going to be the toughest part of this puzzle, not simply buying
trucks and weapons.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
Mr. Secretary, I was very pleased to hear your comments in re-
sponse to Senator Warner's question about the necessity of BRAC.
Would you recommend a veto if the defense bill came to the Presi-
dent that had a 2-year delay in BRAC?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I certainly would. It would be a ter-
rible thing, Senator.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, did you happen to see today's Reuters story, "The
United States and Japan have detected signs that North Korea is
preparing to launch a ballistic missile with a range capable of hit-
ting almost all of Japan"?
Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not see the Reuters story. I have been
told about that.
Senator McCain. The reason why I bring this up is at a time of
withdrawal of troops we obviously are seeing increasing bellicosity
and lack of cooperation on the part of the North Koreans, who are
unpredictable at best, which raises the whole issue of personnel
that I am extremely concerned about.
I think we all appreciate that we are going to be in Iraq for a
long period of time in significant numbers. We now, for the first
time in history, have the largest percentage on a sustained basis
of Guard and reservists as part of our Active-Duty Forces, some 40
percent in Iraq. We are calling up people on active duty who are
members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who thought that
they would never ever be recalled to active duty. We have a thing
that some call a back-door draft and that is a "stop loss" where
people are being required to remain on active duty past their en-
listed time.
35
Meanwhile, there are units, such as the Second Brigade of the
Tenth Mountain Division, who have been home for 208 days be-
tween more than year-long deployments in Iraq. The impact of this,
anecdotally, is very serious on recruiting and retention, and now
facts are emerging. The Guard recruiting fell 12 percent below
their goals in the first three quarters of 2004. The delayed entry
program for the United States Army is well below its goals for this
year.
We have authorized an increase and so has the House in active
duty personnel. We have 30,000 individuals in addition on active
duty through various ways that we have all been made aware of,
30,000 additional for some "temporary" time.
My point is, Mr. Secretary, that if something happens in Korea —
the Iranians are now thumbing their nose at the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their Nonproliferation Treaty vio-
lations— that the strain on our active duty, Guard, and Reserve
Forces are incredible as we speak, and there are very few people
that I know who believe that we can sustain the level of deploy-
ments that we are having just to Iraq. Then we have a problem
with Korea or with Iran or another flashpoint in the world and it
is clear, at least to most observers, that we do not have sufficient
personnel, despite the efficiencies which you have so well and
graphically described.
Now, I can only quote Colonel Rob Baker, commander of the Sec-
ond Brigade, First Armored Division, who knows something about
the personal costs of extended combat tours. After spending 19 of
the past 20 months deployed in Iraq and the Middle East, he re-
cently returned home and found himself unable to pick out his
youngest daughter in the "welcome home" crowd.
Baker said: "I know the strains that back to back deployments
can put on a great relationship and a great family. There is a
threshold beyond which people will say T just cannot give any
more.'"
Now, we are hearing, Mr. Secretary, that good and decent and
wonderful and brave and patriotic and sacrificing Americans who
are serving in the military are saying that they cannot keep up this
level of deployments. Much larger percentages of military person-
nel than was in past conflicts are married, and many of them with
children.
Now, I am very concerned about the personnel situation in the
military, and I would be glad to hear from General Jones and Ad-
miral Fargo and General LaPorte as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Senator. This is an enormously
important issue. It is true that there has been modest use of the
individual ready reservists and there very likely will be somewhat
additional use of individual ready reservists. They all knew from
the beginning when they signed up, as I did, to be a reservist that
for a period after you are in the Selected Reserve you are available
in the Individual Ready Reserve.
With respect to stop-loss, that is not new. It has been used for
decades, as I understand it, by the military, and it is aimed at unit
cohesion. It has not had a significant effect to my understanding.
All of us are deeply sensitive to the things you are raising and
that is why we have something like 30 different things going on to
36
reduce stress on the force. We mentioned some in my testimony:
the movement of military jobs to civilian jobs so that more military
are available; the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve.
The fact is we have 1.4 million on active duty, we have 850,000
in the Selected Reserve, we have another 450,000 in the Individual
Ready Reserve, for a total of over 2.5 million people, and we are
only putting 250,000 in the U.S. Central Command Area of Respon-
sibility (CENTCOM AOR). So we have a lot of people that have not
been called up in the Reserves ever. We have a lot of people who
are not being used. What we need to do is better manage the force.
To the extent, as you also indicated, we have increased the total
size of the force, we have had to under the President's emergency
authority so that we could meet our demands.
If we need to increase the size of the force, we need to increase
the size of the force, and I am all for it. It would pain me to do
it when we have so many portions of the force that are not being
properly used, and I would much prefer to see us do that.
I am not knowledgeable about the numbers you used in recruit-
ing and retention, but when I talk to General Schoomaker he tells
me that his recruiting and retention numbers are pretty good, quite
good, except in one or two categories, and that he does not at the
moment see a particular problem.
Do you want to comment, Dick?
Senator McCain. I do not need General Myers' response. I know
it will be exactly the same as yours. I would like the personal opin-
ions— and I do not mean that as in any way a criticism, General
Myers. I would like the personal opinions of the other combatant
commanders if I could, since my time has expired.
Chairman WARNER. I think that I will grant from my time the
opportunity for General Myers to reply.
General Myers. I have a few numbers here that might help. Re-
tention of Reserve Forces: They have targeted ceilings for loss.
They are under those. They could be impacted, those numbers
could be impacted, by stop-loss. When they come back and stop-loss
is taken off that could change that.
The Army National Guard is the one area where the recruiting
is the tightest right now. They probably will not make their goals
this year. On the other hand, they are going to be within 2 percent
of their end strength. So there are lots of numbers you could use
to look at these things.
I think what Senator McCain said is very valid. What we have
to do is look out beyond what we know and try to predict what our
retention is going to be. This would be a very serious matter if we
wind up in a year or 2 and we do not have the kind of force that
we need, particularly in the Reserve component, because they are
not built overnight and they are so essential, I think, to the way
we do our military business in this country and connect us to our
citizenry.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, before the other witnesses re-
spond, I did not mean it as any slight to General Myers. I apolo-
gize, General Myers, if I did. I was interested in the operational as-
pect of the commands, and I apologize. I always value your opinion.
37
The chairman does not like me to practice, as I usually do, run-
ning over the time allowed me rather significantly. I apologize,
General Myers.
Chairman Warner. We will now hear from the other combatant
commanders.
Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, Senator, this is something we
are watching very closely, looking at all of the metrics. It is a con-
cern. I think we are fortunate in the Pacific that the naval forces
and the air forces have largely been reconstituted from their work
in CENTCOM and so they are essentially full up. We have used
those forces in the Pacific to compensate for the stress that we rec-
ognize is on the ground forces right now, and that is the reason you
have seen things such as the bomber deployments to Guam, the ro-
tation of the John C. Stennis into the western Pacific. She will be
backfilled by Abraham Lincoln later on this year.
Senator McCain. I was asking about effects on retention and mo-
rale.
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. The numbers right now remain high.
The retention certainly in all of the armed services in the Pacific
Command are above, well above, historical norm.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
General LaPorte. Senator, it is hard to dispute the anecdotal
comments of people who have had great separation. I reflect back
on the separation that the World War II generation had in terms
of family.
Senator McCain. Which happened to be a declared war.
General LaPorte. The issue of increasing the size of the military
I think is more an issue of increasing the effectiveness of the mili-
tary. That includes the size dimension and we are growing the
Army. But it also includes an issue of increasing effectiveness rel-
ative to the organizational structure, the capabilities, and the ac-
cess of those capabilities. Those are programs that I am convinced
General Schoomaker is working very diligently.
In terms of the impact on retention, in my command, retention
is extremely high. I will quote an example. We instituted a policy
where we asked soldiers to increase their voluntary stay in the Re-
public of Korea. We called it the assignment incentive program. We
began that program on 15 March. Up to today, we have had 8,700
soldiers and airmen voluntarily extend their tour of duty in Korea
by 1 year and 2,000 of those extended for 2 years.
That is a volunteer willingness to accept personal sacrifice. I
think that is a pretty good indication of the dedication of our young
men and women.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Jones.
General Jones. Senator, in the European theater reenlistments
and retention across the components appear to be satisfactory. We
do have, we have had for some time, a greater reliance on Reserves
and National Guards, to be absolutely truthful. However, we do
have some good news coming with the situation in Macedonia being
fairly well resolved, Bosnia is now coming to a closure in terms of
our reliance on large numbers of U.S. troops, so I think that will
help relieve some of the strain.
38
The greatest impact with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq with
regard to European forces has been on the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Air Force. We have seen, obviously, two full Army divisions com-
mitted in Iraq and we have other forces that are training now, get-
ting ready to take a rotation back into Afghanistan.
One of the things that I think makes the retention picture and
the reenlistment picture good is that Congress and the Department
of Defense and the Services have worked together to I think create
family support programs and quality of life programs that have
really helped over the past 5 or 6 years, have been instrumental —
I am always tremendously impressed at the support system that is
available to the families, whether it is in Germany or in the con-
tinental United States.
Having said that, obviously there are only so many people in the
force and if you use it at a cyclic rate you have to be very careful
because at some point you could overuse it, and I think all of us
are very sensitive to that.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, one more comment, if it is per-
missible.
Chairman WARNER. Yes.
General MYERS. With respect to Korea in particular, but our war
plans in general, one of the things the Joint Chiefs of Staff do as
we deploy forces around the world, particularly to the Central
Command, is take a look at our ability to support those other war
plans that we know we might have to fill. We look at this periodi-
cally to make sure we can do that.
With regard to the Korean war plan in particular, there should
be no doubt that we have the forces to respond to that contingency
if we need to do that. That is something that we measure and we
look at regularly.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
I will charge those responses, add it to my time.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Listening to Prime Minister Allawi this
morning and the Secretary brief to Congress yesterday, as the
chairman pointed out, it seems like we are operating in two dif-
ferent worlds. Yesterday we heard from Secretary Rumsfeld and
others that the military never lost a battle and elections are on
schedule, and today we heard from Prime Minister Allawi saying
that we are succeeding in Iraq. Notwithstanding what the adminis-
tration says, the July National Intelligence Estimate makes clear
that, as bad as things are now, they could get worse. As the press
has reported, the intelligence estimate paints a very different pic-
ture.
For example, the Washington Post said last Friday, the intel-
ligence estimate: "Iraq's prospect for stability and self-governance
over the next 18 months were at best tenuous, according to U.S.
Government officials who had read the report." The report identi-
fied serious problems in recruiting, training an effective Iraqi army
and police force, and establishing a competent central government,
rebuilding significant infrastructure.
39
Today the Congressional Quarterly said about the estimate: "It
forecasts three scenarios for Iraq, ranging from continued violence
at current levels to civil war."
Now, I am bringing this up, Mr. Secretary, because I listened to
the report yesterday, then I went down and read the NIE report,
and I have quoted the public documents that are out in the record
now characterizing it.
The report also included some unclassified polling data that was
collected by the CPA, and the CIA obviously felt it was valid
enough to include as part of the intelligence estimate, and it cer-
tainly rings an alarm bell about the lack of support for our mission.
I have an unclassified version of that page and it shows that over
90 percent of the Iraqis view us as occupiers, not liberators. It
shows that nearly 50 percent of the Iraqis view insurgent attacks
as an attempt to liberate Iraq from U.S. occupation. It says that
over 75 percent of Iraqis believe that insurgent attacks have in-
creased because Iraqis have lost confidence in the coalition, and the
number of Iraqis who want us to leave immediately has grown dra-
matically— all in that chart — and support for the coalition has de-
clined dramatically.
Yet President Bush dismissed the ominous parts of the estimate,
saying the CIA was just "guessing" what conditions might be like.
Today he said he should have used a better word, "estimate," not
"guess."
The intelligence estimate is not the only alarming sign that con-
ditions in Iraq have gone from bad to worse. During August, 900
American troops were killed or wounded. The numbers keep going
up, not down. The same month our forces were attacked an average
70 times a day, far more than the previous year. The Schlesinger
report, which you commissioned, says that senior leaders in the De-
partment of Defense failed to see the insurgency growing in Iraq
last year.
We know that after heavy fighting our troops withdrew from
Fallujah, which has allowed the insurgents to regroup and gather
strength. Other cities in the Sunni Triangle remain violent and
dangerous.
Yet all we hear from the administration are rosy scenarios. The
reality is much worse and the administration failed to plan for it.
We seem to be closer to mission impossible rather than mission ac-
complished. The failures so far have made our job and the job of
Prime Minister Allawi far more difficult.
So let me ask you, how do you explain the huge discrepancy be-
tween what you say and what we see, and how can whatever gov-
ernment is elected be seen as legitimate if large parts of the popu-
lation do not feel safe enough to vote?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First of all, I do not agree with your
premise that there is a wide disparity between what I say or what
General Abizaid said yesterday and what the prime minister said
or what the NIE said. Is the glass half empty or half full? Is it dan-
gerous? Yes. Are people being killed? Yes. Is it a violent country?
You bet. Were there 200 and some odd people killed in Washington,
D.C., last year? Yes. Were they on the front page of every news-
paper? Were they on the television every night? No.
40
Now, first of all on the data in the classified material you cited
to
Senator KENNEDY. Just on this point, just on your point about
everything
Chairman WARNER. Let us give the Secretary the opportunity.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Just a minute. This data is probably 4 or
5 months old, probably April, May, say May. So it is June, July,
August, September.
Number two, the data that you cited comes from three cities —
Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. It does not come across the entire
country.
Is the data probably right? Yes. Was it right then? Probably. Is
it true today? I do not know. Do polls swing around depending on
the circumstance? You bet.
Is this exactly what the terrorists want to have happen? Yes.
They want to have the people of the country lose heart. They want
to have the people of the country decide that the terrorists and the
extremists are going to win and that the free Iraqi government and
the coalition forces that are trying to help that country are going
to lose, and it is a test of wills.
Now, I do not believe that you have heard from General Myers
or me or others, even General Abizaid, a rosy picture. You cannot
think it is a rosy picture when you see people killed every day, and
we understand that. I think it is a mischaracterization.
Senator Kennedy. Let me point out, this is what the President
said, August 23: "We are making progress on the ground." August
24, the Vice President: "We are moving in the right direction in
Iraq." September 14, Don Rumsfeld: "I am very encouraged about
the situation in Iraq."
I could continue to read these. I am also talking about the
growth of violence, and I am also saying that that poll was — I am
not pulling that poll out. That was in the NIE report, Mr. Sec-
retary. Evidently the CIA thought it was of at least some value.
Secretary RUMSFELD. It is.
Senator Kennedy. So we ought to include it in the report.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is fine.
Senator Kennedy. The point that you cannot get away from is
the dramatic increase in violence. You might be able to dismiss a
poll, but we have this dramatic increase of violence.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not dismiss the poll, Senator.
Senator KENNEDY. I am talking now about the violence.
Secretary RUMSFELD. I said it was probably accurate when it was
made.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Let us put it in whatever perspective
you want.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Okay.
Senator Kennedy. Let us get to the dramatic increase in vio-
lence. That is the violence has increased.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. No two ways about it.
Secretary RUMSFELD. That is right, I said that.
Senator Kennedy. It has increased. It has increased and it con-
tinues to increase.
41
Secretary Rumsfeld. General Abizaid said it yesterday in the
hearing you were attending. We all say that.
Senator Kennedy. Well, what is the plan? What is plan B then?
How are we going to get people out to vote with the dramatic in-
crease in violence in these places? How are we going to expect that
you are going to have a real election in Fallujah when you have
the dissidents and the insurgents controlling it today? How are you
going to have elections there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me see if I can respond this way. The
situation in Iraq is notably different in different parts of the coun-
try. It is not a single picture. It is quite different. The prime min-
ister today said that he believed that in a large fraction of the total
provinces elections could be held today.
Now, when the elections are held in January it may be that some
of those provinces have higher levels of violence. But you can — I be-
lieve he is right, the prime minister, that you will be able to hold
elections and that there will be elections in January. As he said
today, everyone said you could not go past sovereignty. We did it.
We passed it 2 days early. They said you could not hold a con-
ference of 1,000 people and pick 100 people for the constituent as-
sembly. They did it.
They have met every single benchmark politically. They are mak-
ing progress. Now, they are making progress at a time when the
people, the extremists, are trying to chop people's heads off. Does
anyone think that is a good idea, to chop people's heads off, to en-
courage that? I do not. I think it is a terrible thing.
But it may be — I should not even say this, because I just do not
know enough about it. This is something that the ambassador is
working on. But let us pretend hypothetically that you get to elec-
tion time in January and let us pretend that it is roughly like it
is or a little worse, which it could be because you have to expect
it to continue. They are not happy the way it is going. They do not
want a government elected in that country. Badly they do not want
that.
Let us say you tried to have an elections and you could have it
in three-quarters or four-fifths of the country, but some places you
could not because the violence was too great. Well, so be it. Noth-
ing is perfect in life. So you have an election that is not quite per-
fect. Is it better than not having an election? You bet.
Senator KENNEDY. Are you planning to have more troops?
Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not have a plan for troops or more or
less.
Senator Kennedy. For the elections?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I know that General Abizaid has said that
it may be that he will want some more troops. He is getting more
troops every day. If you think about it, the Iraqi forces are now the
biggest part, almost the biggest part, the second biggest part, of the
coalition. We have 39,000 police trained, equipped, and on duty.
You have 14,000 border guards trained, equipped, and on duty. You
have 5,000 in the army trained, equipped, and on duty. The na-
tional guard has 38,000. The intervention force has 2,000. The spe-
cial ops has 500.
42
That number will keep growing, so there will be more troops by
time of election. It will be somewhere between 110,000 and
140,000, I would guess, Iraqi troops, forces of various types.
Coalition forces, I do not know. Some forces have said they will
come in to help protect the U.N. Some countries are considering
whether they want to bring in forces to help with the election. In
the event General Abizaid decided he needs more forces to assist
in the elections, like he has for example in Afghanistan, he will ask
and he will get it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
I would like to take a minute of my time. I likewise was con-
cerned about the NIE and I asked the Department of State to pro-
vide me with their comments, and I received the following, which
I will put into the record. This is dated September 8, which pre-
sumably is quite current: "Polls show that a large majority of Iraqis
have a positive outlook on their young democracy and the elections
that are to take place by January 2005. More than 77 percent of
respondents feel that regular fair elections would be the most im-
portant political right for the Iraqi people. 58 percent feel that the
democracy in Iraq is likely to succeed."
Also, in meeting with the prime minister, all of us studied his
distinguished biography. You talked about chopping off heads. Sad-
dam Hussein tried literally to chop his off one time and he suffered
a terrible injury, requiring over a year of hospitalization. I mention
that only because when you look into the faces of the prime min-
ister and the ministers that he had with him today, every one of
those men are operating as best they can voluntarily, under ex-
traordinary personal threats to them individually.
So I think they exhibit the will of the Iraqi people to succeed
under these difficult circumstances.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to get back onto the subject of your Global Posture
Review and kind of take us back to the very start. The previous
administration I understand had examined whether to consider re-
ordering their Global Posture, but had determined that such an ef-
fort would be difficult. What motivated you, Mr. Secretary, or the
President, to consider reordering our global posture, and explain to
us why this is so important in today's environment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, anyone who looked at where our
forces were left at the end of the Cold War had to know that they
were not where they ought to be.
Second, we have to be respectful of taxpayers' dollars.
Third, it seems to me that we have to be respectful of the men
and women who volunteer to serve in the military, and to the ex-
tent we can reduce stress on the force by reducing the number of
permanent changes of station for people and create a life that is
somewhat better for the spouses, so they will not have to change
jobs so frequently, and for the kids that do not have to get jerked
out of high school, that we owed it to them.
Fourth, we have found that, as we have gone along, our needs
are different. We were planning to fight in place in Korea and Eu-
rope. We are no longer planning to fight in place. We know the
odds are we are going to fight somewhere other than where we are
43
located. That means we simply must have the kind of usability of
our forces. We have to be able to get them out of there and get
them where they need to go and get them fast, and not have a big
debate with a neighboring country about whether or not you can
use rail across their country because their sensitivities are both-
ered by something.
We also want people where they are wanted. Our forces — we are
going to have better recruiting and better retention if they are in
places where the people want them there.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the 21st century does not call
for the permanent deployment of heavy forces. We are going to
have to be agile, we are going to have to move fast, we are going
to have to be able to go where the problem is.
I would submit that no one on this committee asked Secretary
Cheney when he was being looked at for Secretary of Defense
about Iraq, and yet he ended up in a war in Iraq. No one asked
me about Afghanistan. If that does not tell you that it is not pos-
sible to know where a threat is going to come from — we are going
to have to deal with capabilities that enemies have that are in-
creasingly lethal and dangerous, but can come from any number of
locations.
As a result, I just felt compelled to push this. The President and
I talked about it. It is an incredibly difficult task. It is so com-
plicated and so difficult to deal with so many countries and so
many committees of Congress. It is going to cost some money, let
there be no doubt.
So it is not something where you get up in the morning and say,
"Gee, I think I would like to go change the force posture of the
United States of America." This is something we had to do, and we
are doing it.
Senator Allard. Mr. Secretary, when do you think you will be
able to implement the Global Posture Review? I would like to hear
comments from the other members on the panel here. Then also,
when do you anticipate the reorienting of our forces will be com-
pleted? Again, I would like to have the full panel respond to those
two questions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can give you a short general answer and
it is that I do not know. What we have to do is we have a theory
as to where we prefer to be arranged and with what countries and
in what ways. We have other choices. We have options. We will go
to those first choices first, and if we can get an arrangement that
is satisfactory in terms of usability and cost we will do it. If we
cannot, we will go to our second choice and work that out. We will
call audibles as we go along.
It will play out probably over a period of 6 to 8 years, is my best
guess.
Senator ALLARD. Do any other members of the panel have any
comments on when we start implementation? Yes, General Jones?
General JONES. Senator, some of the elements of the plan actu-
ally can already be considered to be under way. The Navy and Air
Force component headquarters have begun — we have begun
streamlining them. These are things that are important to do in
order to modernize our headquarters and transform them into ac-
tual warfighting headquarters.
44
We have conducted exercises in Eastern Europe to test a rota-
tional concept. So we are doing a lot of things to get ready for the
majority of the work. We are negotiating — we are talking to our al-
lies and friends and making sure that they understand the intent
and how this is beneficial.
Also, in Europe this is extremely closely watched by our allies be-
cause it also affects the transformational plans of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization. We have many countries that we work
with on a regular basis, particularly the newer members from the
eastern part of Europe, who are very interested in reducing the
size of their armies, principally, and transforming them into capa-
bilities that are much more usable and much more expeditionary.
The United States Army in Europe, which forms the bulk of our
transformation, is really the model that others are looking for to
try to emulate.
This is going to take a long time. It is not something you can
rush into. But it is definitely something that we feel is worth doing.
Senator Allard. Admiral?
Admiral Fargo. Senator, just as General Jones has said, some of
our efforts are already under way, and I think I mentioned in my
opening statement that we have already moved two of the three
submarines to Guam. We have rotational bomber elements in
Guam right now. The Stryker brigades are being formed and
trained and they will be in position early. We just broke ground on
C-17 facilities in Hawaii.
So this is the early, the leading edge of this. I think the rest of
it will occur probably over about a 10-year period. I think that is
a fair estimate of how long it will take to conduct this complex and
extensive change.
Senator Allard. I know my time has expired, but I just want to
follow up this question if the chairman will allow me. The press
has reported there will be 70,000 they think may be returning back
to the United States. Can you comment about that figure that has
been put out there, and if it is close to true, what impact it may
have on what facilities we already have in this country?
Secretary RUMSFELD. I can comment on it. You have been given
a report from the Department on this that has a classified attach-
ment. The classified attachment will give you the details in each
country that is a theory, a first choice.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. I have it here in my hand. I was
about to mention it. It is in the committee files that arrived a few
days ago and it gives an outline of those options together with the
figures and the locations.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But we have said broadly, Senator, that
70,000 is about the right number that would be moving from an
overseas post to a possession or a State of the United States, plus
another 100,000 dependents. If I am not mistaken, the number of
installations, meaning any kind of facility — a base, a radar an-
tenna, radio antenna, could be a storage facility — we are going to
go from something like 560 down to 360 outside of the U.S. Think
of the advantage from a force protection standpoint — enormous.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
45
We now have Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Gentlemen, thanks for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I applaud you for going forward with the Global
Posture Review and committing to implementing it. In a lot of
ways it is long overdue. It makes sense as part of a general trans-
formation of our military.
I noted, I believe in response to Senator Allard, that you said
there is a lot of work to be done with many countries and many
committees of Congress. I wonder which was harder work? [Laugh-
ter.]
You do not have to answer that question.
I wanted to ask you about what the fiscal implications of this
Global Posture Review will be, both short-term and longer-term, in-
sofar as you are able. In other words, I assume that in the shorter-
term there are some significant costs associated with moving the
personnel around, and I would like to hear something about that.
But then what about the longer-term? Are there savings potentially
involved here or not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are. If one thinks — I do not know
what the average cost of a permanent change of station is, but if
you think of the reduction in the total number of permanent
changes of stations and moving vans and dependents, 100,000 de-
pendents back in the U.S., it is significant savings.
Now, the cost is greater than the savings during the immediate
period, v/hich is always true. The same is true with BRAC. We do
not know the number because we do not know which of the options
we will end up landing on. But there has been a wild guess and
I think it is in the material that has been given to you and I would
rather not say it because I am sure it will be wrong. But it is a
very, very, very modest percentage or percentage of a percentage
of the Future Years Defense Plan.
Now, the Future Years Defense Plan is very big, so I am not sug-
gesting it is a small amount of money. It is in the billions. But part
of it will depend on how much other countries will pay and part
of it will depend on — the other advantage, of course, is we will be
filling bases that would then not be BRAC'ed.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Let me come back to another one of Senator Allard's questions.
The total number redeployed is 70,000. Obviously not all, I pre-
sume, are coming back to the U.S. A number will be redeployed
elsewhere.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. or U.S. possessions.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a net number worldwide.
Senator Lieberman. So the net will not just be redeployed — the
70,000 is a number that will go to U.S. or U.S. possessions, not to
other foreign countries?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. There will also be moves among
foreign countries.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Secretary RUMSFELD. But that is in addition to the 70,000.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I appreciate that clarification.
46
In terms of calculating the cost and considering the agility that,
as you describe and have been committed to, that we need in our
military forces, is there a concern that we should have that it will
cost more in a time of crisis to deploy forces from the U.S. as op-
posed to forward-deployed positions around the world closer to po-
tential crisis spots?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me say two things in that regard. First,
let me go back to the first question. We always have to look at
what it costs to do it. We also want to look at what the costs would
be if we did not do it. The cost if we did not do it would be that
we would continue for another 50 years malarranged in the world,
arranged for the last century, not the current century, and have a
considerably greater stress on our force. That cost is significant.
I am sorry, I lost your
Senator Lieberman. My question is, is there not a concern that
if we move that many net numbers back to the U.S.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, in terms of deployment.
Senator Lieberman. — that it will cost more to deploy them in
a crisis.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our people do not think so. For example,
if you have to go from Germany up north and then around into the
Atlantic Ocean and then down into the Mediterranean and then
over to the Middle East, it is about the same distance as from the
United States.
Second, we do not know where we are going to have to use these
forces to fight and therefore you cannot know what the cost would
be unless you know where it is you are going to be going. That is,
as I have said, something that is difficult to nail down at any given
time.
Senator Lieberman. General LaPorte, I want to ask you a ques-
tion because I have a question about Korea, but I also want to ask
you a question because Senator Reed loves to hear you speak be-
cause you are from Rhode Island. [Laughter.]
The question is this. There have been concerns, as the Secretary
and I think you may have said, about moving approximately 12,500
of our troops out of South Korea when the North Koreans, Kim
Jong II, seem to be in an aggressive, certainly unpredictable, pos-
ture. I wonder to the extent you are able to describe to us why we
should not have those concerns. In other words, what will we con-
tinue to have on the ground in the region, that if there is some ag-
gressive action, hostile action by the North Koreans, that we
should not worry that we have 12,000 fewer boots on the ground
there?
General LaPorte. Senator, that is a very fair question. In Korea
I often use a translator and Senator Reed thought I might need a
translator for this committee. [Laughter.]
There are tremendous capabilities resident on the Korean Penin-
sula. As I mentioned, the Republic of Korea military is over
600,000 strong. They are a very capable military, well-led, well-
equipped, highly motivated. We should never forget that.
In terms of the reduction of 12,500, the capabilities that are resi-
dent in the region that are provided by Pacific Command — there
are seven United Nations bases, for example, in Japan. Those
bases have tremendous capabilities, rapid reinforcement capabili-
47
ties, to the peninsula, as well as our strategic deployment capabil-
ity.
So I am very confident that this reduction will not increase risk.
Kim Jong II has always had a strategy of provocation. For years
that is what he does. He will continue to do that regardless of the
number of forces that are resident on the peninsula.
Senator LlEBERMAN. Let me be specific on this one. Moving
troops away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul south 50
miles, what are the plusses and minusses of doing that?
General LaPorte. The plusses are we could not be tactically
fixed by North Korea's artillery, first of all, because we would be
out of the range of the artillery and we would have the operational
agility to go where we need to go.
Second, it gives us better training opportunities. We went to
ground 50 years ago and we stayed there for 50 years. We are used
to being at the end of dusty trails. Today those camps are sur-
rounded by urban development and we have become an irritant to
the Korean people when we crank our helicopters, fire our tanks.
So we need to move to an area that is less intrusive and gives us
an opportunity to train better.
Senator Lieberman. So moving south is not only not a diminish-
ing of our capacity to stop a potential North Korean move on the
ground south, it actually puts us in a better position to respond to
it?
General LaPorte. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I know I am not the only one who worries that
in a political season about the debate over our policy in Iraq what
impact the negativism and the doom and gloom that we hear
preached in some quarters has on our troops. So I think we have
a special responsibility, those of us who serve in public office, to
make sure that we do what we do responsibly.
But it does have an impact on people all across America as well,
because they wonder how much of this doom and gloom as opposed
to what we heard from Prime Minister Allawi this morning about
positive steps and progress in Iraq — what is the truth. For exam-
ple, yesterday afternoon I had a constituent of mine call me from
Lubbock, Texas, because he heard yesterday that it is possible that
the President would reinstate the draft to handle the war in Iraq
if reelected. This statement followed on a charge last week that the
President is planning a surprise post-election callup of additional
Guard and Reserve troops.
Mr. Secretary, would you state for the record, are there any
plans for a post-election callup of additional Guard or Reserve
troops, and is there any plan to reinstate the draft?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me take the first one on the draft and
I will leave General Myers to talk about how we are managing our
force rotation.
I am not supposed to get in politics, but it is absolutely false that
anyone in this administration is considering reinstating the draft.
That is nonsense. We have 295 million people in the United States
48
of America. We need 1.4 million people to serve in the Active Force.
We are having no trouble attracting and retaining the people we
need. If we were managing this force better — and it takes years to
rearrange it properly. It has been malorganized, malarranged as
between the active and the Reserve components, and we have too
darn many people in uniform doing civilian jobs. If we have to in-
crease the numbers above 1.4 million we can do it under the emer-
gency authority.
We are not having trouble maintaining a force of volunteers.
Every single person is a volunteer. We do not need to use compul-
sion to get people to come into the armed services. We have an
ample number of talented, skillful, courageous, dedicated young
men and women willing to serve, and it is false.
General Myers. On continued callup of the Reserve component
and the active duty, what we have done is try to build in as much
predictability as we can, both for Active Forces and for our Reserve
component forces. There will be more Guard and Reserve callups
in November, in December, in January, and for as long as we need
forces to provide to General Abizaid or any of the other combatant
commanders that are sitting here with me.
So yes, there will be. None of them have been delayed for any
reason. This is a process that has been consistent now for about the
last year. There were callups in September. There will be some in
October, there will be some in November. So yes, it will continue
on as we continue to feed forces to the combatant commanders to
do what they need to do.
But what we are really trying to do is get ahead of the whole
process so we can provide predictability, particularly for the Re-
serve component, who have to in many cases leave civilian jobs and
their families not near military installations and answer the call
their country gives them. So we are trying to do that.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that very much.
Let me just ask one more question and this time it is about the
subject upon which this hearing actually was convened, and that
is Global Posture Review. Of course, there have been some ques-
tions about the interrelationship or the interdependence of that
process and BRAC. Obviously that is something we are concerned
about on a number of different levels.
But can you explain to me, Mr. Secretary — it is unclear to me,
if this Global Posture Review, which I understand has been going
on for 3 years or more, how it is that we will make sure there are
accommodations here in the United States on existing military
bases, how those two are going to dovetail in a way that makes
sense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. It is really exactly this way. We
have decided that it makes sense to bring back to the United
States from all around the world, different places. We know those
numbers. We feed that number into the BRAC process and it then
becomes part of their deliberations as to where, which bases they
should go to and how it ought to be arranged.
Had we not done this work over the past 3 years, we would not
know what was going to have to come back and therefore there
would have been a question mark in the BRAC process. The two
are dovetailing perfectly and they link together tightly.
49
Senator CORNYN. Finally, I have heard it said that we are not
out of troops, we are out of balance, and I think that is a thumb-
nail sketch for what you described earlier with regard to the re-
structuring of our military, which I know is under way and General
Schoomaker and others are working on. But I will say that we have
already begun to see some evidence of that restructuring with re-
cent announcements of the placement of modular brigades at Fort
Hood and Fort Bliss. So this is a very dynamic period of time we
are in here, where I think we are going to see a lot of change, but
I think we are on the right track and I appreciate your efforts.
Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Reed.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, the Defense
Science Board has reached a very startling conclusion: inadequate
total numbers of U.S. troops. They briefed you, and also a lack of
long-term endurance. They suggest some ways to cope with this: to
trade combat capabilities for stabilization capabilities. That of
course impacts mission performance if there is a conventional con-
flict. Depend on others, like the United Nations or other nations;
that has been a dispiriting process over the last several years.
Even if we do all these things, their conclusion is extremely, I
think, both provocative and startling: "If everything we recommend
is implemented over the next 5 years, but we continue our current
foreign policy of military expeditions every 2 years, we will begin
two more stabilization operations without sufficient preparation or
resources." They conclude by saying: "Anything started wrong
tends to continue wrong."
That brings us back to points that Senator McCain and others
have raised. Iran and North Korea are provocative. They very well
might cause us to take military action. One hopes not. As you often
say, there is also the surprises that we do not even contemplate at
this moment.
As a result I find it again puzzling why you have not supported
an authorized end strength increase, including those soldiers, par-
ticularly marines, in the regular budget process, obtaining the
funds for them by looking at other programs outside of the Army
and the Marine Corps, because if we do not do this I think we are
running off the cliff, if you will.
Relying on supplemental appropriations is increasingly more
challenging. The Army, I am told, has an $8 billion requirement for
equipment resetting, $4.5 billion for maintenance, $1.3 billion for
ammo, in addition to personnel costs.
But I think the major point, the one I think the Defense Science
Board concludes with, is that we have put ourselves in a strategic
position where we may not be able to respond to obvious threats
that we are seeing today.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me comment and then I know
General Myers will want to comment. I thought the study was a
good one, the summer study of the Defense Science Board, and I
thought it was sufficiently interesting that I have had it briefed to
50
the Chiefs and I believe the combatant commanders and others in
the Department.
Second, you said we have not supported an increase in strength.
We have and we have an increase in strength under the emergency
authorities. We have not supported an end strength increase, per-
manent end strength increase by statute, that is correct. The rea-
son for that very simply is we do not need to do that and the Army
prefers not to until they have a sense, General Schoomaker, until
he has a sense of how he is able to transform the Army force from
33 brigades up to 43 and possibly 48. He believes — he does not
know, but he believes that over a period of 4 or 5 years doing that
he may be able to do that without a permanent increase in end
strength because of the 20 or 30 other things we are doing, several
of which I have mentioned here today.
Believe me, if we need more end strength we will request more
end strength. We will either do it under the emergency authority
to start with or we will come before Congress. The senior managers
of the Department are doing I believe it is 35 or 40 different things
to relieve stress on the force and it is having a payoff already. We
have been able to achieve things.
We also, under General Schoomaker's theory, are going to move
the spigot down on the rain barrel to be able to draw on more of
the 2.5 million men and women who have volunteered, because we
are only drawing on a very small fraction of them at the present
time.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, we have had these discussions for
probably 2 years now. It is becoming increasingly clear that your
response is simply avoiding the obvious. If we have a long-term
commitment in Iraq and other places, if we have to be prepared to
react to North Korea and Iran, we cannot live supplemental to sup-
plemental, the Army cannot. The equipment costs are piling up. We
need an end strength because we have to put the budget behind
that, not in a supplemental emergency capacity, but the money be-
hind it, and that has to be done.
Your own Defense Science Board, individuals that you chose, in-
dividuals that you respect, individuals you tasked to look at this,
have come back and said, not for the short run but the long run —
I mean, it is their conclusion — this is a long-term problem of main-
taining these forces.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It could be.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you continue to say it could be. It
is quite obvious.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I am not pulling this out of thin
air, my answers to you. What I am giving you is what the Chiefs
in the tank conclude, what the senior levels of the Department
have concluded. We would be happy to sit down and walk through
the entire process with you. It is complicated. There are a lot of
pieces to it.
Admittedly, there are uncertainties about whether — what can ac-
tually be achieved with the new national security personnel sys-
tem. There are uncertainties as to how far down that rain barrel
we can get that spigot. But if we cannot get it far enough because
we just cannot manage better, then by golly you are right, we will
have to go to an increase in end strength.
51
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, a final question on this point. Did
the Defense Science Board consider the changes that you are sug-
gesting, modularity? Were they aware of them? Did they consider
them?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know if they were briefed to the
extent of all the things we are doing in the Department. I doubt
it.
Senator Reed. So you had your experts study the issue of man-
power and they were not aware of what is going on in the Depart-
ment?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Knowing what is going on in the Depart-
ment is — it is a big Department, Senator, as you are well aware.
These are part-time people who come in and are given a specific
assignment and take a period and study it, and they do a terrific
job. To what extent they — if we gave them a quiz on all the things
that we are doing in the Department to reduce stress on the force,
I just am not in a position to answer your question.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, may I ask General LaPorte a ques-
tion because again, I like the way he talks? [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. If you wish to put a question to General
LaPorte, please feel free.
Senator Reed. General, your comments about the adequacy of
forces in Korea I presume are related to your current mission,
which is deterrence of a North Korean attack. Would those com-
ments change if you had to take military action to disarm North
Korea?
General LaPorte. I did not
Senator Reed. Take military offensive action to disarm North
Korea; would your comments change with respect to the adequacy
of the personnel and equipment?
General LaPorte. That is a difficult question to answer
Senator Reed. That is why I asked. I think that is the question,
though.
Chairman Warner. Why do you not, General, give us a brief re-
sponse and then provide a more extensive response for the record.
General LaPorte. I will do that.
Disarming North Korea would require a significant amount of ca-
pabilities, not just ground component but all our components. We
have significant capabilities to address that threat from North
Korea.
TThe information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, could I add something
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
General Myers. — just to try to help understand what we are
talking about here. When we talk about numbers, numbers do not
equal capability. We are trying to build capability. The Army plan
is to build more units of maneuver, the brigade. That is a very good
thing to do. We do look at this, the Joint Chiefs do, and we talk
to the combatant commanders. We ask ourselves, do we have
enough forces, because it is a very serious issue. We understand
that.
52
The Secretary has authorized the United States Army to go
30,000 above its authorized end strength to properly man it to do
the expansion in capability that it needs. That will take them
through early 2007, at which time they will see if they need a big-
ger Army.
We are on a glide slope or on a ramp right now that is about as
fast as you could do if you authorized whatever number you want
to authorize. It takes you time to recruit them and train them. But
we are on a slope that is probably above anything that could be au-
thorized right now, and it will take us until 2007 to figure out if
this is enough: what does the world look like?; is it as predicted by
the Defense Science Board, whatever it was?; every 2 years will we
have to be utilized in some sort of stability operation?; and we will
know.
Capability does count. I think General LaPorte will tell you that
a couple years ago, just 3 years ago, we were very worried about
the artillery that sat in North Korea behind the mountains, that
could range in some cases all the way to Seoul. South Korea. It was
a very big problem and the way we were going to solve it was a
lot of counter-battery fire from surface units.
The Joint Direct Attack Munition global positioning system-guid-
ed solves a lot of those problems. Now we can drop it all-weather.
These shoot-and-scoot systems the North Koreans have now are
very vulnerable to air power and other precision artillery systems.
It is almost — and that battle has changed dramatically, I think
General LaPorte would probably agree.
So as we talk about numbers, as we talk about this and that, we
have to remember we are talking capability in the end.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. To General Jones and Ad-
miral Fargo and General LaPorte, I would hope that you will ex-
press to the men and women serving under you how much we ap-
preciate their service to our country.
Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation in the media
over the last couple of days about the potential for the reinstitution
of the draft. I had my staff check and there appears to be some leg-
islation on the House side introduced by Congressman Rangel and
some legislation on the Senate side introduced by Senator Hollings.
As far as I know, neither one of those pieces of legislation has
moved one inch.
Is there any ongoing discussion at the Pentagon about the poten-
tial for the reinstitution of the draft?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Not a word.
Chairman Warner. Senator, the Secretary had that question
earlier and gave us a rather Trumanesque response to it, and he
may well follow it up by letter. But I am sure that he might add
a word here.
Senator CHAMBLISS. I appreciate that. I am sorry I missed the
first answer, but I am glad you got to answer it twice.
Also, Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation here ear-
lier in the questioning relative to the status of the police forces in
53
Iraq, also the Armed Forces in Iraq, and there have been some
comments in the media about statements that have been made rel-
ative to the size of both of those force structures and whether or
not the numbers that have been given are accurate.
I took the liberty of going to one of your Web sites today,
www.defendamerica.mil, and I pulled up two sheets, one of which
on page 22 at that Web site states "Police Forces, Current Status."
This document gives the number of components that have been au-
thorized, the number on duty, the number in training, the weapons
they have, the vehicles, and so forth and so on.
I look at page 23, it is titled "Armed Forces, Current Status."
Again, with respect to the Iraqi Army it gives the number author-
ized, the number on duty, the number in training, the number
trained, the weapons, vehicles, so forth and so on.
Is this public information that folks like me who do not know
much about how to use a computer can pick up as easy as I picked
this up today?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. It is readily available and it ought
not to be a mystery to anybody.
Senator CHAMBLISS. When you give out numbers or the Depart-
ment gives out numbers relative to the size of the Iraqi police
forces or the size of the Iraqi Armed Forces, are these the numbers
that you use and do you consistently update these numbers?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We do. General Casey and General
Petraeus work with General Myers and the Joint Staff to update
them I believe every 2 weeks.
Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you. These appear to be data as of
September 13, 2004.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to introduce
these two sheets of paper into the record.
Chairman WARNER. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Chambliss. Mr. Secretary, I noted your comment in your
written statement about restructuring the Reserve components to
achieve a more appropriate distribution of skills and create an en-
vironment in which reservists and guardsmen will mobilize less
often, with more predictability. I want to commend you for that ap-
proach, especially in your and the Department's efforts to shift the
reservists into career fields that are heavily used in order to reduce
the burden on certain specialties.
It is a fact that approximately 38 percent of our selected reserv-
ists have not been mobilized at all since September 11, 2001. This
does not appear to be an overuse of the Reserve. However, the fact
56
that many of our reservists have been deployed for long periods of
time while most of them have not been deployed at all indicates to
me that you are on the right track, that we need more people in
the high-demand career fields.
Could you update us on how these rebalancing efforts are going
and how it will affect the ways in which the Guard and Reserve
are used in coming years?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The Army has the biggest task
and it I believe has already accomplished somewhere between
10,000 and 20,000 of rebalancing between the active component
and the Reserve component. Is that about right?
General Myers. That is about right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. They are aiming, the Services generally are
aiming, at a number of about 10,000 a year over the coming period,
where they will be moving skill sets and balancing between the ac-
tive and the Reserve components so that the same people do not
get called up too frequently, and because we will then have, after
rebalancing, more people in the Active Force who have those skill
sets, that we now can reasonably predict are going to be needed in
the 21st century.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
General Jones, you made reference in your opening statement to
the need for strategic lift, both sealift and airlift, to project power
in the European theater and how this need will grow and trans-
form as EUCOM moves to more dispersed bases and operating lo-
cations. How would you assess your current airlift needs specifi-
cally and what limitations, if any, do you foresee in both the inter-
and intra-theater airlift in the coming years?
General Jones. Senator, as we transform the force, one of the
things that I like to point out is that we are transforming it to be-
come more strategically useful. One of the key elements in making
the force of the future effective is to balance the force that we have
forward deployed with the rotational forces that will be required in
various spots in order to maintain our influence, take into account
our alliance obligations, the coalitions, the crises, and the like.
So to me one of the most important elements of transformation
is the fact that, while we will be able to return a number of forces
and their families to the United States, the transformation of the
Services, notably the Army in particular, into more expeditionary
forces means that we will have a greater strategic effect across a
broader area, not just in Western Europe, where we have been for
50 years. In my theater it is relatively straightforward to see that
we will be engaged at greater distances to the east and I believe
that it is fair to say that there are upcoming challenges in the
southern part of our area of responsibility, notably Africa, that are
going to consume much of our time.
I think one of the critical elements in achieving new capabilities
will also be found in the mobility and the correct positioning of our
prepositioned equipment, both at sea and on land, and also ensur-
ing that our strategic airlift and sealift remains modern and ade-
quate to do the job. This is not just true in Europe; it is true in
all of the other combatant commanders' geographical areas of re-
sponsibility.
57
It is clear that the investment that we made in the C-17 is hav-
ing dramatic effects and this is really a capability that we just sim-
ply could not do without. I believe that we will continue to watch
to make sure that that very increasingly important component of
our overall ability is sufficiently resourced and modernized to make
sure that it is the engine that delivers the forces where we need
them.
So on that score I am confident that we have thought that
through and it is an essential component of all of our proposals to
transform our capabilities.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen. I appreciate very much
your being here today. Mr. Secretary, as you look at the trans-
formation and capabilities, I think Senator Reed's question about
what kind of capabilities would be required in South Korea, wheth-
er it is defensive or offensive, are you making any distinctions be-
tween offensive and defensive capabilities when we look at the
total transformation, reduction of troops, changing of locations of
our commands in the various parts of the world?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think General LaPorte should
answer the question and I will be happy to yield to him. But first
let me just say, I think I need to emphasize this: It is in the 21st
century, I honestly believe it is a mistake to count things and
equate them with capability. It simply is not the case.
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with you.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Second — and this is not directly to your
question, but, Mr. Chairman, I have to say this — deterrence de-
pends on the perception. It is what is in a person's mind. We have
had discussions today about whether or not the United States mili-
tary is capable of fulfilling its assigned missions. Let there be no
doubt, the United States military is capable of executing skillfully
and swiftly its assigned missions, and people ought not to go away
in the world with any different perception as a result of the kinds
of questions and discussions that have been taking place here
today.
The chairman and the chiefs and the combatant commanders ad-
dress this on a continuing basis. They do a series of things to deter-
mine how capabilities would be moved, how tasks would be accom-
plished. They know what they are doing and they are confident
that the United States can fulfill its assigned missions.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, in that regard, I assume
that is one of the reasons why Strategic Command now has both
offensive and defensive capabilities across the board with the mili-
tary; is that a fair question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, it is not the reason. It was simply a
matter of command assignments that seemed to make sense to the
chairman and to the chiefs and me.
General LaPorte, you may want to respond on the other piece?
General LaPorte. Sir, I would just add to what the Secretary
said. We are a combined force, a Republic of Korea-U.S. force, and
both nations have tremendous capabilities. Our operational plan-
ning is across a wide spectrum of potential scenarios. I would be
58
glad to give you detailed briefings on those, but it is a capability
that I am looking for as a commander, not some raw number, be-
cause there are more intangibles relative to capabilities.
Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate your answer. Thank you.
General Jones, I think NATO announced yesterday that they are
going to be expanding their training mission from 50 officers to
perhaps 300 officers in Iraq, and this is to train Iraqi security
forces before the January election. I know that it probably was not
an easy task to get that increase in support.
What does this bring to NATO's Iraqi commitment right now in
terms of numbers?
General JONES. The overall estimate in terms of the troop
strength required to execute this mission is about a brigade, rough-
ly about 3,000 total, to do the force protection requirements, to do
the infrastructure, logistics, and the trainers.
So the piece that was in the newspaper pertained to the trainers
and I would say that that is a fairly soft number. The real number
is being developed virtually as we speak, now that the North Atlan-
tic Council (NAC) has spoken and said to proceed with the concept
of operations, and that will be developed within the next few
weeks.
Senator Ben Nelson. Some critics have said that NATO, much
like our Guard and Reserve units, is stretched too thin. Do you
think that is true or do you think that is false, about NATO?
General Jones. The answer to that question is that this is an al-
liance of 26 sovereign nations. There are over two million people,
two million Europeans, wearing uniforms. The fraction that is de-
ployed is probably no more than about 60,000, maybe less.
What needs to happen in the alliance, as I have said before this
committee, is a transformation, and NATO is trying to do that. The
United States plays an important leadership role in showing the
way and in leading and supporting. NATO is trying to make a seri-
ous contribution. It is making a serious contribution in Afghani-
stan. It is wrapping up the Bosnian deployment after a number of
years. Kosovo is still very much a commitment that takes about
18,000 troops.
We are still involved in providing security, backup security, for
the Greek Armed Forces in the Olympics. There is an ongoing very
successful naval expeditionary operation in the Mediterranean that
really constitutes NATO's primary counterterrorism operation.
So the alliance is doing more. It is transitioning from a static, re-
active, linear posture that was required in the 20th century and it
is moving into answering the requirements of the 21st century. The
NATO Response Force is probably the most important trans-
formational program that is ongoing. So I think that as we become
more usable and as nations transform and their forces become
more usable and more expeditionary, despite the fact that their
numbers will go down, their capabilities will go up, and we are
looking forward to that progress.
Senator Ben Nelson. So they are focused on capabilities rather
than pure numbers of equipment, personnel, et cetera; is that accu-
rate?
General JONES. That is correct. The problem is what they have
now is pure numbers and we are trying to change that metric.
59
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General MYERS. Senator Nelson, let me just clarify one thing.
You asked the question about Strategic Command and perhaps
why we assigned certain missions, was it offense or defense-related.
Senator BEN NELSON. No, I meant combining them so we had the
capacity to look at both aspects of the military.
General Myers. Sir, I think the reason that we wanted to com-
bine Space Command and Strategic Command and give them some
new missions was because of the perspective that both those com-
mands had before we merged them and the perspective they would
need afterwards, and that was the global perspective. So every mis-
sion that they have been given has a huge global component, and
we thought we needed one of our unified commands to be respon-
sible for that. So that was more the issue than the offense and de-
fense.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for General Myers and General Jones. If it became the
policy of this country to announce that we would withdraw from
Iraq in 4 years or that would be our goal, what effect, if any, do
you think it would have on current operations, the terrorism men-
tality, and our allies in Iraq who are fighting for democracy?
General Myers. I think it would be playing into the hands of
folks like Zarqawi and the former regime elements that are trying
to keep progress in Iraq from happening. I think if we announce
our intentions to withdraw it would be detrimental. I think we
would see an increase in violence. If they thought there was a goal
line in sight, that is what they would march to.
So that is why we have said, I think, in front of the committee
consistently that, when asked on troop strength in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, that we have maintained that it will be what the com-
batant commander needs based on the situation on the ground.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with that, General Jones?
General Jones. Sir, I do. I think it is extremely important to
maybe look back on history. For instance, in Bosnia I think the
international community certainly wanted to solve that problem
quicker than we did, but it has taken over a decade and we are
coming to a conclusion.
I think it is very difficult to predict and not wise to announce end
states that you might not be able to deliver on.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary, it is very important to me that
we give an honest assessment about where we are going and how
can we get there in Iraq, and we will get to the globalization effort
here in a moment, not because I am unsupportive. I am very sup-
portive. But the likelihood of violence, to me, is going to increase
because of the elections here and there.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree.
Senator Graham. You made a comment that I think needs to be
explored a bit. What is the likelihood in your opinion of substantial
parts of Iraq being ungovernable by January and what can we do
to change that dynamic beginning now?
60
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that by January there will be elec-
tions and that they will be successful elections, although very likely
imperfect elections. I think that you are right, the level of violence
may very well increase between now and the Iraqi elections. I sus-
pect that if there were areas — first of all, the prime minister of
Iraq and General Abizaid and General Casey and the coalition
partners all understand that you cannot, over a sustained period
of time, permit safe havens and sanctuaries within a country that
will allow the enemies of that country to continue attacking it and
destroying it. They understand that.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If there were to be an area where the ex-
tremists focused during the election period and an election was not
possible in that area at that time, so be it. You have the rest of
the election and you go on. Life is not perfect.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
To the globalization effort, General Jones, are the Germans okay
with the idea that we are going to be reducing our forces in Ger-
many, and by how much will we reduce our forces under this plan?
General Jones. There is in security circles general agreement as
to the validity and the necessity of implementing this plan. The
thing that makes the argument, the portion of the argument that
makes it compelling, is that this is not just a troop reduction; this
is genuine transformation, and that the U.S. Army in Europe in
particular, which is much of the German preoccupation, is actually
going to be transformed with the advent of more expeditionary bri-
gades, one Stryker brigade, and the like.
Senator Graham. Are the Germans okay with the plan?
General JONES. To my understanding, at the Federal level they
are okay. Obviously there are some local mayors whose economics
differ a little bit on that, but at the national level and at the mili-
tary level I think we are fine.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Can I make two quick comments, please?
The German coordinator for U.S. relations said, "This is positive.
Let us not make a crisis out of something that is in reality a suc-
cess story. It is an expression of the fact that the Cold War is over
and that Europe's division has been eliminated."
Second, I have met with the Minister of Defense of Germany on
several occasions. He is doing exactly the same thing. He is adjust-
ing his force. He is reducing the number of locations, and he is
doing it in coordination with us.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
General, regarding Korea, is Taiwan okay with what we are
doing in Korea?
I am sorry, I cannot read his name. I apologize.
Chairman Warner. Do you mean to address that to the Admiral?
Senator Graham. The General in charge of Korea. I did not want
to mispronounce your name.
General LaPorte. Admiral Fargo might be
Chairman Warner. Admiral Fargo.
Senator Graham. I am sorry, I apologize.
Chairman Warner. He has of course jurisdiction primarily over
Taiwan.
61
Admiral Fargo. I think that when you look at the Pacific you
need to look at how we maintain a level signal
Senator Graham. No, my question is, is Taiwan okay with what
you are trying to do.
Admiral Fargo. I have not asked Taiwan that question and
would not.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Now, one word about what you are trying to do
Chairman WARNER. That is an important inquiry. I do not want
to have it too chopped up. Did you have adequate time to under-
stand the question and reply to it?
Senator Graham. He said he did not talk to Taiwan.
Admiral Fargo. I have not discussed that with Taiwan.
Chairman Warner. All right.
Senator Graham. Now, my concern is you are a reformer, Sec-
retary Rumsfeld, and I appreciate that and I think we need it, and
that is why I support BRAC, and you are trying to do some things
with the civilian aspects of the military, that I think are long over-
due.
I have a general concern. The fight is expanding and, whether
we like it or not, at least to me this signals that we are coming
home, and I see the fight expanding and it has many tentacles in
terms of the expansion. So I will go slow, evaluate, but I am con-
cerned about how it may affect some old friends and it may be
sending the wrong signal politically at absolutely the right time be-
cause we are going to need old friends.
One last comment. In terms of the force structure and numbers
and capability, all I can tell you is that over the last 2 years I have
seen more dispirited people than I thought I would see in uniform
in terms of the burden they are carrying. When I went to Kuwait,
getting ready to go into Iraq, I had dinner with nine young South
Carolinians, all of them reservists, in a truck maintenance com-
mand, and all nine are getting out. So I hope that does not con-
tinue to happen.
Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just quickly answer your first ques-
tion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, asked if this implied
a weaker U.S. commitment in the world, said: "Absolutely not. The
Cold War is a thing of the past." The Foreign Minister said that
"Japan welcomes the review of the U.S. military framework." South
Korea said: "The South Korean government has been well aware of
the plan." Australia said: "We see this initiative as a positive."
So I do not believe that anyone who gets up and takes a fresh
look at the world could honestly believe that it makes sense to stay
locked in the 20th century. We will be more mobile, more agile,
more lethal, and better able to live in the world that you have
properly described.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of those quotes by
different foreign officials, to include some press quotes. Could we
offer that for the record?
Chairman Warner. Without objection, you may insert at this
point into the record that important information.
62
[The information referred to follows:]
unclassifis::
insert for the record
senate ahmed services committee
hearing on: global review 0? the military forces stationed overseas
oats: 23 september 2004
PAGE #113, LINE #11
PA3E 1 of 2
The information follows:
Official
GERMANY: Karsten Voight, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US
relations: "This is positive: let's not make a crisis out of something
that is in reality a success story_it is an expression of the fact that
the Cold War is over and that Europe's division has been eliminated."
ITALY: Minister of Foreign Affairs Frattini, when asked if OS plans
imply a weaker US commitment: "Absolutely net. The Cold War is a thing
of the past."
JAPAN: Statement by the Foreign Ministry: "Japan welcor.es the
review of the US military framework that will better suit the global
security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
SOUTH KOREA: Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-Moon, when asked if
Seoul had been consulted: "The South Korean government has been well
aware of this plan," and he continued by dismissing fears of a security
vacuum on the Korean peninsula.
AUSTRALIA: Minister of Defense Hill: "_we see this initiative as a
positive development for both regional and global security. It will
improve US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat
global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and enable
the US to engage more effectively in regional contingencies."
RUSSIA: Minister of Defense Ivanov, when asked about US presence in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia: "I don't see anything alarming in these
plans . "
GERMANY: Deutsche Welle and Frankfurter Allgemeine - noted the
need for NATC to improve its own capabilities in conjunction with US
changes .
UK: 33C, Financial Times, and The Economist - favorable and
detailed discussion of the strategic rationale and implications.
• B3C: "_not a sign that the US is retreating into an
isolationist 'Fortress America.'"
• Financial Times : "_it is hard to argue with the logic of the
moves"
63
UNCLASSISIFED
INSERT FOR THE RECORD
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
HEARING ON: GL03AL REVIEW OF THE MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS
DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 2004
PAGE =113, LINE »11
PAGE 2 of 2
JAPAN: Japan Times and Asahi - praise for the strategic rationale
• Japan. Times: "-today's security landscape differs markedly
from that of the Cold War—military forces need to be quicker
and mere mobile, capable of deploying around the world at a
moment's notice. The planned redeployments are designed to
facilitate that objective."
Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I would like to join with the others in saluting you
and thanking you for your dedicated defense of our country and
your leadership. I support your plan to consolidate our forces that
are deployed worldwide. I look forward to the next phase of your
recommendation, which is their reassignment to Minnesota.
[Laughter.]
One of the ways we can, as Senator Graham said, reduce the
pressures on our Active Forces as well as our Reserves and our Na-
tional Guardsmen and women is to get the Iraqi forces to do what
the military and security forces of any country under any form of
government must do, which is to patrol their own streets and es-
tablish law and order and provide it and safeguard their highways
and defend their borders.
Mr. Secretary, when you testified before this committee last Feb-
ruary 4, you stated that — this is a direct quote: "We have acceler-
ated the training of Iraqi security forces, now more than 200,000
strong." The figure that was referenced in the documents provided
then, actually I believe slightly before then, and subsequent to that
statement that I have seen, confirmed that figure. Then to my
knowledge, the first time it was stated publicly, on September 14,
7 months later, is that that number is down now to 105,000 that
are trained, equipped, and manned up, Iraqi security forces.
I am confused by what exactly this redefinition of what con-
stitutes "security forces" is. But that is a big disparity, sir, from
206,000 down to 105,000.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me explain it as clearly as is humanly
possible. We said there were 206,000 security forces. Since then we
have subtracted 74,000 Facility Protection Service people that are
reporting to the various Iraqi ministries and are now classifying
them as security forces. They obviously are providing security for
facilities, but they are not police, they are not border patrol, they
are not army, and they are not counterterrorism or National Guard
activities. So that is one difference.
The other difference is within the 206,000, as we said, was a
mixture of people that were trained and not trained. Now the num-
ber we are using now is 100,000 today that are manned, trained,
and equipped. They have the equipment, they have the appropriate
64
training. There are more than that on duty, the ones who are not
fully trained and do not have full equipment. That number is
scheduled in January 2005 to be 145,000.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Taking then that number, 100,000
that are now equipped and trained — and I do not know what the
current estimate is of the insurgency forces, say for example under
direct control of Zarqawi. If there are those numbers, though — I
have never seen a published report of the insurgent strength esti-
mated anywhere near approximately that number — why are not
those security forces of Iraq going after someone like that, and if
he is holed up somewhere like Fallujah, where he is reputed to be,
if the intelligence tells you and them where he is, why are not
50,000 or 75,000 or whatever number it takes going in there?
I can understand why our forces should be respecting certain
sites in that city or that country, but why are they not doing what
they should be doing to protect their own country and stand up for
it? I guess as a corollary to that, as long as they know there are
138,000 of the best, the most courageous fighting forces in the
world, our own soldiers, in there doing their work for them, what
is to motivate them to take those positions instead?
Secretary RUMSFELD. There are currently about 100,000 Iraqi se-
curity forces, there are currently 138,000 U.S. forces and about
23,000 coalition forces, for a total of 261,000. They are all engaged
in providing security in that country.
You say why are not the Iraqis doing anything? Well, the
Iraqis
Senator DAYTON. I did not say "anything," but I said why are
they not going after these pockets.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will answer.
The Iraqis have had 721 Iraqi security forces killed in the proc-
ess of providing security in Iraq since May 1, 2003. They have had
678 killed since September 1, 2003.
Senator Dayton. We have had over a thousand of ours.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the beginning.
Senator Dayton. 2003.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The comparable number is that since May
1, 2003 the United States has lost 670 and the Iraqi security forces
have lost 721. So they are not sitting in their barracks with their
fingers in their ear. They are out there doing things. It is tough,
and they are getting killed and they are getting wounded and they
are still standing in line to sign up to join the army and the police
and the border patrol, because there are enough people in that
country that want to secure the liberation of that country.
Senator Dayton. If there is a pocket of resistance, again in
Fallujah — that is from reports I have read — that are whatever
number, a couple thousand, whatever the number, I do not know,
strong, and if that is where somebody like Zarqawi is reputed to
be holed up and operating from, then why are not again whatever
necessary troop strength of the Iraqi forces going in there to wipe
that force strength out there, the insurgent strength out there?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision has been made to handle
Fallujah the way it has been handled by the Iraqi political leader-
ship in the country and the U.S. military leadership and political
leadership in the country. As I indicated earlier, all of those indi-
65
viduals understand you cannot have a safe haven in Fallujah or
anywhere else in that country over a sustained period of time.
Now, given the fact that they understand that, it suggests to me
that they will do something about that. The reason they did not do
it at the time they were cocked and ready to do it I believe — and
Dick, you might want to comment on this — at that moment the
U.N. representative, I believe it was Mr. Brahimi, was in the proc-
ess of putting together the government that would transition away
from the Iraqi Governing Council to the Interim Iraqi Government,
and the Governing Council that existed at that time and Brahimi,
as I recall, were strongly opposed to doing anything at that mo-
ment.
Senator Dayton. What about this moment now, sir?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think I will leave that to the commanders
on the ground, and I have already indicated to you that they are
fully aware you cannot leave a sanctuary in that country, and that
is exactly what Fallujah is today.
General Myers. Senator Dayton, let me just add. You focused on
a really bad person, Zarqawi, and let me just assure you in this
open hearing that we are doing all we can to take care of that situ-
ation. As the Secretary said, we are going to leave that up to the
operational commanders on the ground.
I will tell you in the last 2 to 3 weeks we have killed a handful,
I think it is six, of his lieutenants. We continue to go after that or-
ganization very hard. It is a very dangerous organization and it is
the one that we know in at least one case was responsible for the
beheading, probably in the other cases as well. They have no re-
spect for any human life — Muslim, Christian, Jewish, whatever,
man, woman, or child. This is a very, very bad threat. We under-
stand that and will take appropriate action.
Senator DAYTON. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I appre-
ciate your response and I would just say, responding to my col-
league Senator Graham — and I understand the reservations about
citing a period of time of 4 years, but our colleague Senator
McCain, who has greater expertise than I, has cited a possible pe-
riod of time of U.S. force involvement there of 10 to 20 years.
I would just submit again that, in my view, as long as the Iraqis
know that the best fighting forces in the world, our own, are going
to be there doing the heavy lifting and the dying and the leading
and draining our own resources here, they are going to — they may
not entirely, but they are going to be holding back from what any
government, any country, has to do with their own citizens, their
own armed forces, which is protect and defend their own country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers. Senator Dayton, if we go back to April and May
when we had the uprising by Sadr's militia, at that time we said
the performance of the Iraqi security forces was certainly uneven.
Very few units performed well, but some did. Most did not. One of
the reasons they did not, a couple of the reasons, is they did not
have proper equipment at that point; they also did not have the
proper leadership.
If you look at the same uprising around al-Najaf this time, it was
just a flip-flop. In fact, the estimate from the commanders in the
field is that 70 percent of the Iraqi units that participated per-
66
formed very, very well. Some did not perform well, but 70 percent
did. So that situation is turning around.
We have to do our job, which our promise has been to properly
train and equip them. As the Secretary said earlier, that is the
easy part. It is the soft stuff, it is making sure they have proper
leadership and that leadership has a trail all the way up to the na-
tional level. That still has to be accomplished. That is not accom-
plished at this point. We are working very hard to do that.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much.
I would probably ask General Schoomaker this if he were here,
but since he is not, General Myers, let me ask you this. Would you
say that the Army of today across a broad spectrum of require-
ments is more or less capable than the Army of 20 years ago?
General Myers. No, I would not.
Senator Talent. It is substantially more capable, is it not?
General Myers. Absolutely.
Senator Talent. The Army of 20 years ago I think had 18 active
divisions in it and the one today has 10 active divisions.
General Myers. Right.
Senator TALENT. Wriat I wanted to illustrate is something Gen-
eral LaPorte said. It really is not a question of numbers, except in-
sofar as numbers tend to suggest capabilities. I chair the Seapower
Subcommittee and actually it was the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) who brought this to my mind. I was having breakfast with
him one day and he said: Look, would anybody argue that the
Navy of today is less capable than the Navy of 20 years ago, when
we had almost 600 ships? Because I was harping on him about the
numbers of ships. Mr. Chairman, you know how strongly I feel
about numbers of ships.
So it is not that numbers are irrelevant. It is just that you have
to consider it in terms of capabilities.
One other point I will just state for the record about the history
of end strength, Mr. Chairman. This is something some of us have
noticed, been noticing for a long time. We went from 18 to 14 to
12 in the base force of 1992, and then when I came in in 1993 at
the same time the Clinton administration came in they reduced it
to 10 active duty. You remember that, Mr. Chairman.
I was very concerned about it at the time, not that the Army
would be incapable of performing a mission, because I think our
Army will perform any mission we ask them to perform, but that
in circumstances like this we might all be a little bit less com-
fortable about how far out on the margin of risk we were.
I am very pleased that you have agreed, at least temporarily, to
an increase of 30,000, which would get us back in terms of num-
bers to the equivalent of 21 active divisions. I am just going to sug-
gest that at a certain point when you can calculate what you really
think you are going to get from these efficiencies, not what in the-
ory you could get but what you really think you are going to be
able to get — what we are learning about the needs, capabilities we
67
need for civil administration and the kind of thing we are doing in
Iraq — that maybe we have a hearing on the subject of what kind
of end strength we need.
I will just suggest, Mr. Chairman, with great respect that it
might be good to do it at a time other than 6 weeks before a gen-
eral election. I think I would have a little bit more confidence in
the tone of the hearing.
I did want to ask a couple of things, though, about the posture
of where our forces are going to be, which is what the hearing I
thought was about. Two points, and I will get the questions out
and then you can address them.
One of them is, I have been very intrigued with the CNO's Sea
Power 21 and Sea Basing concepts, the idea of being able to in ef-
fect base at sea. Now, how does that figure in the repositioning of
forces, if you have thought it through to that extent?
Number two, if we are going to pull back from the traditional
bases in places where we are no longer as wanted and where it is
harder to get force projected — and I think I agree with that on stra-
tegic level — does this mean we rebase in third world countries from
which we think we can project power? Are we confident enough in
the stability of those countries to be able to do that?
Maybe you just could address that. You probably have not
worked it out on a level of detail, but I would be interested in hear-
ing your thoughts on it, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Just a couple of quick comments. With re-
spect to the Chief of Naval Operations plan, which I am very much
a supporter of — I think Admiral Fargo might be the best one to an-
swer this. I just realized you are an Admiral, are you not? [Laugh-
ter.]
Senator Talent. Yes, I should maybe have referred this to the
man in the dark blue suit there. [Laughter.]
Secretary RUMSFELD. He has developed this surge capability
which significantly increases our capability around the world, and
he has done it by managing the way maintenance is done and over-
haul and repair and that whole cycle. He has shifted the entire
cycle. He has also done some forward basing.
With respect to the — and I will let Tom comment on that. But
with respect to rebasing in third world countries, let me draw a
distinction that you will find in these papers, which is probably im-
perfect. But a base I think of as a fixed, permanent place with fam-
ilies and a long life. We are doing two other things, forward operat-
ing sites and forward operating locations, and they are not bases.
They are rotational locations. We fall into the use of the word
"base" and I almost said "rotation base."
But they are places where we can train, they are places we can
exercise. They are locations we could deploy from if that were de-
sirable. In some cases there might be prepositioning. We would
have well-developed arrangements, cross-accessing agreements. We
would have status of forces agreements with those countries, that
we would know what we could do and what we could not do out
of those locations.
But in terms of the kinds of heavy division fixed bases we have
had in Germany, the answer is no, we are not thinking of that in
68
some of the other countries, and we would have much lighter foot-
print and less investment.
Do you want to?
Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, let me add to the Secretary's comments.
Certainly, with respect to the Pacific, sea basing makes great sense
for a couple reasons. The first is that nobody's crystal ball is clear
where we are going to have to fight next. It is just impossible to
predict. If we look to — as we mentioned earlier in the hearing, if
we looked a few years back and tried to predict where we are at
right now, we would not have. If we try to look 4 or 5 or 10 or 20
years forward, we probably would not have great success there. So
being able to sea base provides us a great deal of flexibility.
The second piece is that access is problematic and you do not
know whether you are going to have access in certain places at cer-
tain periods of time. So the sea base once again provides you great
flexibility.
I think the third point is, to the extent that you can sustain
forces from the sea gives you huge advantage. So partnering with
not only the Marine Corps, but also the Army, and standing up the
joint program office which the Navy has for the sea base I think
is going to provide exactly what we need, which are new operating
concepts for the future.
Senator Talent. I agree. My time is up. I will just add this com-
ment. I agree, I really like the CNO's plan. However, if we are
going to reposition or keep forces somewhat lower on the grounds
that we can project faster, if we in essence have force enhancers,
then we must fund the force enhancers.
Let us not make the mistake we made in the 1990s, where we
cut the Army thinking that we would make each soldier more le-
thal and less vulnerable, and then cut the modernization programs
that were going to make each soldier more lethal and less vulner-
able. We do not want to make that mistake again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, currently in the conference committee on the de-
fense authorization bill there is a provision concerning the oppor-
tunity for Guard and Reserve members to access TRICARE in
order to have health insurance. We learned that about 20 percent
of our Guard and Reserve members do not have health insurance.
Senator Graham and I along with Senator Daschle and others in-
troduced this legislation. We were successful in passing it in the
Senate. We continue to be told that the Department of Defense op-
poses it. Could you explain your opposition to what I see as a criti-
cal part of ensuring that the Guard and Reserve members who are
being called up on a continuing basis will have, along with their
families, access to health insurance where they do not currently
have it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to ask General Myers, who is
up to speed on this, to comment on it. But one of the things I have
discussed with Dr. Chu, the head of the Department of Defense
Personnel and Readiness Office, and with the Chairman, is what
69
I believe to be the need for us to look on a macro basis at how we
manage our force, the Active Force, the Guard, and the Reserve.
What has taken place over recent years is that, for a variety of
reasons, incremental benefits have been added in large measure to
the Guard and the Reserve and the Retired Force, less so to the
Active Force. The cost of each person has been incrementally
changing, and we are getting to the point where the cost of Guard
and Reserve relative to the active is something that needs to be ad-
dressed so that we can manage it in a way that is proper from the
standpoint of the taxpayers and appropriate from the standpoint of
the people we need to volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces.
Rather than — my personal view is — and as I say, I want Dick to
answer this. But I think that what happens, each time there is a
new proposal here, then it is passed and then there is another pro-
posal that comes along to create some sort of equity across the
board, and the imbalance that is evolving is something that I know
this committee needs to address, just as we need to address, and
we want to do that together.
Dick, do you want to respond precisely on this point?
General Myers. Precisely, I do not know. But Senator Clinton,
I can respond. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are worried about
a couple of things. One is cost. This will not be cheap and
healthcare costs, as we know, have had a history of going up in a
way that is almost unpredictable.
There is an equity issue that is brought up as well. The equity
issue is, "Gee, I am serving on active duty, I serve 365 days a year
I get healthcare for me and my family; somebody that serves part-
time gets the same healthcare benefit," which is one of the better
and bigger benefits that the United States military gets. So that
is brought up from time to time.
Nobody is saying we do not need to change the way we provide
healthcare to the Reserve component. We found that out in these
massive callups, that indeed many reservists are not ready for ac-
tive duty. Any proposal that would ensure that reservists on an an-
nual basis get a physical paid for by the United States Government
would be a very good thing, because we would then know what
kind of force we have out there and we would not have to reject
people as they showed up at the mobilization station because they
are not healthy.
My understanding is DOD has a proposal, a counterproposal,
that would put in place another program to test for a while, and
I think it would be my view that we ought to proceed fairly slowly
here, mainly due to the cost. It is not an issue of providing the
right benefits to the Reserve component, but it is a huge cost issue.
Senator CLINTON. I know that it is a huge cost issue, but we
have heard a lot of discussion today about capability and about
needing to equip our men and women in uniform, and I for one feel
very strongly that it is clear we are going to continue to rely on
the Guard and Reserve, and when you have 20 percent without
health insurance and then, I guess not coincidentally, you have 20
percent who are found to be unready when they are activated, that
is a cost and it is a readiness issue.
We are going to continue to press our point because we think
that the best investment we can make is in these men and women
70
that we are sending out and, given the way transformation is pro-
ceeding and given the pressures on the existing force, it certainly
seems to me that it is no longer fair to exclude, if not fail to help,
those who are in the Guard and Reserve.
Secretary Rumsfeld, over the weekend I am sure you saw, be-
cause there was a lot of publicity, about a number of very distin-
guished Republican Senators, including Senators Lugar, Hagel,
McCain, Graham, and others, raising very serious questions about
our status in Iraq, using strong language: Senator Lugar talking
about incompetence in this administration, the lack of planning is
apparent; Senator Hagel referencing his belief that no, we are not
winning, and how did we ever get into this situation.
When you look at the statements that have been made in the
past by you and others in the administration, it is very difficult to
track the predictions and the expectations that were presented to
this committee, to others in Congress, and certainly to the Amer-
ican people with where we are today.
We now know from books that have been written with the full
cooperation of the administration that shortly after September 11
war plans were begun with respect to Iraq. That was not informa-
tion shared with Congress, nor with the American people. In fact,
as late as August 2002 the administration was still saying there
were absolutely no plans to go into Iraq, and we know what hap-
pened then.
In a recent article reporting on the work of the Defense Science
Board and their concerns about our ability to maintain ongoing sta-
bility operations, there is a paragraph that refers to a widely re-
ported phone call in which William Moody, a senior Pentagon pol-
icy official, hinted with congressional aides from both parties that
a second Bush administration may carry its preemptive war strat-
egy to five or six other nations beyond the current axis of evil.
Mr. Secretary, I respect and appreciate your long service to this
country, but if there are such plans, if there are such discussions,
do you not believe that Congress and the American people ought
to be informed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me take some of that in pieces
here. First of all, you said "you and others" have made predictions.
I tend not to make predictions. You have been in a lot of committee
hearings with me and I tend to be fairly careful about what I say.
Second, there is no one I know who would characterize what I
have said about Iraq or Afghanistan or any other aspect of the
global war on terror as painting a rosy picture. I have not painted
a rosy picture. I do not believe it is a rosy picture. I think it is a
dirty, tough, ugly business, and I have said so from the beginning.
Next, you raise the question of plans from books, you say. The
job of the Pentagon is to have plans. That is what we do. There
have been plans for Iraq for goodness knows how many years,
every administration. There have to be plans. There have to be con-
tingency plans. We owe that to the President. We owe it to Con-
gress. We owe it to the American people. That is what they do.
When General LaPorte or Admiral Fargo or General Jones take
these tasks, they have the responsibility of going to the shelf, look-
ing to see what contingency plans there are, coming in, making a
recommendation to the Joint Chiefs: We think these are appro-
71
priate or not appropriate, we need to freshen them up, we need to
change them, we need to add some excursions on different things.
There have been plans in the Department of Defense ever since
there has been a Department of Defense.
The kinds of things you read in books are either misinformed,
uninformed, or mischievous. One ought not to say: Oh my good-
ness, were there plans? Of course there are plans. That is what we
do.
The quote about the Defense Science Board, I do not know any-
thing about it, but I can assure you that anyone at that level would
have no knowledge and would certainly not be involved, and those
decisions are decisions for a President. I work with the President
every day. I was with him this morning. I have never heard any-
thing like that out of his mouth, nor has anyone heard anything
like that out of my mouth.
So the fact that there are some staff people reporting that some-
body hinted at something is really not something one ought to give
credence to.
Chairman WARNER. I understand you very clearly, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Senator, for your questions.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I hope that anyone who believes that there is a prob-
lem with the progress that is taking place in Iraq today was there
listening to the Prime Minister this morning. He was very out-
spoken. I would further say that I have been over there quite a few
times and as I observe the transition in Afghanistan and the train-
ing of the Afghan troops from us to the Afghans — and the Afghan
National Army is now being trained by the Afghans — I saw the
pride on their faces as they were training out there and I thought:
That is a model for Iraq and that is what is going to happen.
I agree with Prime Minister Allawi this morning when he said
that the press is not giving us a fair shake; we have great suc-
cesses. He expressed appreciation on behalf of the Iraqi people.
I have two questions for General Jones and then one you may
have to answer for the record from each one of you because it may
take a little bit longer. First of all, General Jones, we talked, now
it has been years ago, about the subject that we are addressing
today and how significant it is that we readdress this thing and
start looking to the future, the cost of sustaining families in West-
ern Europe, the problems we are having right now with the envi-
ronmental restrictions that keep us from adequately being able to
train our young troops over there.
I took the time to go to some of the eastern countries. I was in
the Ukraine, I was in Bulgaria, I was in Romania. In talking to the
military leaders there, they want us there. They are going to — they
offered to billet us. They offered things that the Europeans never
did, the Western Europeans. It just makes more sense to have
shorter deployments and have them over there where you can do
it. Some time we should put — maybe you have done this already —
kind of a cost analysis of how much money can be saved if we are
able to make this transition.
Now, I see two problems — and I apologize for not being here for
your opening statements and I was told that you talked about
72
maybe 8 to 10 years before we can do this. The two problems as
I see it: They are very patient. They have great training ranges.
I watched them on the training ranges. But they have to make
their own realignment decisions and things, and they cannot do
that until we give them some indication as to what new host coun-
tries might be out there. So that is one of the concerns I have.
The other is two of the countries I just mentioned have applica-
tions for entrance into the European Union. There are some chap-
ters and protocols on the environment that they would have to ei-
ther have exempt or be grandfathered in, and they do not want to
be held up in their opportunity as they see it to get into the Euro-
pean Union — I do not see this as an opportunity, but they do — by
not being able to do this until they have an indication as to wheth-
er or not they might be a host country.
Now, so addressing those two, you Mr. Secretary or anyone else,
is there anyway or are you already negotiating with some of those
to the point where they can go ahead and make those decisions,
even though it may be 8 years before we fulfill this transition?
General Jones?
General Jones. Senator, we have been in close contact with a
number of countries. We have done site surveys. We have made
some recommendations as to how we might proceed with regard to
the types of presence that we might be able to implement in East-
ern Europe. These are very attractive to us, but we have repeatedly
said that these would be more on the order of expeditionary type
bases, not relocating, for example, Ramstein and larger main oper-
ating bases.
But absolutely, without question we are very interested in work-
ing with our Eastern European allies and friends who are now part
of the alliance and are working very closely with each one of the
Service components.
I think that the time frame for specifically identifying where it
is we would like to go will be fairly short. This is all keyed to
BRAC and so I think we are talking about months, months and
certainly not years. The implementation piece might take a little
bit longer because that is a little bit — that is a little bit tougher.
But I think the nations where we will finally wind up establishing
forward operating sites or cooperative security locations will be
identified fairly quickly.
Senator Inhofe. Well, okay, because they expressed that concern
over there.
General JONES. I am familiar with it.
Senator Inhofe. Of course, they want to continue on with their
application and the environmental provisions and chapters and
protocols would make a difference.
The second thing is, I know it is in its infancy right now, but I
have taken a great interest, tieing back to the successes we are
having in teaching the Afghans to train themselves, using that
same model of course in Iraq, and now getting down potentially to
the five African brigades. I know that you are not in a position to
be very specific about that. I want to compliment General Wald. I
have spent some time in the countries where I believe might be the
locations for these.
73
But the concept, as we put the squeeze in the Middle East — and
I have spent two trips down in Djibouti, recognizing that the Horn
is where they are all going to be going in, Mr. Chairman, and going
throughout Africa. I see this as something that really needs to be
expedited, we need to get into, because I do not say "if that hap-
pens," I say "when that happens," I would like to have these bri-
gades out there so that they would be able to respond and we
would not have to be sending our troops over.
Would you like to make any comments about that?
General Jones. I think you hit on something that is extremely
important. We have some cooperative security locations in Africa
right now. We have five of them: one in Senegal, Ghana, Gabon,
and Uganda. We are proposing some additional sites. We have done
site surveys on many others so that we have some flexibility, if you
will, an inventory.
General Wald and his interest and leadership and your interest
also in visiting has stimulated the momentum to develop this glob-
al peacekeeping operation initiative and to help emerging forces
help themselves. The whole region of the pan-Sahel, for example,
is being actively engaged and we are seeing countries being able
to secure their borders a little bit better, and I think the support
to the African security proposals with helping Africans help them-
selves is the way to go in the future.
Senator INHOFE. Again I compliment General Wald. I spent quite
a bit of time talking to him just last week on this, and we want
to be kept up.
I know my time has expired. Let me just ask a question for the
record so they can respond, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. We will do that.
Senator Inhofe. With all the problems that we have over there —
and I think each one of you would want to answer in your own
area; General Myers, for example, our restrictions we have right
now, our lift assets, capability assets, refueling and all of that — do
you think we really need to get significantly faster into some of
these programs so that we can — like more C-17s, so we could ac-
commodate that? No one ever dreamed back when our first bunch
of C-17s came in what would happen in Bosnia and Kosovo and
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Also, I have been very proud back in the late 1990s of General
Jumper when he admitted that our modernization program was not
moving fast enough and the Sukhoi strike vehicles actually were
better than our F-15s and F-16s in certain areas. So do you think
it is desirable to try to move those modernization programs on a
little faster?
Lastly, General LaPorte, I have been very interested in the Fu-
ture Combat System and I know that we are doing as well as we
can right now, but I would like to have your assessment as to when
those are going to be fielded and is that going to be soon enough.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
General LaPorte. In July 2004, the U.S. Army announced plans to accelerate the
delivery of selected components of the Future Combat Systems. Although the Army
has not published a specific unit distribution plan, fielding to units is slated to begin
in 2010.
74
In the interim, the transformation of the Eighth U.S. Army and the remainder
of United States Forces Korea will continue as planned. Our ability to rapidly rein-
force the Republic of Korea's armed forces, in concert with the DOD Global Posture
Review, will continue to provide adequate deterrence, and if needed the ability to
defeat any attack on South Korea.
My assessment is that the Future Combat Systems' projected fielding timelines
are consistent with United States Forces Korea's currently projected transformation
planning, and will support our continued deterrence capabilities.
General Jones. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) works closely with U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to ensure our theater strategic lift require-
ments are known. How those requirements are met, and accordingly the pace of air-
craft modernization programs, is a responsibility vested in the Service Chiefs and
TRANSCOM.
EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan is designed to mitigate the need for stra-
tegic lift by having war reserve material at a number of pre-positioned sites
throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). The pre-positioned equipment, in con-
junction with en-route infrastructure at the (Joint) Main Operating Bases, will pro-
vide the National Command Authority the flexibility to respond to crises across the
full spectrum of conflict. Additionally, EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation pro-
gram is intended to increase U.S. presence and secure access across a broader por-
tion of the EUCOM theater thereby increasing stability and diminishing potential
conflict.
EUCOM has and will continue to work closely with TRANSCOM to ensure our
strategic lift requirements are able to support the operational concept which under-
pins our transformation initiative.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. We will take that for the record.
The chair observes that there are three members that have not
had the opportunity the witnesses are prepared to afford them, but
we will not go to a second round of questions. We will keep the
record open through tomorrow close of business for purposes of sub-
mitting such other questions as my colleagues may have. Thank
you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your public
service.
General LaPorte, it has been widely reported that in this reorga-
nization, realignment, that there is a recommendation or a decision
to reduce the number of our troops in South Korea by 12,000. What
I would like is your judgment: What kind of signal does that send
to North Korea?
General LaPorte. Senator, first of all, we are an alliance. We are
a Republic of Korea-United States alliance. The Republic of Korea
forces number over 600,000 active, with the ability to mobilize to
3 million forces. So the reduction of 12,000 in terms of total num-
bers is based in those parameters.
But it is not the boots on the ground that is the critical issue.
It is the capabilities that the force has, both resident to the penin-
sula, which is significant — in my opening statement I talked about
150 systems enhancements that Congress has paid for and are in
the force and are coming into the force. The Republic of Korea has
a similar modernization program relative to its capabilities.
We have significant regional reinforcement capabilities from Ha-
waii, Guam, Japan, that can rapidly project forces to the peninsula.
Then we have our strategic deployment capability and we have
demonstrated repeatedly our ability to do that.
So I think we are sending a very strong message and a very
strong message of our increased commitment to the Republic of
Korea.
75
Senator Bill Nelson. There is another interpretation of that,
particularly at this critical time where we have to be successful in
getting North Korea to understand that we cannot allow them to
be a nuclear power. Although I agree with you on the repositioning
of the forces further south, your enhanced training capability, it
seems like at this time that it is the worst possible time to suggest
that there might be a diminution. Even though, as you say, it may
not be true in total force projection, nevertheless it is a signal and
I worry about that.
Thank you for your response.
Mr. Secretary, I am sad to say that we have a fourth hurricane
that is headed toward Florida, and we have been visited by the oth-
ers. I was just there and Pensacola got hit pretty hard. Earlier Pat-
rick Air Force Base had gotten hit by Frances, which was the sec-
ond hurricane, and that was about $33 million, and that was in-
cluded in the President's supplemental request that will be added
to the Department of Homeland Security bill. Just for example, it
did not hit Patrick that much. It did $125 million of damage to the
Kennedy Space Center.
But when we come to Pensacola Naval Air Station, it got hit
pretty bad. The preliminary figures are just for the Navy, including
Whiting Field, $850 million, and then when you take the Air Force
in the area — Eglin, Hurlbert, and some of the Air Force at Pensa-
cola— you are talking in terms of over a billion dollars just of struc-
tural damage.
Now, of course they are looking to their Senator from Florida to
produce, but I need some help. Now let me just add one other
thing. There was this crazy rumor going around in the last 2 days
that we have had to stamp out, that, Homestead Air Force Base
that got hit pretty hard — well, of course it was basically totally de-
stroyed during Hurricane Andrew 12 years ago — that therefore,
since Pensacola got hit so bad, that it is now a candidate to be
closed.
Would you give me some security of knowing that for this billion
dollars on structural — this does not include equipment — that we
can get this going and get it going soon? I might say, for the sailors
and the airmen, they are up and running. Pensacola is going to
open on Monday for flight training and they have already got the
Air Force installations in the area, that were not hit as bad, up and
running. Your comments, please?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I know Pensacola well. I went
through flight school there. I was stationed there as a flight in-
structor and then an instructor of flight instructors, and I was sta-
tioned at Whiting Field as well.
It has been very badly hit. The Navy in Florida in the first hurri-
cane had losses. The second hurricane had losses. This one, as you
pointed out, is big. When you total it all up, I do not know where
it will come out.
But I have not even heard the rumor that you have heard. I do
not know if you have, Dick?
General MYERS. No, I have not heard that rumor.
Secretary Rumsfeld. So obviously
Senator Bill Nelson. I think we have put it down.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Good.
76
Senator Bill Nelson. I mean, it is kind of silly. But how about
rebuilding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not doubt for a minute but that the
President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will be
talking to the various departments and agencies and making a
judgment as to how to manage, as they have during the previous
two situations, the various losses that have existed. I have not been
involved in that discussion, but it is a pattern. It seems to me if
one connects the dots one can assume that that will take place with
respect to the most recent one as well.
Senator Bill Nelson. OMB is going to come to you because it
is the Department of Defense that is suffering these losses.
Secretary RUMSFELD. All I have seen is the first rough cut and
they said almost every building in the place was damaged.
Senator BILL NELSON. Would you be supportive of rebuilding?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh my goodness, absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is what I want to hear.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Waener. With that, thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Sessions.
Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Secretary, I would like to bring us back
to the Global Posture Review, the purpose of this hearing, and just
say to you thank you. Early last year, January or spring a year
ago, 13 Senators, I know Chairman Warner and Senator McCain
and others, signed a letter I circulated calling on you to review our
force structure worldwide and expressing the view that we were
committed too strongly in areas that no longer represent clear
threats to us.
As a matter of fact, I think we have been slow to get around to
it. I know you had a war to fight and all of you have. I am glad
that you are moving forward with it. This is great news, to bring
50,000, 60,000, however many thousands of troops home to Amer-
ica to be with their families, to help achieve what General
Schoomaker desires, and that is a soldier to be stationed in a base
for up to 7 years before he has to move again. Those are great
things that are all a part of your plan to transform our military,
to make it more effective, more efficient, and keep dollars at home.
As somebody said earlier, I hope some of those troops come to
Alabama. I do not know; they may not. But I would like it, and cer-
tainly they will be paying taxes in the United States and support-
ing the economies of the people in the United States. So generally,
I think we are all supportive of that.
General Jones, early this year I traveled with Senator Lott to the
NATO accession conference and we went through Germany and
met with Chancellor Schroeder and told him that we were doing
our BRAC in the United States and we were going to be looking
at Germany, and there were no hard feelings and it was not pique
that we were dealing with, but I did not think that we were going
to be able to maintain the number of soldiers there that we have
been. He smiled and said he fully understood that and he was re-
viewing his force structure.
Earlier this year, Senator Chambliss and Senator Enzi and I vis-
ited you in Europe and we visited 12 installations to deal with this
very issue of realignment. I was very impressed with the depth of
77
consideration you and your subordinate commanders have given to
this issue and how much care you have given it. But I find it im-
possible to believe that we need this many troops in Germany after
World War II has been over 60 years.
But first, my question to you is, describe for us briefly how much
time and care you have given to it and describe for us how our al-
lies have been consulted all along this way? It is not a unilateral
act. Finally, is it not important that our allies transform also so
that we can mesh their capabilities with ours?
General JONES. Thank you, Senator. The time spent — this is a
project that started almost 3 years ago, I believe, Mr. Secretary.
Certainly I have been in my position now for 20 months and we
picked up on that from the first day. We have gone through a com-
plete review, for example, of all of our installations. Even in ad-
vance of execution, I think we were able to reduce our military con-
struction bill by about $300 million just last year because we iden-
tified facilities that in a transformed European theater would no
longer be useful.
So we have actually started. We are collapsing headquarters. We
are eliminating the duplications that we have in theater. We are
spending a lot of time thinking about where the forces of the future
might be best used. So EUCOM right now is, for example, working
on a post-transformation phase to try to determine what might be
the request that we would come in to the Department of Defense
and to the Joint Chiefs on to augment the permanent based forces
that we have left with rotational forces in some of the emerging
areas in Africa that will be increasingly more important and much
further to the east, where in the Caspian, for example, we have in-
terests that will be emerging and will be part of our theater.
We will need strategically agile forces to be able to do that. The
value of transformation is that where they come from does not mat-
ter as much any more. You do not have to have the mountain of
logistics. What we are trying to do is use the "tooth" portion of our
forces in a more agile and usable way. So I think this trans-
formation will do that.
Allies have been consulted with openly, consistently, both in the
theater and from Washington.
Senator SESSIONS. You have personally done that?
General JONES. Personally.
Senator Sessions. Personally met with them?
General Jones. Personally.
Senator SESSIONS. Regularly?
General JONES. Regularly.
In my NATO assignment the word "transformation" is also being
used, and most of our allies are keying on our experiences in trans-
formation to shape their force as well. There is not any country
that I know of in the 26-member alliance of NATO that is not
watching what the U.S. Armed Forces are doing closely.
One of the things that we have to guard against, of course, is
that it is not misinterpreted, that it is not interpreted as a with-
drawal from a very important area, 91 countries; that it is not an
indication that we are less interested or that we are not going to
support NATO as we have in the past. Those things are being dealt
with every day.
78
But for the people who understand the future military trans-
formation, both in the United States and in Europe, this is work
that has to be done. In Germany, at the national leadership level
there is support for this because, as you pointed out, they are doing
exactly the same thing. In their own way, across the entire North
Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are doing the same type of
thing.
So at the end of the day, if we do this right and we develop the
NATO Response Force and we get a U.S. basing paradigm that is
firmly anchored in the European and African theater, but that is
also able to be more usefully deployed because where the forces
come from will not matter nearly as much, we are going to be able
to do some very exciting things in the future.
But I think the point that I am particularly excited about is the
fact that it is not just the U.S. transformation, that there are par-
allel transformations in the 25 other countries and also partner na-
tions who are keying on this, the new agility as well, and under-
standing that the paradigms of the 20th century no longer apply.
Senator SESSIONS. I think you are the right person to help make
that happen and I salute you for it. I know how carefully you work
at it.
General LaPorte, I have been to Korea twice and I know how bad
some of the conditions are there. If you bring those troops back
below the DMZ further, build new facilities, and reconfigure them
for more effective military responses, will we not end up with a bet-
ter quality life for the soldiers that are going there?
General LaPorte. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator SESSIONS. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.
Senator Bayh, you may well be the wrap-up. Mr. Secretary,
might I ask that you avail the opportunity for Senator Levin and
I to speak to you a few minutes at the conclusion of this hearing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. There are a couple of things I
would like to say at the end. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. We will be glad to receive them.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first, gentlemen, say I admire your fortitude. It has been
a long hearing. Mr. Chairman, I hope this is a case of saving the
best for last. Maybe it is just the last for last. But in any event,
I do appreciate your time today and your service to our country.
I apologize for having had to step out. We had some important
business before the Intelligence Committee. So if my line of inquiry
is redundant, I regret that.
But I would like to follow up on something that Senator McCain
raised in his questioning and Senator Nelson touched upon just
briefly, and that is the subject of both Iran and North Korea. As
you are well aware, there are ominous signs from both. The Ira-
nians seem to be hell-bent upon acquiring a nuclear capability.
They may play rope-a-dope with the global community for a while,
but it seems pretty clear they are intent upon going forward.
North Korea, as has been mentioned, appears to be in the proc-
ess of scheduling tests for missiles capable of carrying a nuclear
warhead and as best as we can assess is already a nuclear power.
79
There do not appear to be any good options. Both apparently
seek nuclear weapons for strategic reasons that are unlikely to be
altered by either incentives to do the right thing or disincentives
to do the wrong thing or diplomacy. So I would like to start my
questions first, Mr. Secretary, to you. What is your opinion about
the consequences to the United States' security of an Iran possess-
ing a nuclear capability and/or a Korea possessing the capability of
delivering a nuclear device to the continental United States, which
does not exist today but may very well in the years to come?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, those are two problems, needless
to say, that people in Congress and the executive branch worry
through on a regular basis. It is increasingly a more dangerous
world. As we have gone through the past several decades, 2 dec-
ades, 3 since I was Secretary of Defense the last time, we have
seen any number of countries become nuclear powers.
The effect of that is that it is a more dangerous world. It also
highlights something terribly important and that is that no coun-
try, no country, including the United States, has the ability to deal
with this terrible problem of proliferation of these increasingly le-
thal technologies. It takes cooperation among a lot of countries, and
that is why the President proposed the Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative.
But unless a lot of countries, important countries, come together
and impose on those countries that are doing what North Korea is
doing and doing what Iran is doing the kind of — I do not want to
use the word "sanctions," but — persuasion, that they clearly see it
in their interests not to do something like that
Senator Bayh. Forgive me for interrupting, Mr. Secretary. I did
want to ask the uniformed officers a couple questions. But I take
it that this would not be a good development for the United States'
security interests, particularly since Iran we have identified as the
foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world and North Korea
has an erratic regime, to say the least?
Secretary RUMSFELD. True.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Gentlemen, as the Secretary indicated, you are in the business
of planning and among the planning has to be planning for worst
case scenarios. Since this is about our global posture and capabili-
ties, if worst comes to worst — here is the question I would like to
ask you. If we were to decide that it is unacceptable for our na-
tional security to have a North Korea capable of delivering a nu-
clear device to this country or for Iran to possess such weapons,
and we had tried diplomacy, we had tried sanctions, we had tried
incentives, et cetera, but none of those things had worked, if we
concluded that this was unacceptable to us, do we have the means
to do something about it?
If we had to forcibly disarm North Korea, General LaPorte, are
we currently capable of doing that? Do you have the forces nec-
essary to accomplish such a thing, given our commitments in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere?
General LaPorte. First of all, Senator, we are an alliance, a
military alliance, in Korea. So the Republic of Korea and the
United States stand shoulder to shoulder. The capabilities that
have been developed in this alliance just over the past 2Vfe years
80
that I have been in command are very significant, from our intel-
ligence capabilities, command and control, to the platforms associ-
ated with it.
These capabilities can be brought to bear in different scenarios.
So it is a very, very capable force that we have.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think in an open hearing it is preferable
just simply to say that the United States and through working
with Congress has capabilities to protect and defend the interests
of the United States of America.
Senator Bayh. I am glad to hear that.
I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, that these are substantial
threats, and we are going to try a variety of other things. It never
ceases to amaze me why some other countries do not see it as more
in their interest and bring a greater sense of urgency to restraining
these developments. But, taking a hard-eyed look at recent history,
they just do not seem to be bringing the necessary urgency to the
table, and we may be faced with the very difficult — I said there are
no good options here.
We may be faced with the very difficult decision of: Are we will-
ing to accept a world in which those capabilities exist, and if we
are not, do we have the ability to do something about it. I am de-
lighted to hear your answer and in a different setting perhaps we
can hear some of the details. But it is something that does concern
me.
General Myers, I was going to ask you the same about Iran, but
I will not because you have been here a long time and there was
one other question I wanted to ask, unless you just felt you needed
to add something.
General Myers. I feel compelled to at least add something to the
debate. I do not disagree with your characterization of Iran and
North Korea. We know they are poorly led and not taking care of
their people right, and they are involved in all sorts of things, mis-
sile proliferation in the case of Korea and other things, counterfeit-
ing and terrorism, in the case of Iran.
But my contribution would be, those are very serious threats. As
I would rank threats today, I would rank them below the extremist
threat that we have been dealing with. I think that by far has to
be dealt with.
Senator BAYH. I agree, that is a greater — that is more imme-
diate.
General MYERS. Perhaps long-lasting.
Senator Bayh. But weapons of mass destruction, of course, is a
threat, while maybe perhaps not as immediate, of a different mag-
nitude, and the possible nexus between Iran and some of these
groups is very well known.
General Myers. Proliferation is a serious, serious issue.
Senator BAYH. North Korea has been proven to be willing to sell
about anything to anybody for hard money.
General Myers. I do not disagree.
Senator BAYH. I just have one last question. Mr. Secretary, this
is for you again. I get asked by the press, from time to time and
from some others about Vietnam and Iraq and is this another Viet-
nam, et cetera. I personally think it is not an apt analogy for a va-
riety of reasons.
81
But there is one aspect of it I wanted to get your answer to since
I am asked about it so often, and that is the term "Vietnamiza-
tion," which as you will recall back in that time our hope had been
that we were going to upgrade the capability of the Vietnamese
government through training their police forces, their military,
their intelligence, so that we could gradually withdraw our own. In-
deed, we did eventually withdraw, but they were not able to sus-
tain themselves for very long.
Why is the situation in Iraq going to be different?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with you that the Vietnam analogy
is imperfect in a lot of ways. I guess you never know what the fu-
ture will hold, but clearly any time any country occupies and frees
a people from what was and points them in a direction to what
might be, there is a question mark. There was a question mark on
Japan, there was a question mark on Germany, there was a ques-
tion mark on Italy, whether they were ready for democracy.
Bosnia has been a question mark. People said they would be out
by Christmas of that year, as I recall, and here it is what, 5, 10
years later. You cannot know with certain knowledge what will
happen because your goal is not to make it happen. Your goal is
to create an environment where the people of that country can
make it happen. We cannot do it for them. We have to take the
hand off the bicycle seat, and when you take your hand off the bi-
cycle seat they might fall.
I do not think they are going to. I think they have a good crack
at it. They have money, they have oil, they have water, they have
intelligent people, and they have lived in a rotten, vicious dictator-
ship for decades. I believe the natural state of man is to want to
be free, and I think they are going to make it.
But can we train up their security forces fast enough so that they
can create an environment that they can have elections and that
they can go forward and have the kind of prosperity that will make
people want to bet on their future? I think we can. I think they
can. But I know we cannot do it for them. We can only create an
environment that they can do it.
Senator Bayh. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, we will give you such time as you desire, but I
would like to comment that we have had a very long hearing.
Twenty two of the 25 members of this committee have availed
themselves of the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I think
that you have been most responsive and I thank you and your wit-
nesses, and I believe that the program, which was the primary con-
sideration of this hearing will be wholeheartedly adopted by Con-
gress which will support the President and yourself in this effort.
So I thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
have three quick things.
First of all, the global posture effort has been a 3-year effort to
come up with these proposals, and Andy Hoehn, who is sitting back
here next to Powell Moore, is the individual in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense who has been masterminding it and has
worked very closely with the combatant commanders and with the
Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff and has done a superb job.
82
Second, I doubt if Admiral Fargo will be back before this commit-
tee. He is making plans for, I believe, November to go into private
life. He is a superb naval officer. In fact, he is a superb military
officer.
Senator Levin. I have been trying to interpret that smile on his
face all day long. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rumsfeld. He has done for this country in his most
recent assignment, when I have had the privilege to work with
him, an absolutely superb job and we are all deeply grateful to
him.
Chairman WARNER. May I associate myself with those remarks.
I rather imagine our first contact you were an ensign or a lieuten-
ant junior grade, would that be correct?
Admiral Fargo. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman WARNER. And your family, Admiral, very much.
Admiral Fargo. It has been my pleasure to serve.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Last, we came to talk about force posture
and we end up talking about Iraq a lot and it bothers me in this
sense. I think it is a mistake to look at Iraq and Afghanistan
through a soda straw. They are part of something much bigger,
much broader, and much more dangerous. The aggregation of ex-
tremists and people who are determined to reorder the world and
attack the state system through terrorizing people — we call it a
global war on terror, but in fact terror is simply the weapon of
choice. It is a struggle in this globe between extremists and people
who believe in freedom and want to live lives their own way and
refuse to be terrorized.
There is no way to make a separate peace and to the extent we
do not understand that this is a test of wills, to the extent that we
do not understand it is going to take a long time, to the extent that
we do not understand that it is not going to be ugly and messy and
that people are going to die, we are making a big mistake.
It is a serious business and General Myers is exactly on the
mark. What bothers me is when heads get chopped off I see people
saying, "oh my goodness, why did you not stop them from chopping
off that head," instead of saying, "when heads get chopped off,
think of the people who are doing that, what kind of people are
they?" What does it say about the kind of world we would be living
in if we followed the counsel of people who say toss it in, it is not
worth the pain, it is not worth the losses, it is not worth the
money?
It is worth it. All you have to do is sit, imagine yourself with a
Taliban rule in country after country, with soccer stadiums where
they go out and have public executions. That is not the kind of
world we want.
Looking at it in pieces misunderstands it, it seems to me. So I
hope that we will, to the extent we have hearings, that we have
hearings on the big problem and we talk about the big problem and
not think we are addressing it in a useful way if we deal only with
little pieces.
Chairman Warner. May I say that yesterday, thanks to your of-
fice, I had the opportunity — Senator Levin was unavailable — to
83
spend almost an hour with General Abizaid and he showed me a
detailed briefing on precisely the subject that you mentioned. I in-
dicated to him, and perhaps the Secretary can arrange for our com-
mittee to be briefed on that very point that he raised, and he has
it graphically and statistically and factually supported in great de-
tail, but nevertheless in a classified document.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Happy to do it.
Chairman Warner. We will do that. I recognize that we do our
best here, but as you well know, I have served under seven chair-
men in this committee and the freedom to ask questions has al-
ways been accorded to our membership.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Chairman WARNER. I recognize that had we done it in a more
structured framework perhaps we could have conveyed from this
hearing an equally stronger message. But I agree with you, but I
would just close with my own observation, and that is as we wit-
ness these frantic, unbelievable atrocities, whether it is in Afghani-
stan or Iraq or the Chechens, what they went through, these same
people are trying to come across our borders and inflict such harm
in this country, and thank God we have men and women of the
Armed Forces beyond our shores who are taking the risk and giv-
ing their lives and limbs, with the support of their families, to pre-
vent that from happening.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Again, I have known many secretar-
ies, served under three. It is a lonely, though, and often thankless
job. I commend you, sir. Thank you.
Senator Levtn. Could I have a word?
Chairman Warner. He is going to come to the desk.
Senator LEVIN. I know, but I just wanted to comment on his com-
ment. It is obviously a heartfelt comment. I do not think anyone
agrees with you in terms of your characterization of the people who
carry out atrocities.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You mean you do not think anyone dis-
agrees?
Senator Levin. Disagrees.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I thought you said "agrees."
Senator Levin. I hope I said "disagrees."
Chairman Warner. It has been a long day and he has had a
tough week.
Senator Levin. I hope I said "disagrees," but if not thank you.
Chairman Warner. The record will reflect that.
Senator Levin. I think in your comment, though, here something
else comes through which is not healthy, and that is a suggestion
that people who might have proposals for trying to change a nega-
tive dynamic which exists in Iraq somehow or other are playing
into the hands of our enemies. The enemies are clear, and I hope
you are not suggesting that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not.
Senator Levin. I hope, General, you did not suggest that today,
either.
General Myers. By what, sir?
Senator Levin. Suggesting that people that have other proposals
for dealing with an enemy are not playing into the hands of the
enemy.
84
General Myers. No, no, sir.
Senator Levin. What bothers me, Secretary Rumsfeld, is that
when you say that throwing in the towel is not acceptable, that is
not the only alternative.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course not.
Senator Levin. When you hold that up as being the alternative
to continuing to do what we are doing, it seems to me you are look-
ing through a straw, you are narrowing a vision. We have to look
for options to try to change a dynamic which is not a good dynamic
there. That does not mean cut and run and that does not mean
that somehow or other people want to just throw in the towel.
But there are ways hopefully of avoiding, if nothing else, throw-
ing fuel onto that fire. There are ways of hopefully giving incen-
tives, perhaps pressuring the people of Iraq into recognizing that
what you describe is a horrendous, unacceptable future and that
they have to want a nation as much as we do. They have to act
to control the violent ones inside their midst. We cannot do it for
them. We can help them, but we cannot take on this responsibility
by ourselves.
If they do not want, we will call it "democracy," although it is
more complicated than that, if they do not want democracy at least
as much as we do, they are not going to get it. They have to want
it as much. A lot of them are dying for it, by the way, and I do
not want to in any way minimize the courage of those people in
Iraq who are putting their lives on the line to try to create a na-
tion. I do not want to minimize that.
But it is going to take a massive effort on the part of Iraqi lead-
ers in all of their groupings to put an end to the terrorists in their
midst.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly right.
Senator Levin. There may be ways that we can promote their
doing so. By the way, there is something else here at play. We have
to look for ways, we have to be open to ideas, to try to find paths
to getting other Islamic countries to recognize that they have a
stake in Iraq becoming a democratic nation. So far, in my judg-
ment, because of the way we proceeded — and you are not going to
agree with that part, but nonetheless — and so far we have not at-
tracted Islamic countries to send in some troops and some police
to help create a nation.
It seems to me we all ought to be together on at least an effort
to try to persuade, cajole, entice, and/or use carrots and sticks to
get other nations to come in and take some risks to create that na-
tion. We are taking risks there, big risks, and creating a nation
there is a useful goal. I could not agree with you more. The people
who commit these atrocities are as horrendous individuals as I
have ever seen or ever heard of probably except for the even more
massive murders when we think of Hitler and World War II. But
nonetheless, I cannot think of anything much more despicable than
what we see on Al-Jazeera.
But I would just urge you not to suggest in your words when you
hold out the horrors that are right there that alternatives to try
to address this problem and to reduce this negative dynamic and
to bring in much more forcefully Islamic nations into that effort to
create a nation, and to try to bring the Iraqi people to take risks
85
more than already have — and I emphasize because I know that
there are a lot who are dying there to create a nation — more than
already have, that when people suggest alternative courses or al-
ternative emphasis that somehow or other they are playing into the
hands of the enemy.
That is the one thing I would hope that you would avoid.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not even suggest that.
Let me just say a couple of things. Number one, I agree com-
pletely that the Iraqis have to do this. Number two, we have
worked from the beginning of this effort in the United Nations to
get other Islamic countries to come into that. The Iraqis have re-
sisted it. They did not want Turks in there helping and they have
resisted other countries. They have their own reasons. It is a com-
plicated part of the world. But we have been very much in the
mode of trying to get Islamic countries to join that effort.
I would say one other thing we have to do, and that is to get
more people like Karzai and Allawi and Musharraf leading the
moderate cause in the world against those extremists. Those men
are all subject to death threats. They all have prices on their
heads. They all have enormous courage. They all have tremendous
leadership skills. They are beginning to form a pattern in that part
of the world.
Think of that. Think of the courage of Musharraf in his country
to do what he is doing. Think of Karzai and think of Allawi. We
have examples popping up in that part of the world where there
were not examples of that type of leadership, and that is a pretty
exciting thing.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, and we thank
each of your colleagues and we wish you well. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
consultation vice coordination with the department of state
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am impressed with the number of con-
sultations that the Department of Defense has had with the Department of State
in 20 countries and the ambassadorial-level consultations that have been conducted
in 30 countries on 5 continents. However, if the plan is based on cultivating long-
lasting relationships with numerous countries, should not the Department of State
be the leader in their development instead of the Department of Defense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Department of Defense expertise was central to the drafting
of an effective and flexible plan for our global defense posture, and the Department
of State was and remains a full player in the broader review process of our posture
changes. Secretary Powell and senior officials from both departments have all been
fully engaged in the comprehensive diplomatic consultations that have accompanied
the public announcement of our posture changes. Both departments fulfill critical
needs in talks with our allies and partners.
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am concerned about the level of coordi-
nation that you have had with the Department of State in the development of your
Global Force Posture. How does the Global Force Posture fit within the context of
the larger political and economic policies and foreign policies we are pursuing in
both Europe and Asia?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Departments of Defense and State have maintained ex-
ceptionally close coordination during the global posture review process, regularly
participating together in interagency discussions of the proposals and in consulta-
tions with allies and Congress on our plans. Without exception, consultations in for-
eign capitals and on Capitol Hill have included representatives from both depart-
ments. The Department of State's appreciation for how posture changes should fit
86
into our broader policy goals in Europe, Asia, and other regions was critical to shap-
ing and strengthening the plan as it was developed.
SAVINGS FROM GLOBAL FORCE STRUCTURE
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, your September 17, 2004 Global Force
Posture report states that it will make "our alliances more affordable and sustain-
able." What savings are you expecting to achieve from reducing foreign basing by
35 percent?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Eliminating excess infrastructure overseas will result in cost
savings over time, as the United States will lower its overall overhead and mainte-
nance costs as a result of fewer bases, facilities, and installations. Relying relatively
more on a rotational presence of U.S. forces, instead of permanently stationed forces
with their families and a bigger overall U.S. "footprint" in host nations, will help
us to make our alliances sustainable by keeping them affordable.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, the changes you are proposing contain
broad and far-reaching implications for our Nation, our allies, and our military. How
will the committees with jurisdiction be able to oversee and affect the implementa-
tion of this 6 to 8 year realignment effort when you are asking us to bless the entire
plan at its inception?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although our current plan provides a clear way forward for
global posture changes, our posture will continue to evolve over time. As stated in
our September report, Congress is a full partner in our process to strengthen our
global posture, and will remain so.
AVAILABLE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
5. Senator McCain. General Myers, your proposed Global Force Posture is based
on the assumption that you can deploy forces rapidly from the Continental United
States (CONUS) to anywhere in the world. Do you have the high speed sealift, at-
sea connectors, and strategic airlift, today, that will allow us to deploy from CONUS
faster than from our current forward-deployed locations?
General Myers. Under the Global Force Posture, in most scenarios we can deploy
forces rapidly from the CONUS. Using our existing and programmed strategic lift
capabilities, we can move CONUS-based forces several days faster than we move
forward-based forces today. This is because our strategic sealift assets are home-
ported in CONUS close to our heavy maneuver forces. Conversely, heavy maneuver
forces that are forward based today require sealift to transit from CONUS, pick up
those forces at their forward location, and then transport them to area of oper-
ations— requiring more time than a direct movement from CONUS.
With regard to high-speed sealift, the DOD has not yet fielded a high-speed sealift
capability; however, the Navy and Army will field intra-theater high-speed vessels
beginning fiscal year 2011. Further, the Navy currently has additional R&D funding
in the POM for strategic highspeed sealift development and the Air Force continues
its programmed acquisition of the C-17 airlifter. These programs are essential to
our National Security Strategy force-planning construct and the Strategic Planning
Guidance (SPG) 10-30-30 planning goal.
REDUCED ENGAGEMENT
6. Senator McCain. General Myers, the Global Force Posture will replace forward
presence with periodic exercises. How will we maintain our level of engagement
with reduced familiarity and personal contact with our allies?
General Myers. One of the goals of the global posture strategy is to promote the
expansion of allied roles by encouraging new partnerships. A key ingredient to
maintaining and increasing U.S. level of engagement lies in the combatant com-
mander's ability to improve their existing theater unique Theater Security Coopera-
tion (TSC) programs by cultivating new as well as standing relationships. The
COCOM's ability to place U.S. forces in strategic locations, allows the U.S. to influ-
ence regional security ultimately preventing war.
Global posture strategies will incorporate assured readiness through efficient glob-
al force management practices. In the recent past, the U.S. has been very successful
in developing coalition relationships through rotational presence in exercises such
87
as: Immediate Response, Cobra Gold, Ulchi-Focus Lens, and Bright Star exercises.
Expanding on these bilateral and multilateral exercises, combatant commanders
will continue to build upon the interoperability between U.S. and allied forces and
help spur allied transformation initiatives. These exercises will also test our ability
to project forces, exercise the defense transportation systems, and evaluate our en
route infrastructure's ability to receive, stage, and integrate U.S. forces in various
environments. There is no realistic simulation for this experience.
Our new global posture strategy will not only increase coalition warfighting skills
aimed at deterrence, it will also allow for U.S. forces to influence and access areas
where we can better battle ideological terrorist underpinnings. In short, our new
strategy implies realigning forces, not necessarily withdrawing them.
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
7. Senator McCain. General Jones, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has strained
some of our relations with European allies. I am concerned about the timing for the
implementation of the Global Force Posture. Is this the best time to start realigning
our posture in Europe?
General Jones. Yes, it is imperative that we begin to realign our force posture
across our theater to more accurately reflect today's security environment. The fun-
damental objective of our plan is to increase United States European Command's
strategic effect through a fundamental realignment of basing concepts, access, and
force capabilities.
In no way does our posture realignment signal a reduced commitment or interest
in our theater. Moreover, our European allies understand the rationale for changing
our footprint. We have communicated with our alliance partners on many levels the
need to adopt new methods to better protect our collective interests in today's inter-
national security environment to include the realignment of our forces and bases in
theater. We simply cannot afford to remain in a defensive posture that is no longer
relevant. Transforming the theater will strengthen our commitment to the NATO
alliance and serve as a model upon which our allies can base their own trans-
formation. This mutually beneficial arrangement can increase the ability of the alli-
ance and partner nations to respond to security challenges well into the century.
The timing of our realignment is critical as well. In the Secretary of Defense's
September 2004 Report to Congress; the "Global defense posture changes will have
direct implications for the forthcoming round of Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC)." It is my belief that BRAC and global posture transformation are inter-
dependent processes, and that this is an optimum time to begin implementation of
our proposed plan. When completed, our realigned posture will improve our ability
to meet our alliance commitments and global responsibilities.
As we proceed, we will retain the flexibility to adjust the scope and breadth of
our transformation as strategic circumstances dictate. We will work closely with
Congress to ensure that you remain full partners in this important endeavor.
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REALIGNMENT IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
8. Senator McCain. Admiral Fargo, the Global Force Posture is a demonstrable
shift of focus from Europe to the Pacific, which may well be warranted. What signal
will the realignment of forces within your theater send to China and our allies in
Asia?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment on this ex-
tremely important matter.
In Asia and the Pacific, vibrant economies, burgeoning populations, maturing de-
mocracies, and military modernization only serve to add momentum to regional
transformation and increase the need for new security strategies.
In response to this changing environment, Pacific Command undertook efforts,
with the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to operationalize our national secu-
rity strategy and strengthen both our global and theater defense posture.
I believe that China, as well as our friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region,
will interpret the realignment of our forces as a signal of our enduring commitment
to peace and stability in the region. The realignment of our forces is intended to
enhance our capability to respond to contingencies, to long-standing security com-
mitments in the region, and to defeat terrorism and other transnational threats.
We must continue to assure our friends and allies, and dissuade and deter poten-
tial adversaries. Overall, the realignment of forces should signal to our friends and
others that the U.S. has long-term interests in the Asia-Pacific region and is adjust-
ing our force structure to reflect those enduring interests.
88
PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. FORCES-KOREA TROOP REDUCTIONS IN ASIA
9. Senator McCain. General LaPorte, for over 50 years U.S. forces have main-
tained a stalemate on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). What signal do you think we
will be sending to Asia as a whole with the troop reductions you have planned?
General LaPorte. The reduction of American troops from Korea should not be
viewed as a lessening of our commitment to the Republic of Korea or Asia, in actual-
ity the converse is true. The enhance, shape and align transformation plan of the
United States Forces Korea (USFK) is congruent with the Defense Department's
new Global Posture Review, which leverages our improved capabilities to increase
our readiness and deterrence, while supporting an enduring United States military
presence in the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. This message has been clear-
ly explained to America's allies and friends in Asia, who have expressed their appre-
ciation for our improved efforts at maintaining stability in the region while consider-
ing their unique situations.
In Korea, our planned enhancements, realignments, and troop reductions are in-
tended to strengthen our combined defense of the Republic of Korea while creating
a less intrusive military footprint. No longer is the number of troops on the ground
an appropriate metric for measuring U.S. combat capability and American commit-
ment. The reduction of troops from the United States Forces Korea is representative
of a combined transformation of capabilities. This transformation empowers Repub-
lic of Korea forces with missions and tasks that they are both willing and capable
of performing, while simultaneously unencumbering U.S. forces to enable strategic
flexibility for both within the Pacific region and globally.
10. Senator McCain. General LaPorte, I understand that the Army is announcing
this afternoon that the 3,700 person 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry
Division will be temporarily relocated from Korea to Fort Carson, Colorado, upon
their return from OIF in the fall of 2005. How will this announcement be perceived
by Seoul after their government has requested a 2-year delay in force reductions on
the Peninsula?
General LaPorte. Troop reduction consultations between the United States and
the Republic of Korea have been ongoing since early June of this year. The deploy-
ment announcement of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, like other troop reduction
announcements that are forthcoming, represents the harmony of our ROK-U.S. joint
consultation efforts.
Specifically, on August 20, 2004, at the conclusion of the 11th meeting of the Fu-
ture of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance Policy Initiative (commonly
called FOTA), Richard Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs for Asia and Pacific and his negotiating counterpart Dr.
Ahn Kwang-Chan, Deputy Minister of Defense (MND) for Policy held a joint press
session in Seoul, where, among other items, they announced the deployment of the
2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 2nd Infantry Division to Iraq. During this
joint press session, Dr. Ahn indicated that the 2nd BCT would not be returning to
Korea as its deployment was a portion of USFK's permanent troop reductions.
On October 4, the ROK MND and U.S. DOD concluded USFK troop reduction con-
sultations, publicly announcing on 6 October a 5-year reduction plan that includes
a USFK reduction of 5,000 troops in 2004, 3,000 troops in 2005, 2,000 troops in
2006, and 2,500 troops between 2007 and 2008. The duration of this reduction plan
is in harmony with the modernization plans of the ROK military, and has been well
received by the ROK government.
Question Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
military capabilities standards
11. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your testimony you state that "sheer
numbers of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or capabili-
ties." One of the six principal strategic considerations in the Global Posture Review
states that "effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel and platforms,
are what create decisive military effects and will enable the United States to exe-
cute its security commitments globally." While I understand your point, Iraq dem-
onstrates that numbers do matter. As I'm sure you will recall, General Eric
Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, warned prior to the war that it might take
several hundred thousand troops to secure post-war Iraq. Had General Shinseki's
advice been heeded, would we currently be dealing with the level of insurgency we
see now?
89
Secretary Rumsfeld. While numbers do matter, applying the correct capabilities
to the problem remains the most appropriate response. I believe we have the appro-
priately-sized multi-national force, which in concert with expanding capabilities
demonstrated by the growing Iraqi security forces, will continue to be the right force
for executing the military component of an effective counterinsurgency.
The current level of insurgency is a combination of several factors — fighters com-
prised from former regime elements, religious extremists, and others, each of whom
also receives support from the criminal elements present in the country. These
groups have exhibited the capability to organize and execute operations against coa-
lition forces, Iraqi security forces, and most recently against Iraqi civilians. Some
operations indicate a small level of cooperation among the various groups, although
they are more likely due to convenience rather than shared ideological aims.
Effective counterinsurgency, however, requires more than a military response. In
fact, the military component should be a supporting arm to the more pressing lines
of operation such as economic development, infrastructure enhancement, and the de-
velopment and sustainment of good governance and a strong judicial system. Gen-
eral Casey and Ambassador Negroponte have correctly identified these elements —
in support of the Iraqi Interim Government's aims — to continue to reduce the level
of the insurgency by progress in creating jobs, supporting the electoral process, and
improving the infrastructure while conducting security operations to eliminate the
hard-line insurgents and retain control of key areas of the country.
To achieve these aims requires us to continue to support the efforts of the Multi-
National Forces-Iraq, our country team, and the efforts of our coalition partners to
provide the overt backing to the Iraqi Interim Government and create irreversible
positive momentum. The capabilities we provide — security forces, money, expertise,
diplomatic initiatives, and others — provide a synergistic effect that is greater than
the single factor of number of soldiers on the ground.
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
iraqi militias
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, at the Department of Defense briefing on
April 12, 2004, General Sanchez, with General Abizaid at his side, said "the mission
of U.S. forces is to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr." Is killing or capturing Sadr
still the mission? If not, when did it change and why?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A number of things have happened regarding Muqtada al
Sadr since Lieutenant General Sanchez made the statement to which you refer. The
most important is that subsequent to the August 2004 confrontation in Najaf be-
tween U.S. forces and militiamen loyal to al Sadr, al Sadr and his lieutenants have
entered the Iraqi political process and have largely ceased their former violent ac-
tivities. Al Sadr's connection to the murder of Grand Ayatollah Al Khoie and other
crimes are in the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Interim Government.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is your strategy for dealing with
Sadr's Mahdi army and other militias?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our strategy is to attempt to disband all Iraqi militias and
to bring the constituencies they represent in the Iraqi political process. Our pref-
erence is to do this through negotiation where possible. But if any militia engages
in hostile action towards U.S. and coalition forces we are prepared to forcibly disarm
them.
IRAQI VETO
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is there an Iraqi veto on U.S. actions?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No. U.S. and coalition forces that comprise the Multi-
national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are in Iraq at the invitation of the Interim Iraqi Gov-
ernment, and operate under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution (UNSCR) 1546. UNSCR 1546 provides a unified command authority for
MNF-I, under which Iraqi forces serve as equal partners alongside forces from more
than 30 nations. Although MNF-I commanders work in close consultation with the
Interim Government through participation in organs such as the Ministerial Com-
mittee for National Security, Iraqi leaders do not have a veto over the actions of
coalition forces in Iraq.
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AFGHANISTAN
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is the U.S. troop strength and funding
sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan and allow elections to proceed, to reverse the drug
trade, and to capture Osama bin Laden, and if so, why haven't we done any of these
things?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. troop strength is sufficient to accomplish the U.S. stra-
tegic goals in Afghanistan. The U.S. has helped the Afghan government prepare a
comprehensive presidential election security plan involving U.S., coalition, and Af-
ghan security forces. U.S. efforts to counter the Afghan drug trade are underway:
the U.S. approach is that counternarcotics in Afghanistan is a law-enforcement mis-
sion for which the military can play a supporting role. However, a successful coun-
ternarcotics program is a long-term enterprise, requiring a concerted effort in a
number of areas over time. The U.S. supports the U.K. as the international lead
for Afghan counternarcotics. Efforts to capture Osama Bin Laden continue.
MILITARY TACTICS IN IRAQ
16. Senator Levin. General Myers, earlier this week, Iraqi terrorists beheaded yet
another American citizen in Iraq. Upwards of 250 Iraqis have been reported killed
in the last few days in suicide attacks, car bombings, roadside ambushes, and
kidnapings. Meanwhile, the U.S. has made airstrikes against Fallujah, which evi-
dently have not caused the terrorists to stop their attacks, but have reportedly re-
sulted in dozens more Iraqi civilian deaths. U.S. officials assert that most of the
Iraqis being killed in airstrikes are terrorists — many Iraqis appear to believe other-
wise. It seems to me that our military tactics are not working in Iraq — and in fact
it seems as though these airstrikes, while they may kill a few bona-fide terrorists,
also cause more Iraqis to hate the U.S., and result in more of them being drawn
in to the fight against us. Don't you agree that such attacks may be counter-produc-
tive and may be producing more support for the insurgency, and perhaps creating
more terrorists and insurgents than we are killing?
General Myers. Recent airstrikes in Fallujah have all been against credible ter-
rorist targets. In each, collateral damage was mitigated through precise planning
based on confirmed intelligence and the use of precision-guided munitions. Analysis
of potential collateral damage is part of pre-strike approval process and commanders
consider planning aspects such as timing and type of munitions to minimize poten-
tial for civilian casualties. All means available are used to prevent collateral dam-
age.
Military operations are a viable and effective mechanism for dismantling the
Zarqawi network. These strikes are surgical in nature. While it is possible that indi-
viduals located nearby may have been injured, it is Zarqawi and his fighters that
place the people of Fallujah at risk by hiding among them. Information on civilian
casualties should be carefully scrutinized for accuracy. Some stories of civilian cas-
ualties are prefabricated and part of a Zarqawi propaganda campaign. Intelligence
from previous strikes have concluded the following techniques are used by Zarqawi
associates to misrepresent events:
• Ambulances taking supposed civilian casualties to the hospital several
hours after the attack has occurred.
• Blood displayed for effect and in a manner inconsistent with the number
of casualties described or known.
• Using civilians as human shields to include capturing civilians against
their will when under attack.
• In one recent strike (September 28), Fallujah hospital officials reported
casualties before a coalition strike occurred. Although witnesses reported
coalition forces had fired rockets into the city, coalition forces only fired illu-
mination rounds.
• In an October 8 strike on a Zarqawi safe house, hospital officials reported
mass casualties from a coalition strike, including claims that a wedding
party was being held at the location. However, prior to the operation, no
activity related to such a gathering was observed or noted by intelligence
collection. After the strike, no personnel related to any rescue attempts for
a wedding party was observed or noted.
These precision air strikes have not only been effective in dismantling the
Zarqawi network, these airstrikes and other MNF-I operations have disrupted the
Zarqawi network, thus limiting Zarqawi's tactics of intimidation, death, and destruc-
tion in Fallujah. Regarding public support, the overwhelming majority of Fallujah's
citizens have been repulsed by the atrocities that Zarqawi and other extremists
91
have made commonplace in Iraq. The foreign militants are thought to produce the
car bombs that now explode around Iraq several times a day, and Zarqawi's organi-
zation has asserted responsibility for the slaying of several Westerners, some of
which were shown in videos posted on the internet. In his most heinous crime,
Zarqawi claimed credit for the September 30 car bombing of more than 34 children
at a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Baghdad for a sewage treatment facility. Recent ne-
gotiations in Fallujah between the Iraqi Interim Government and local leaders indi-
cate the desire for stability and security in Fallujah. The citizens of Fallujah are
tired of terrorism and the pain Zarqawi has inflicted on the city.
WAR ON TERROR
17. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your global war on terrorism memo of
October 16, 2003, that was leaked to the press, you asked "Are we capturing, killing,
or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the
radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" Given the level
of violence and the number of attacks against coalition forces and ordinary Iraqis
today, how would you answer your own question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We and our Iraqi allies are winning. Coalition and Iraqi
forces are seeking out the enemy and taking the fight to them. We are also working
to mitigate the effects of those enemy attacks that our offensive operations do not
stop. A new Iraq is taking shape and it offers the Iraqi people a more hopeful future
than they have known in the past 35 years; the Iraqi people want to move forward
into that hopeful future, not return to their terrifying past. The majority of Iraqis
support the new Iraq and recruiting for the Iraqi security forces remains strong. I
think many potential or past insurgents have been deterred or dissuaded and we
see evidence that the enemy's recruiting within Iraq has become much more dif-
ficult.
INTERNATIONAL TROOPS IN IRAQ
18. Senator Levin. General Myers, high level military officers have told me that
national governments are placing severe restrictions on the international troops de-
ployed to Iraq. What is the nature of these restrictions?
General Myers. Several countries have imposed restrictions on the types of tasks
their forces in Iraq can perform. In many cases, limitations were required in order
to get parliamentary/legislative approval for tbe commitment of forces. In other
cases, there are legal limits on the types of tasks a particular nation can perform.
Most of the restrictions center on the ability to conduct offensively oriented missions
such as raids, ambushes, and attacks outside of assigned operating areas.
19. Senator Levin. General Myers, do restrictions placed on international troops
in Iraq limit their usefulness?
General Myers. Requirements to gain national level authority for cordon and
search missions, raids and counterterror operations have limited force effectiveness
and complicated command and control. Simply put, the operational constraints
placed on some forces make it difficult to deal effectively with the security chal-
lenges we face.
20. Senator Levin. General Myers, have you made any effort with your coalition
counterparts to remove these restrictions?
General Myers. In April 2004, I sent personal letters to 23 of my multinational
force counterparts asking each of them to review the rules of engagement they were
operating under. In particular, I asked them to approve the use of force (including
deadly force) to prevent interference with the mission to establish a safe and secure
environment in Iraq as well as the use of force against military and/or para-military
forces declared hostile by the multinational forces in Iraq. I also asked that the abil-
ity to conduct these operations not be contingent on prior approval from national
authorities. While some countries modified their rules of engagement, most re-
sponded that they were unable to for political or legal reasons.
IRAQ ELECTIONS
21. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you agree with U.N. Secretary-General
Annan's statement that under the current security conditions in Iraq it is difficult
to conduct credible elections?
92
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that it will be difficult logistically to conduct elec-
tions in an environment in which Baathist and al Qaeda terrorists are willing to
commit horrifying atrocities in order to prevent Iraqis from expressing freedom on
political expression and selecting a representative government. But we do not have
to look any further than the terrorists' own words to see that they feel any election
in Iraq would be credible. In the letter written by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to his al
Qaeda associates in Afghanistan, which we captured January 2004, Zarqawi wrote
that democracy would be suffocating to his murderous campaign in Iraq. The terror-
ists fear that Iraqis will regain a sense of ownership of their country after years
of Saddam's tyranny, and will be more willing to fight back. Thus, it is quite likely
that we will actually see a surge in attacks as the terrorists attempt to derail the
electoral process in Iraq.
But just because something is difficult does not mean it is not worth doing. On
the contrary, I believe that the terrorist campaign of violence and intimidation is
a sign of how strategically significant holding elections will be, and why we are on
the right track in Iraq.
STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIREMENTS
22. Senator Levin. General Myers, what impact does the proposed global force
structure have on our strategic lift requirements?
General Myers. We are currently in the middle of a mobility capabilities study
that will help us determine the mobility capabilities that we need to support the
defense strategy. This study is designed to look at the entire defense transportation
system from the point-of-origin to the foxhole and to help determine not only our
strategic lift needs but also what we need to support the forces within the theater.
The study is projected to report out in March 2005.
23. Senator Levin. General Myers, how many additional, or how many less, airlift
aircraft and sealift ships will be necessary to support the proposed global force
structure?
General Myers. We are currently in the middle of a mobility capabilities study
that will help us determine the mobility capabilities that we need to support the
defense strategy. This study, which is focused on 2012, is due to report out in March
2005. It will address the impacts of the Global Force Posture and will help us deter-
mine what we need to transport our forces.
BUDGET CONTROL OVER CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
24. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs recently completed marking up a bill on reforming the Intelligence Commu-
nity. The bill would make a number of reforms, including creating a new "National
Intelligence Program", and adding substantial authority to the position of National
Intelligence Director to control funds and personnel (civilian and military) within
that program. Included in the National Intelligence Program would be all of the
funding for the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Do you believe that a new National
Intelligence Director should have budget control of all funding of these agencies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Since the August 17 hearing, the President has issued Exec-
utive Order 13355, "Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community,"
which expands the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over reprogram-
ming of intelligence funds. On September 8, the White House announced that the
President supports providing this expanded authority to a newly created National
Intelligence Director.
IMPACT ON DEPLOYMENT TIMES
25. Senator Levin. General Myers, one of the key questions with respect to these
proposals is how they impact our ability to support operations in the U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) region where the chances of instability leading to the use
of the military are the highest. Please provide, in both classified and unclassified
form, the Department's analysis of this issue, including how long it took to deploy
our forces, people, and equipment, from Germany to the CENTCOM region for Oper-
ation Iraqi Freedom, along with your analysis of how long it would take to deploy
those same forces from the United States in a comparable scenario.
General Myers. [Deleted.]
93
RELIEF FOR NEAR-TERM STRESS ON THE FORCE
26. Senator Levin. General Myers, today our entire active Army, and a significant
portion of the National Guard and Reserve, is tied up with our deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Does this plan do anything to improve our ability to support these
current force levels if we are forced to do so for years to come?
General Myers. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) are
not designed to increase force levels. However, it will facilitate more effective use
of the force to respond rapidly globally.
As we Testation the force to meet expeditionary demands, we will facilitate more
time in the United States for families and fewer moves for our service members.
Over the next decade IGPBS will result in the closure of hundreds of U.S. facilities
overseas. This will in turn bring home up to 70,000 uniformed personnel and nearly
100,000 family members and civilian employees. Service members will have more
time on the home front and fewer moves over a career. Military spouses will experi-
ence fewer job changes and have greater stability for their families.
There are several other initiatives underway within the Department of Defense
to relieve stress on the force, and thereby improve our ability to support operational
demands, by making more of the current force available for deployments and high
demand activities. These include, but are not limited to, military-to-civilian conver-
sions, rebalancing of the Reserve components, and Army modularity.
The Department is converting 20,070 military positions to civilian or contractor
positions in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These conversions occur in positions where
the work is not deemed inherently military in nature. This makes more military
personnel available to the Service Chiefs for more critical military tasks. The De-
partment is studying the feasibility of expanding this initiative in fiscal year 2006
and beyond.
Rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. We are
currently assessing our force structure and rebalancing within the Reserve compo-
nents and between the active and Reserve components. The purpose is to move
forces from low demand to high demand specialties thereby improving readiness and
deployability. From fiscal year 2003 to 2009, approximately 58,000 positions will be
rebalanced in this manner. These rebalancing efforts will shift forces to critical spe-
cialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, Special Forces,
and Intelligence while divesting Cold War structure to enable the global war on ter-
rorism capability.
The Army is shifting from a division-based force to a modular combat brigade cen-
tric construct. In doing so, the Army will increase its operational capability from its
current 33 brigade force to a 43 brigade force with the flexibility to add additional
brigades if required. This effort began in fiscal year 2004 and is scheduled for com-
pletion in fiscal year 2010. By adding 10 (or more) additional active brigades, the
Army will increase the rotation base of units available for deployment and further
reduce the burden on active and Reserve soldiers.
Military-to-civilian conversions, rebalancing of the force, Army modularity,
IGPBS, all combined, have a significant positive impact on the force. They greatly
increase warfighting capabilities where gaps currently exist, and increase the rota-
tional base of units available for deployment. The net result is a reduction in the
OPTEMPO on active and Reserve component soldiers, more time in the United
States for families, and fewer moves for servicemembers.
COST OF THE PROPOSALS TO REALIGN OUR FORCES
27. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, please provide your analysis of the likely
cost of these proposals to realign our forces over the next 5 years, to include a de-
scription of the elements that will affect costs and savings such as relocation costs,
military construction costs here in the U.S., the impact on military pay and benefits
such as permanent change of station and family separation payments, the impact
on prepositioning and logistic operations, and the impact on our mobility require-
ments.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The changes to global posture under consideration are fo-
cused on positioning U.S. forces to better meet 21st century challenges — and par-
ticularly to conduct the global war on terrorism — while helping to ease the burden
of the post-September 11 operational tempo on our Armed Forces. The new posture
will base and deploy U.S. forces and prepositioned stocks to enhance global respon-
siveness.
Cost estimates are continually being refined as implementation plans develop.
The range of current estimates is $9 billion to $12 billion in net costs for all pro-
jected posture changes through fiscal year 2011.
94
Many of the force realignments under consideration fall within the scope of the
BRAC process. The estimate for such "BRAC-related" moves is $5 billion to $6 bil-
lion in net costs. This estimate includes relocation and construction costs in the
United States, changes to military housing allowances, as well as savings from clos-
ing overseas facilities. As precise locations are identified — and plans mature — more
detailed cost assessments will be prepared.
IMPACT ON TROOP ROTATION PLANS AND FAMILY SEPARATION
28. Senator Levin. General Myers, please provide the Department's analysis of
the impact of these proposals on troop rotation plans and of the extent to which it
will increase or decrease family separation.
General Myers. One of the key aspects of the DOD force deployment goal for glob-
al sourcing, to include Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, is the
dwell time concept. Dwell time ensures the members of the military deployed to any
contingency operation spend an equal amount of time at home station as they do
while deployed. The goal for dwell time is, at a minimum, a 1:1 ratio (e.g., one day
at home station for each day deployed). Whenever possible, forces are chosen to de-
ploy based upon longest home station dwell time. This goal is a result of DOD anal-
ysis of recent troop rotations.
INTELLIGENCE reorganization
29. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a number of concerns about the
intelligence reorganization bill being marked up in the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs this week. Please provide your views on this bill.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I support the position put forward by the President.
KOREA — REDUCTIONS WITHOUT NORTH KOREAN CONCESSIONS
30. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, why are we proceeding with withdrawing
troops from the DMZ and reducing the total number of U.S. forces in South Korea
without seeking some sort of concession from North Korea, including, for example,
a withdrawal of North Korean troops from their side of the DMZ?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our realignment of troops in Korea is long overdue. For
more than a decade, ROK forces have had the overwhelmingly predominant role of
securing the DMZ, while we have maintained only a small force actually on the
DMZ in the vicinity of Panmunjom. The mission of that small security force is now
being transferred to the ROK.
The realignment of the U.S. Second Infantry Division into areas further south not
only recognizes the ROK's predominant role in their defense, but also allows us to
consolidate our forces and leverage their increasing capabilities.
These increasing capabilities, of both the ROK and U.S. forces, is what allows us
to confidently redeploy a portion of the U.S. troop presence with no decrease in the
deterrent and defense posture of our combined force. Indeed, when the realignment
and our capability enhancements are fully examined, there is a net increase in our
overall deterrent and defensive capabilities.
The leadership in North Korea understands this.
STATIONING FORCES IN CENTCOM REGION
31. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is it your intention at this time to perma-
nently station combat forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our intention is to provide presence without permanence in
the CENTCOM AOR. We will have a robust network of headquarters to oversee a
rotational presence of our rapidly deployable forces so that we can continue to as-
sure our allies and deter aggression in this critical region. We will rely increasingly
on forward operating sites and host-nation cooperative security locations to enable
us to have rapid access into various parts of the region without impinging on local
sensitivities via a large military footprint.
LEGAL AND POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS IN BASING COUNTRIES
32. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony states that an absence of
legal and political restrictions is a factor on where we want to station our troops.
It is easy for nations to indicate up front that they intend to be agreeable to letting
95
us stage from their countries to conduct military operations. But when a specific
contingency arises in the future, aren't you going to have to go back to those host
countries and get specific approval for that specific operation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is vital to have comprehensive legal and logistical ar-
rangements in place, prior to a contingency arising, with a broad range of friends
and allies so that we have maximum flexibility to pursue operations globally — so
that the absence of support from a single ally does not hinder our ability to pros-
ecute a contingency operation.
33. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, is this plan optimized for small-scale op-
erations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This plan provides us the flexibility to prosecute the full
range of military operations globally.
34. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony describes the need to
transform our forces to meet asymmetric challenges and states a desire to shift from
having our forces arranged to fight large armies, navies, or air forces to one that
can respond to small enemy cells. Is this plan built around the assumption that we
need to shift the focus of our military to increase its ability to conduct smaller scale
operations against terrorists or guerilla movements, and that we can and should de-
emphasize our capability to conduct larger scale military operations against nation-
states?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This plan is built around the assumption that we must con-
tinue to transform our military capabilities to be able to meet the full range of chal-
lenges that may confront us, both large scale and small scale, and both traditional
and non-traditional. Our overseas posture will emphasize rapidly deployable early-
entry capabilities in forward locations, with heavier follow-on forces concentrated in
the United States, from where they will have global reach.
U.S. ABILITY TO HANDLE ANOTHER CONFLICT
35. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, the war in Iraq and the continuing, unre-
solved conflict in Afghanistan are putting enormous stress on the U.S. military, es-
pecially the Army. Prior to these wars, our military strategy was based on being
able to counter an unforeseen conflict, such as one started by North Korea. How
would the U.S. respond to such an unforeseen conflict and where would we get the
extra troops to support such a third war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our current defense strategy calls for the ability to conduct
two nearly simultaneous overlapping campaigns to swiftly defeat aggression and
deny an adversary's strategic objectives. If the Armed Forces were required to do
this while still engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, current forces in
place would remain and we would globally source capabilities to the second conflict
as appropriate. In your example, we are already in the process of realigning our
forces on the Korean Peninsula to better posture ourselves to support the Republic
of Korea in the event of North Korean aggression. The capabilities we would employ
would depend on the nature of the North Korean aggression and the needs of the
Republic of Korea, consistent with our treaty obligations.
36. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, how would we make more troops available
in time without sacrificing our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense has several strategic initiatives
underway that will address this issue. First, the Department is in the process of
transitioning the force management process from a regional to a global system.
Global Force Management (GFM) will ensure the Secretary of Defense is presented
allocation recommendations to support combatant commander requirements in
terms of force availability and associated risk. GFM will also prioritize combatant
commander requirements to ensure ongoing operations are sourced to the required
levels while offering mitigation options to counter assumed risk. In short, GFM will
ensure OIF and OEF are sourced to the level required by the combatant com-
mander.
Second, the Department is instituting myriad OIF/OEF lessons learned initiatives
to reduce stress on the force. This includes military-to-civilian conversion, active
component/Reserve component (AC/RC) realignment, force structure adjustments,
and transformation initiatives in the U.S. Army that will increase the number of
combat brigades from 33 to 43. These initiatives — once implemented — will combine
to reduce stress on the force to ensure current operations can be sustained without
adversely affecting long-term readiness.
96
Finally, DOD is in the process of assessing U.S. military presence and missions
around the world. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will realign
the global posture to address the current geo-strategic environment. The end result
will be the rebasing of approximately 60,000 U.S. servicemembers from overseas to
the continental United States. This realignment will ensure more of the force is
trained and ready to support rotational requirements — to include OIF and OEF.
37. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, given current end-strength, how long do
you believe the Marine Corps and Army can sustain current rotation schedules in
Iraq before both Services are severely damaged?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD force deployment goals for Operations Iraqi Free-
dom and Enduring Freedom were developed to ensure the U.S. Army and U.S. Ma-
rine Corps can maintain the current rotation schedules. Additionally, the Joint Staff
and U.S. Central Command continue to plan for future deployments in order to
make certain the Services can provide anticipated force levels without degradation
to recruitment, training, and readiness. This planning is conducted collaboratively
with the Services.
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
locations of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Fargo, in your discussions with the Japanese
government regarding the Global Posture Review, did you raise the issue of the per-
manent stationing of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Japan and has a firm de-
cision been made yet? If not, what is the status of negotiations or discussions with
the Japanese government or military regarding this issue?
Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for your interest in this sensitive issue. Re-
placement of the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) has been a separate item outside of our pos-
ture review discussions with the government of Japan (GO J). The final decision on
Kitty Hawk's replacement has not been made but we hope to replace her with one
of our most advanced, most capable carriers. Such a replacement would maximize
the ability to meet future security concerns, communicate a strong deterrent to
would-be aggressors, and demonstrate our indelible commitment to the alliance and
the defense of Japan. As with other force posture decisions, a change would be man-
aged in full consultation with the GOJ.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, since arriving in the U.S. Senate,
I have consistently argued that the Nation needed to reduce its strategic risk in the
stationing of aircraft carriers on the Atlantic coast by committing to no fewer than
two bases capable of home-porting nuclear aircraft carriers. The Navy has resisted
congressional pressure on this issue as far back as the 1980s, while at the same
time it established a second Pacific coast nuclear carrier base in San Diego, Califor-
nia. I find this an interesting contrast in strategic purpose and programs between
the two coasts and over the security of the carrier fleet. From a strategic perspec-
tive, why would we need two nuclear carrier bases on the Pacific coast and not on
the Atlantic?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Navy currently has two east coast carrier home ports
to meet U.S. strategic objectives, one conventional and one nuclear capable with the
future retirement of U.S. conventional carriers, the DOD is evaluating and consider-
ing the potential of having two east coast nuclear capable carrier home ports.
40. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, on March 2, 2004, in a question
for the record, I asked Secretary England if the Navy had performed any analysis
of the current strategic conditions, force protection, and risk relative to the estab-
lishment of a second base on the Atlantic coast for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
In his response he stated this was underway as part of the U.S. military's Global
Posture Review. Has this review identified a requirement for strategic dispersion of
the east coast nuclear aircraft carrier fleet?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are proposed moves in the Global Defense Posture Re-
port to Congress that address moving the relocation of aircraft carriers and carrier
assets. However, the dispersion of aircraft carriers within CONUS was not a subject
of the report. Any relocation determination of CONUS carriers will be dependent
on recommendations from the upcoming BRAC process.
97
U.S. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
41. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Washington Post reported on
Monday, September 20 that a U.S. delegation, led by William Burns, Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, met with Syrian officials to discuss efforts
to stabilize Syria's 450-mile border with Iraq. I returned from the region in January
2004, and Secretary Powell and Ambassadors in the region all impressed upon me
that this issue— Arab fighters flooding Iraq across the Syrian border— should be our
paramount security concern. What military engagement is possible with Syria on
the border issue?
Secretary Rumsfeld. An interagency U.S. delegation headed by State Department
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs William Burns and Assistant Secretary of
Defense Peter Rodman met in Damascus with Syrian leaders on September 11. The
purpose of the visit was to convey a blunt message to President Asad regarding Syr-
ian behavior in Iraq. We told President Asad that U.S.-Syrian relations would face
further deterioration should Syria continue to undermine stability in Iraq. If Syria
wanted to avoid a crisis in our relations, Syria would have to prevent the movement
of jihadis and insurgents to and from Syria, and clamp down on insurgents organiz-
ing in and operating out of Syria. President Asad assured us that it was his inten-
tion to do so, but said he required assistance. Our current military engagement with
Syria on border security is really a test. We are working with the Syrians and the
Iraqis to establish patrolling mechanisms and intelligence sharing on border-related
issues. Of course, border security is just a symptom of the larger problem: that
former Iraqi regime elements have been operating without constraint from Syria.
We are watching Syrian actions closely, and will continue to do so in the coming
weeks, to ensure that the effort is sustained.
42. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what in your view are the pros-
pects for cooperation given Syria's behavior in the past?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Syria remains an authoritarian government that admin-
isters a robust clandestine WMD program, and is a state sponsor of terrorism and
occupies its neighbor, Lebanon. For the past IV2 years, elements within key institu-
tions in Syria have been making great efforts to undermine the stability of Iraq.
Syrian cooperation with Iraq and the U.S. would be a welcome change in Syrian pol-
icy.
[Whereupon, at 6:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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